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Abstract 
This thesis studies the developments in the Eurozone crisis from different 
perspectives. The first chapter studies the determinants of fiscal fatigue: the fact 
that some countries, after a period of implementing a fiscal adjustment may 
decide to stop adjusting if public debt keeps rising in spite of the adjustment. This 
result could reflect in part the fact that growth has a particularly damaging effect 
on the fiscal balance, so that in fact the effort needed to maintain debt 
sustainability becomes greater and difficult to achieve. 
A key takeaway from the first chapter regards the limits of fiscal policy in the 
context of a country that is a member of a currency area struck by a financial 
crisis. In such a setting, non linearities emerge in the effect of growth on the fiscal 
balance and a previously sound fiscal position can spiral out of control quickly.  
In order to limit this effect, it is essential to build sound institutions and fiscal room 
for manoeuver before the crisis. This is because fiscal policy can become quickly 
constraint in a crisis. Furthermore, as the market adjusts rapidly to the changes 
in debt sustainability, the deterioration of fiscal fundamentals and in particular the 
increase in the cost of funds can accelerate. 
The results of this chapter suggest the ex-ante position and hence limiting the 
extent of the downturn becomes essential to navigate turbulent times. This is true 
not just in terms of the fiscal stance, but also regarding the institutional make up. 
By starting from a stronger starting point, sovereigns are better positioned to 
avoid negative debt dynamics during the downturn. 
It is not just sovereigns that change their behavior when they are hit by a financial 
crisis. Banks also alter their behavior in times of financial stress. In the second 
chapter we explore the drivers of the rise in sovereign bond holdings in stressed 
Eurozone countries at the height of the sovereign debt crisis. The previous 
literature has considered that a rise in sovereign bond holdings deepens the 
downturn, by increasing the credit crunch and so detracting resources from the 
private sector. 
Our analysis studies how the drivers of sovereign debt holdings are different in 
normal times to the dynamics during a financial crisis. Through the use of a 
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regime-switching equation, we find that banks change the sovereign bond 
demand function only in specific periods of particularly acute stress. Our analysis 
suggests the main driver of the rise in sovereign bond holdings was rising 
sovereign stress. Alternative hypotheses, such as search for yield or regulatory 
incentives did not seem to play a role in the rise of sovereign bond holdings. In 
fact, it is sovereign stress rather than a rise in yields that seems to cause the 
increase in sovereign holdings. 
In a similar context, the third paper finds that the increase of sovereign holdings 
did not play a major role in the connectivity between banks and sovereigns. We 
find distress in the sovereign is much better correlated than holdings with 
connectivity amongst these two entities. This is found by employing the 
connectivity framework developed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), which shows 
how certain policy initiatives, and in particular, decisive action by the ECB had a 
substantial effect on the reduction of the sovereign – bank nexus.  
The third paper shows that connectivity evolves during a crisis. As such, the 
appropriate policy response to the crisis can be quite difficult to implement. For 
instance, banks that do not seem systemic in normal times, and that do not have 
a substantial contribution to banking sector stress in tranquil times, can become 
a concern in stressful times and eventually have a systemic impact. 
Overall, our thesis shows how the relationships between the sovereign and 
financial institutions change in crisis periods. As a result, both fiscal and 
prudential policy may become ineffective in such periods. Since the policy options 
available to mitigate the stress in the Eurozone are limited, the role of monetary 
policy becomes all the more important. To the extent that active monetary policy 
can mitigate financial stress, it can be quite useful first, in avoiding negative fiscal 
dynamics, second, reducing bank holdings of sovereign bonds during the periods 
of acute stress, and third, the increase in the bank-sovereign nexus. 
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Resumen 
Esta tesis estudia la evolución de la crisis de la eurozona desde diferentes 
perspectivas. El primer capítulo estudia los determinantes de la fatiga fiscal: el 
proceso por el que algunos países, después de un período de ajuste fiscal sin 
conseguir la estabilización de la deuda, pueden decidir dejar de ajustar, ya que 
la sostenibilidad de la deuda deja de ser una prioridad. Este resultado puede 
darse, en parte, porque la falta de crecimiento económico tiene un efecto 
particularmente perjudicial sobre el saldo fiscal, de modo que el esfuerzo 
necesario para mantener la sostenibilidad de la deuda es más elevado. 
Una conclusión esencial del primer capítulo es que los límites de la política fiscal 
se pueden alcanzar rápidamente en un país miembro de una unión monetaria y 
es golpeado por una crisis financiera. En un escenario de estas características, 
emergen no linealidades en el efecto del crecimiento sobre el saldo fiscal y por 
tanto una posición fiscal previamente sostenible puede deteriorase rápidamente. 
Para limitar este efecto, es esencial la creación de instituciones sólidas y que se 
disponga de margen fiscal y político antes de la crisis. Esto se debe a que el 
margen para adoptar una política fiscal activa puede verse mermado 
rápidamente. Además, en la medida en que la posición fiscal se deteriora, el 
aumento de la prima de riesgo puede conducir a un empeoramiento adicional de 
la sostenibilidad de la deuda. Consecuentemente, en un contexto de estrés 
soberano, el deterioro del saldo fiscal y el aumento del coste de financiación del 
soberano pueden acelerar el empeoramiento de la dinámica de la deuda. 
Los resultados de este capítulo sugieren que las condiciones de crecimiento y el 
punto de partida es un factor crucial para garantizar la sostenibilidad de la 
deuda. Esto es cierto no sólo en términos de la posición fiscal, sino también con 
respecto a la calidad institucional. Consecuentemente, desde un punto de partida 
más fuerte, los soberanos están mejor posicionados para evitar la dinámica 
negativa de la deuda durante la crisis. 
No son sólo los soberanos los que cambian su comportamiento cuando se ven 
afectados por una crisis financiera. Los bancos también alteran su 
comportamiento en épocas de estrés financiero. En el segundo capítulo se 
exploran los determinantes del aumento de las tenencias de bonos soberanos 
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de las entidades financieras de países estresados en el peor momento de la 
crisis. La literatura ha considerado que un aumento en las tenencias de bonos 
soberanos profundiza de recesión, aumentando la contracción del crédito al 
sector privado y así privando de recursos al sector privado. 
El análisis estudia cómo los determinantes de tenencias de deuda soberana 
cambian durante una crisis financiera. Mediante el uso de un modelo de cambio 
de régimen, encontramos que los bancos cambian su función de demanda de 
bonos soberanos sólo en periodos específicos de estrés particularmente 
agudo. Nuestro análisis sugiere que la estabilización del soberano ha 
desempeñado un papel central en el aumento de las tenencias de 
bonos. Hipótesis alternativas, como la búsqueda de rendimiento adicional o 
incentivos regulatorios no parece jugar un papel en los bonos soberanos de 
acumulación. Así, encontramos que el cambio hacia un régimen de mayores 
tenencias de bonos viene determinado, fundamentalmente, por el aumento del 
estrés del soberano, más que por un aumento de los tipos soberanos. 
El tercer artículo concluye que el aumento de las tenencias de bonos soberanos 
no desempeñó un papel importante en la conectividad entre los bancos y los 
soberanos. Encontramos que el estrés del soberano está mucho más correlado 
con la conectividad entre el soberano y los bancos que las tenencias de las 
entidades financieras. Este resultado se halla empleando el análisis de 
conectividad desarrollado por Diebold y Yilmaz (2014), y muestra cómo algunas 
medidas de política económica, y en particular, una acción decidida por parte del 
BCE tuvo un efecto sustancial en la reducción del nexo soberano -bancario. 
El tercer documento muestra los cambios en la conectividad entre entidades y 
soberanos durante la crisis de deuda soberana. Estos cambios dificultan el 
diseño de la respuesta adecuada a la crisis. Por ejemplo, los bancos que por sus 
características no parecen sistémicos en tiempos normales, y que no tienen una 
contribución sustancial al estrés bancario en épocas tranquilas, pueden 
convertirse en un motivo de preocupación en tiempos de estrés y eventualmente 
tener un impacto sistémico. 
En general, esta tesis muestra cómo algunas dinámicas cambian en períodos de 
crisis. Esto afecta a las entidades financieras y al soberano. El resultado es que 
  
17 
el diseño de la política fiscal y prudencial es particularmente difícil en estos 
periodos. Dadas estas limitaciones, el papel de la política monetaria se convierte 
en el más importante. En la medida en que la política monetaria activa puede 
mitigar el estrés financiero, puede ser muy para evitar las dinámicas negativas 
descritas anteriormente.  
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Introduction: 
 
The Global Financial Crisis set the course for a sharp change in economic 
dynamics at the world level. At the core of this change in economic dynamics was 
the Eurozone. Created in 1999, after a long period of relative stability, the 
financial turmoil has tested the foundations of the currency area. 
In a currency area, a prolonged economic shock with an asymmetric impact on 
its members and its ramifications proved a challenge for which there was no easy 
solution.  The challenge was also there for scholars, as the phenomena that 
characterized the euro crisis required changes to the usual framework in which 
the academic literature had studied the propagation of financial crises. This thesis 
is a contribution to the literature that has analyzed some of the aspects that were 
relevant to the management of stress in the euro area. 
The first chapter examines the existence of fiscal fatigue. A literature that started 
in the 1980s found fiscal policy, on the whole, sustainable in developed countries. 
However, some recent contributions analyzed the Eurozone crisis, and found that 
fiscal policy could have two regimes, depending on the state of the economy, 
global finance and institutional indicators: in one of the regimes fiscal policy is 
sustainable, while in the other regime it is not.  
A further step in this area was the concept of fiscal fatigue. Analogous to the 
traditional idea of reform fatigue, by which countries (originally developing 
countries that had been bailed out by the IMF and implemented reforms that were 
supposed to increase growth potential) applied sound policies. However, the 
difficulty and lags in achieving fiscal and financial stability and growth eventually 
led some to abandon those efforts. 
Fiscal fatigue adapts that concept to fiscal adjustment: when faced with rising 
debt, countries usually increase their fiscal balances, a sign of responsible fiscal 
policy. However, if debt is quite large, which could be because past adjustment 
has failed, the adjustment needed is so large that countries do not carry it out. 
We analyze the issue from the prospect of the delayed adjustment literature. In 
this literature, political decisions are characterized as a war of attrition game, in 
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which groups with different interests fight for one type of adjustment or another. 
This concept allows us shed light on the key question of the paper: 
 Can certain institutional features have an effect on fiscal adjustment once 
the fiscal limit has been reached? 
Secondly, a large number of papers have measured the effect of the cycle on the 
fiscal balance. Much of this has been used to understand the cyclical orientation 
of fiscal policy. In our case, the interest is not so much what the intention of the 
government is, but rather, whether there are non-linearities in the impact of the 
economic cycle on the fiscal balance.  
Such nonlinearities may arise for different reasons, such as the progressivity of 
the tax code or a change in the orientation of fiscal policy that depends on the 
economic cycle. As a result, a downturn may have a larger impact on the fiscal 
balance than expected, and, consequently, debt sustainability could be 
compromised earlier than thought.  
Chapter 1 will show that these non-linearities can have a significant effect on debt 
sustainability dynamics, as well as proposing the following research question: 
 Are there non-linearities in the effect of the cycle on the fiscal balance? 
A recurrent observation in crisis countries has been that once they experience 
financial stress, some of the dynamics of the financial sector enhance the 
sovereign-financial feedback loop. This entanglement of sovereign and financial 
risk can have negative consequences on economic activity. Some have attributed 
this entanglement to the rise in the holdings of sovereign bonds by domestic 
financial institutions. In some papers, like Broner et al. (2014) or Uhlig (2014), 
such increases in sovereign bond holdings arise because of changing incentives 
for banks. The consequence of the rise in the holdings is usually a decline in 
welfare, as resources that should be devoted to the economy are taken up by the 
sovereign. These dynamics will tend to deepen the downturn. 
The aim of Chapter 2 is to shed light on the behavior of banks during the recent 
financial crisis in stressed countries. In particular, we try to understand the drivers 
of the increase in sovereign bond holdings. Our starting point is that if sovereign 
bond holdings increased because the economic downturn limited alternative 
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investment opportunities, and because the rise in yields was excessive, such that 
the risk reward of bonds was more favorable, then this should not be considered 
an inefficiency, but rather, banks acting normally given the change in 
fundamentals. So the relevant question is 
 Did the sovereign bond demand function by banks change during the 
crisis? Or was the increase in bond holdings the natural consequence of 
the developments in the determinants of those holdings? 
In order to answer that question, we set up a regime-switching Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM). The idea is to capture whether banks moved, during 
the crisis, to a regime of high holdings of sovereign debt, while during the pre-
crisis period they were in a low-holdings regime. 
From a policy perspective, an issue that has been discussed is whether the 
regulation on required capital has played a key role in bank’s resource allocation 
during the downturn. In particular, the 0 risk weight on the holdings of sovereign 
bonds may have given banks an incentive to hold more bonds, instead of lending 
to the economy. Some banks, facing capital shortfalls, and adverse market 
conditions, instead of adjusting their balance sheets may have switched to 
sovereign bonds, in an attempt to obtain an interest income without 
consequences on their capital ratio.  
In order to understand the role played by risk-weighted assets (RWA) incentives, 
we use “Other Financial Institutions” (OFI) as a control group. This group is made 
up of investment, pension and other funds that do not have to hold capital on their 
assets: to the extent that they are only asset managers, they do not have to bear 
the credit risk on those assets. This entails the following research question: 
 Did the 0 risk weight on the holdings of sovereign bonds lead to excessive 
holdings of government debt during the downturn? 
Other reasons for the increase of sovereign bond holdings put forth by the 
literature have involved banks search for yield, moral suasion by the sovereign, 
or their own self-interest in saving the sovereign. The latter may arise because 
markets perceive that banks need the sovereign backstop to operate. Relatedly, 
a bank´s rating, and so, its access to market, is usually tied to that of its own 
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sovereign. Consequently, the bank will want to avoid a downgrade of its 
sovereign to a speculative grade, for instance. 
In order to understand what may have triggered the change in the demand 
function of banks, we set up a probit model, where the dependent variable is a 
dummy that takes 1 when banks´ sovereign bond function is in crisis- mode (i.e., 
it holds more sovereign bonds than it would in normal times) and 0 when it is not. 
After controlling for factors like financial market volatility, we study the impact of 
two main variables: the level of the yield and its spread. 
If the level of yield is the key determinant, this can be considered a sign of search 
for yield during the period concerned. However, if the spread is found to be the 
main driver in the change in the sovereign bond demand function, then the reason 
behind it can be either moral suasion (by which it is the government pushing the 
bank to increase its holdings) or banks self-interest in stabilizing debt markets in 
turbulent times. Our methodology would not allow us to explore which of the two 
is the actual driver: 
 Was search for yield the driver of increased holdings of sovereign bonds? 
Or was it the stress in sovereign bond markets that drove this increase? 
Of course, other factors may lead to market´s perception of an increase in the 
sovereign-bank feedback loop, not just banks´ direct exposures to the sovereign. 
For instance, the implementation of bank bailouts can change the directionality 
of the connectedness in sovereign-bank spreads. 
The third paper is an attempt to understand connectedness amongst banks, 
between sovereigns and banks and amongst sovereigns from a market pricing 
perspective. Starting from the credit default swap (CDS) of the entities, using 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) measure of connectedness, we aim at understanding 
how connectedness changed over time and the effect of policy events on it. 
This indicator controls for other relationships that could be affecting the results if 
one were just regressing the CDS of one entity on another. Another advantage is 
that the interpretation is such that it can be additive, and so allows us to break up 
the connectedness measure into groups: network connectedness can be divided 
into connectedness with banks and sovereigns, for instance. 
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The measures allow us to understand several aspects of the developments 
during the Global Financial Crisis. Note the link with the previous papers: if a 
sovereigns´ probability of default depends at least in part on its changing 
relationship with other sovereigns (for example, because of contagion, or 
perceived Eurozone breakup risk), then fiscal policy is far from being the only 
determinant of debt sustainability: in particular, if the CDS feeds through to 
sovereign bond yields, the interest rate on government debt can be subject to 
large swings, thus altering debt sustainability dynamics, even without an ex-ante 
change in fiscal policy or growth dynamics. 
After describing how major policy events changed interconnectedness, we use 
the measure to answer several policy questions, the first being: 
 How did the transmission of risk between banks and own sovereigns 
change during the crisis? 
On this aspect, we find a confirmation of the results in the literature (see Acharya 
and Steffen, 2015), that the banking sector bailouts changed the directionality of 
the transmission of risk: in the early stages of the crisis, banks received from their 
own sovereign, however, after the bailouts in the early stages of the crisis they 
became net issuers of risk. The second policy question is: 
 What determines a bank´s systemic impact? 
This question has an essential importance, given the policy effort leading to tackle 
the issues of Systemically Important Financial Institutions (SIFI). Our starting 
point compares SIFI regulation and the surcharge required to SIFIs with their 
actual connectedness. 
We illustrate how the changes in connectedness that take place during stressed 
periods can make it difficult to determine, ex ante, which banks are systemic. In 
particular, as an example, we show how the contribution of two banks to systemic 
risk can change. Given the usual shocks that these banks can be subject to, we 
show that the probability distribution of the shocks is such that banks that, ex 
ante, would have a smaller systemic impact, with a certain degree of probability 
can end up having a larger impact on the system than the bank that was 
considered non systemic. 
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From a policy perspective, the difficulties in assessing systemicity can serve as 
a word of caution. Once a crisis strikes, in all likelihood, risk may spread through 
entities that, ex ante, did not seem systemic. Therefore, the need for strong 
resolution mechanisms, with appropriate resources and the ability to act quickly 
and forcefully will hold the key to a systemic crisis. This leads to the following 
research question: 
 How did connectedness amongst countries change during the crisis? 
Much like the sovereign bank nexus, we find evidence of changes in the 
connectedness across sovereigns. In line with previous results in the literature 
(Gomez-Puig et al., 2014; Gomez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero, 2013 and Gomez-
Puig and Sosvilla Rivero, 2014), in the first stages of the crisis, core countries 
had a net impact on periphery countries. However, in the height of the crisis, the 
direction of this net impact changed. 
Our interpretation of this change is that markets started to price in a risk of 
fragmentation in the Eurozone, whether through a euro breakup or through a 
different channel. This would explain why core countries were no longer able to 
anchor default probabilities in the periphery. 
The following chapter will survey the literature on the interaction of fiscal and 
financial risk. Chapter 2 will analyze fiscal fatigue focusing on the Eurozone in 
the period 1980-2013. Chapter 3 will model bank demand for sovereign bonds in 
the periphery, while the following chapter will estimate the connectedness 
between sovereigns and banks in the Eurozone. Finally, the conclusion will 
summarize the main findings and policy implications. 
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Chapter 1: A Survey of the literature on the interaction between 
fiscal and financial risk 
 
This thesis is a contribution to the line of work on the interaction between fiscal 
risk and financial risk. The issue has gained prominence in the recent crisis, as 
the combination of a deterioration of the credit quality of sovereigns and a credit 
crunch led to heightened financial fragmentation and deepened the downturn in 
stress countries. 
The relationship between fiscal policy, debt sustainability and financial crises has 
been around for a long time. In the 1980s, the key mechanism for developing a 
financial crisis was through unsustainable fiscal policies that would lead to 
monetary financing, and so, an unsustainable exchange rate (Flood and Marion, 
1998). The seminal papers on the government´s intertemporal budget constraint 
are part of this strand of the literature (Trehan and Walsh, 1988). 
As a result, this thesis deals with separate but related aspects of financial crises. 
Chapter 2 analyzes fiscal fatigue, the idea that a sovereign, which behaves 
responsibly in normal times, may, at some point stop adjusting its fiscal balance 
even as debt rises. This lack of adjustment can lead to the unsustainability of 
public debt. As a result, putting in place the mechanisms necessary to avert this 
scenario is crucial to safeguard debt sustainability. In Chapter 3, we analyze how 
the behavior of banks in sovereign debt crises may enhance sovereign-bank 
loops. By increasing their holdings of sovereign bonds, this link intensifies and 
output may be lower than expected. We study what may have driven the rise in 
sovereign bond holdings in the European periphery during the 2008-2015 period. 
Finally, the network approach proposed in Chapter 4 is used to shed light on the 
sort of links that arise in periods of distress. In particular, we test whether the 
developments in connectivity between stress in banks and in sovereign is related 
to the increase in the holdings of domestic sovereign bonds or, possibly, the 
questioning by investors of the willingness and ability of governments and central 
banks to support the banking sector. 
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1.1 Fiscal fatigue: main aspects 
The idea of fiscal fatigue uses the framework set up by Bohn (1998), who 
analyzed whether fiscal policy in the US was sustainable, in the sense that it 
reacts to an economic shock that raises the debt to Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) ratio by increasing its primary balance, which would eventually stabilize 
debt. A large part of the literature that has examined the issue is empirical, 
although a recent theoretical framework can be found in Ghosh et al. (2013). 
Several studies have addressed this question via single country analysis (Bohn, 
2008) and panel analysis, while others, like Canzoneri et al. (2001), employ a 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) approach. In general, for developed countries, the 
literature finds that the primary balance reacts positively to an increase in the 
debt-GDP ratio. 
Much of the literature deals with country or region-specific fiscal response 
functions. For instance, Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay (2005) show that 
primary balances increase as a response to higher government debt in the 
European Union (EU).  
Bohn´s (1998) paper showed that the reaction of the primary balance to a rise in 
government debt could be considered an indicator of the sustainability of the 
fiscal stance. If an economic shock that leads to an increase in the debt stock is 
followed by a strengthening of the primary balance, fiscal policy can be deemed 
sustainable.  
Bohn (1998) results go in line with the finding in later research regarding 
developed countries: he finds fiscal policy in the United States of America (USA) 
in the 20th century reacted positively to rises in public debt, and so concludes 
that fiscal policy was, by that measure, sustainable.  
Several authors have used the same methodology for European countries: see 
for instance Wyplosz (2006), and Staehr (2008). Piergallini and Postigliola (2012) 
use the methodology for Italy and De Mello (2008) for Brazil. They all find that 
fiscal policy reacted responsibly, in that it rose in response to an increase in debt. 
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1.1.2 Fiscal policy and the cycle 
One of the main determinants of fiscal policy is the economic cycle. A classic 
result of this literature has been that fiscal policy usually is counter-cyclical in 
developed economies, while it is pro-cyclical in emerging economies (Ilzetzki and 
Vegh, 2008, Afonso, 2008). Staehr (2008) finds a similar result within Europe: 
according to his paper, fiscal policy is much more anticyclical in Western Europe 
than in Eastern Europe. 
Egert (2014) confirms that fiscal policy is counter-cyclical in the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), although this is less clear in 
the case of highly indebted countries. Similarly, Sutherland et al. (2010) find that 
the size of the counter-cyclical response of discretionary fiscal policy depends on 
the initial fiscal stance and debt level. 
According to Wyplosz (2006), the cyclically-adjusted balance reacted more 
strongly to the business cycle before the countries entered the euro area than 
afterwards, while the discretionary component was procyclical prior to entry, as 
countries tried to meet the accession criteria, but became a-cyclical once 
countries joined the single currency.  
Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) argue that to the extent that tax revenues have a cyclical 
component, this introduces an automatic co-movement between government 
balances and the cycle. As a result, the procyclicality finding for developing 
countries may not reflect policy intentions but rather the fact that the structure of 
tax revenues is more cyclical there. They use a component analysis, looking at 
government consumption and revenues and correcting for the fact that tax 
revenues are endogenous to the cycle by using tax rates as instruments. They 
conclude that fiscal policy in emerging economies is less procyclical than had 
been found earlier. 
Afonso (2008), using an EU panel, finds a counter-cyclical response of fiscal 
policy, with the primary balance improving with increases in the output gap. He 
also highlights that electoral budget cycles play a role in the determination of 
fiscal policy.  
Other studies have found that the reaction to the cycle is often asymmetric: while 
counter-cyclical in downturns, it is either a-cyclical or mildly pro-cyclical in 
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upswings. As a result, debt accumulated during downturns is not fully paid back 
during good times (see. e. g., Lee and Sung, 2007; and Leigh and Stehn, 2009). 
Many empirical studies have looked at the cyclical co-movements of fiscal 
variables in industrial and developing countries, such as Alesina and Tabellini 
(2005), Catao and Sutton (2002), Gavin and Perotti (1997), Kaminsky, et al. 
(2004) or Talvi and Vegh (2005). These studies document that primary balances 
are counter-cyclical in developed countries, and tend to be more procyclical in 
developing countries (Mendoza and Ostry, 2008).   
1.1.3 Impact of European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 
In order to derive policy conclusions, in particular regarding the effect of 
institutional changes, a number of studies examine how fiscal reaction functions 
change after an event that alters the economic structure of the country or the 
policymaking environment. This has been particularly the case in Europe, where 
several authors have analyzed the impact of the introduction of the Euro, and so 
the Stability and Growth Pact, on the government´s reaction function. 
Gali and Perotti (2003) find that membership of the euro area did not cause 
discretionary fiscal policy to become less counter-cyclical when compared to the 
EU countries that did not seek to join the euro. Ballabriga and Martinez-Mongay 
(2005), similarly, conclude that fiscal policies changed little with the introduction 
of the euro. 
1.1.4 Taking into account government decisions 
Alternatively, fiscal reaction functions can be understood as a problem where 
policymakers minimize a loss function subject to constraints afforded by the 
economy, such as the reaction of other agents (the private sector) to different 
government policies.  The key issue then is to determine whether the change in 
the fiscal balance triggered by debt or another event is intentional. 
One aspect to take into account when assessing government´s policy intentions 
is the existence of persistence, over time, in the fiscal balance. This persistence 
component may be due to rigidities in the budget procedures, for instance 
stemming from the fact that part of a government´s spending in a given year has 
been pre-committed. This seems to be greater in advanced economies (Fatas 
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and Mihov, 2001; 2008). Paloviita (2012) finds that persistence has been lower 
in the peripheral countries than in the rest of the euro area. According to Afonso 
and Furceri (2010), persistence is determined by country income and public 
sector size.  
In order to test for the importance of the government´s intentions, as opposed to 
realized outcomes that may be affected by contemporaneous shocks to the 
economy, a part of the literature has distinguished between planned and realized 
fiscal balances, using the former as an indicator of government intentions.  
Some studies do this by isolating variables that reflect policy decisions such as 
tax rates or discretionary spending categories (Ilzetzki and Vegh; 2008, Darvas; 
2010). Others use real-time data to provide a more realistic picture of fiscal policy-
making (e.g. Bernoth and Wolff. 2008). Similarly, Castro et al. (2013) uses 
quarterly data. 
1.1.5 Discretionary fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers 
In order to obtain a measure of government´s policy intentions, the cyclical 
component must be removed from tax revenue and primary spending items, thus 
obtaining the cyclically-adjusted primary balance. One approach consists in 
regressing the fiscal policy variable on a measure of the cycle and to interpret the 
residuals as the discretionary policy component. For instance, Fatas and Mihov 
(2003) use this approach and find that the residuals of the fiscal policy reaction 
functions of euro area countries diminished over time, indicating less reliance on 
discretionary fiscal policy in the run up to entry into the Eurozone. 
This strategy was criticized by Gali and Perrotti (2003): in their view, this only 
captured the non-systematic part of discretionary policy.  Instead, using cyclically-
adjusted spending and revenue by category (Giorno et al., 1995; André and 
Girouard, 2005) would provide a more reliable overall picture of the fiscal policy 
stance. In line with the results mentioned earlier, they conclude that discretionary 
fiscal policy became more counter-cyclical in the 1990s in most advanced 
countries. He discovers that the introduction of the euro led member countries to 
use a more countercyclical policy. 
Fatas and Mihov (2009) notice that discretionary policy was slightly pro-cyclical 
in the euro area countries, while the United States pursued a strongly counter-
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cyclical discretionary policy. Auerbach (2009) confirms their result, and finds that 
fiscal policy in the US was countercyclical. In his study, this result holds for both 
the expenditure and revenue side for a long time period (between 1984 and 
2009). He suggests that spending responded more strongly than revenues. In 
contrast, the automatic stabilizers are found to react more strongly to the cycle in 
the euro area than in the United States. 
Cimadomo et al. (2007) shows that discretionary fiscal policy intentions are 
counter-cyclical in OECD countries, especially during expansions, by looking at 
ex ante forecasts of cyclically-adjusted primary government balances. He also 
shows that the outcome of discretionary fiscal policy is pro-cyclical ex post. 
Beetsma et al. (2008) find that planned fiscal policy is counter-cyclical in non-EU 
OECD countries while it is a-cyclical in EU countries. Bernoth and Wolff (2008) 
show for euro area countries that fiscal policy is usually planned to be 
countercyclical, but biases in the execution of planned policies lead the fiscal 
stance to become pro-cyclical. Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) point out that the 
results reported above are sensitive to robustness checks, such as alternative 
measures of the output gap: in their setting, the finding that fiscal policy plans in 
the euro area are more counter-cyclical than final outcomes still holds. 
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) use foreign partners’ GDP growth as an instrument 
of the domestic cycle, given the feedback loops between fiscal policy and the 
cycle. Their result overthrows the finding of a pro-cyclical fiscal policy for 
developing countries. Ilzetzki and Vegh (2008) assess the robustness of the 
finding that developing countries pursue pro-cyclical fiscal policies while 
developed OECD countries are less pro-cyclical or acyclical by controlling for 
endogeneity of the cycle variable  through various methods (instrumental 
variables (IV), generalized method of moments (GMM), simultaneous equations 
and VAR models). Lee and Sung (2007), by also using an IV approach also find 
that government spending is strongly counter-cyclical in most OECD economies, 
with a few acyclical exceptions. 
Strawczynski and Zeira (2009) take a different perspective and analyze the 
reaction of fiscal policy to temporary and permanent output shocks rather than to 
cyclical fluctuations. They show that the reaction of general government deficits 
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and spending to a temporary output shock is counter-cyclical. However, the 
reaction to a permanent shock is a-cyclical. 
Based on an event study approach, Leigh and Stehn (2009) argue that the group 
of seven (G7) countries eased discretionary fiscal policy during downturns in a 
timely manner on a number of occasions. Nevertheless, they also show that fiscal 
policy in non-Eurozone countries responded quicker and more often to downturns 
than in Eurozone members of the G7. A further difference between the Eurozone 
and other countries is that discretionary fiscal easing occurs more often during 
economic recoveries in the former than in the latter. 
1.1.6. Political economy and fiscal policy 
Buti and van den Noord (2004) introduce political economy considerations in the 
fiscal framework and find that discretionary fiscal policy was influenced by political 
cycles after the introduction of the euro. Golinelli and Momigliano (2009) report 
similar results for those countries before the adoption of the euro. Elections seem 
to influence general government balances in other OECD countries over longer 
periods as well while government spending is not found to be influenced by 
electoral cycles (Strawczynski and Zeira, 2009). The main specification in Afonso 
and Hauptmeier (2009) also shows that elections are associated with a 
deterioration in primary government balances. Nevertheless, their result is not 
robust to alternative model specifications in which the coefficients either switch 
sign or become insignificant. 
1.1.7 Cyclicality of the components 
Lee and Sung (2007) report that total government revenues of OECD economies 
are countercyclical with respect to GDP growth and total government expenditure 
is mildly pro cyclical. At a higher level of disaggregation, current and capital 
expenditure and subsidies and transfers are found to be a-cyclical. On the 
revenue side, income and commodity taxes react counter-cyclically whereas 
social security contributions appear insensitive to the cycle. 
Lane (2003) shows that the cyclical behavior of overall government spending in 
OECD countries hides a heterogeneous response of the different spending 
components to the cycle. While public transfers and debt interest payments are 
counter-cyclical, current spending is pro-cyclical and government investment is 
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pro-cyclical. In particular, government wages are more pro-cyclical than non-
wage government consumption whereas government employment is a-cyclical. 
The cross-country variation in cyclical reactions is mostly explained by output 
volatility and institutional variables, in particular weak government support. Public 
sector wages are the main channel through which higher output volatility and 
lower government support lead to more pro-cyclicality in government spending.  
1.1.8 Debt sustainability: the fiscal limit 
The relationship between the fiscal reaction function and debt sustainability was 
originally related to the debate on the interactions between monetary and fiscal 
policy. Leeper (2013) postulated that to the extent that governments issue 
substantial debt, when such economies are approaching their fiscal limits, debt 
can be devalued through higher inflation. Based on this insight, he develops a 
model that suggests that the source of inflation is fiscal policy.  Once the fiscal 
limit is approached, the government must finance its deficit by printing money. 
These dynamics may lead to episodes of hyperinflation. 
As a result of his contribution, a body of the literature analyzed how the fiscal limit 
could be determined. In Bi (2012), the fiscal limit depends mainly on the size of 
the government, the degree of countercyclicality of the policy responses, 
economic diversity, and political uncertainty. They justify non linearities in the 
behavior of sovereign risk premia: once they are on the rise, they rise quickly. 
This, in turn, justifies the non-linearities in fiscal adjustment: little adjustment is 
carried out at low levels of debt, when the cost of additional adjustment does not 
seem to be justified, and then a rapid adjustment as the debt limit is approached. 
1.1.9. The determinants of sustainability: sovereign spreads 
For all the importance of the determinants of the primary balance, and the 
determinants of debt sustainability from fundamentals, a body of the literature has 
found that risk premia are often determined by factors not related to fiscal 
fundamentals. To the extent that adverse shocks, not related to a given country´s 
fiscal policy, can lead to shocks on the sovereign premia, and so alter debt 
sustainability dynamics, this can be thought of as a case of the interaction 
between financial markets and fiscal policy, and how the former can impact debt 
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sustainability, even if the fiscal policy stance (and, possibly, the underlying 
macroeconomic conditions) remains unchanged. 
Sovereign spread determinants are typically decomposed into the default risk 
(which is dependent on the assessment of the fiscal health of a given sovereign) 
and risk aversion, which tends to be related to market perception not related to 
actual debt sustainability dynamics of a given country. Sovereign risk can also be 
measured by sovereign credit ratings, CDS premia and other rankings of the 
country risk or sovereign creditworthiness. At first, this literature focused on 
emerging economies, in particular following the 1980s. However, the advent of 
the Euro, and in particular the euro sovereign debt crisis brought about renewed 
attention to the issue from the perspective of developed countries. 
1.1.9.1. Studies on emerging countries 
Edwards (1986) estimates the determinants of bond spreads for a group of 
emerging countries using a panel of bond yield spreads spanning 1976-1980 and 
fixed effects estimates to reflect the date of issuance of the relevant bond. He 
finds that the debt to GNP ratio raises bond spreads, while investment, debt 
service to exports ratios, and the maturity of debt reduce sovereign bond spreads. 
In some cases the debt to exports ratio, the real effective exchange rate, and the 
oil price are all positively and statistically significantly correlated to spreads, while 
reserves and industrial production growth rate have a negative effect on 
sovereign risk. In other words, the original contribution to the literature on 
sovereign spreads suggests that country fundamentals play a dominant role.  
Min (1998) finds for the early 90s a positive and significant effect of debt to GDP, 
debt service to exports, net foreign assets, exports growth, the real exchange 
rate, and inflation on one side, and negative effects of the terms of trade, foreign 
exchange reserves to GDP, maturity and imports growth on sovereign spreads.  
Eichengreen and Mody (1998) conclude that a higher ratio of debt service to 
exports is associated with higher bond spreads. They also show the negative 
significance of the GDP growth rate, the issue size and the residual of a 
regression of the credit rating from fundamentals. The latter is one of the 
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pioneering efforts to capture issues that are not related to country-specific macro 
fundamentals.  
Much like Edwards (1986) and Min (1998), Eichengreen and Mody (1998) do not 
control for global risk aversion individually as opposed to variables that relate to 
the state of world financial markets. In the early stages of this literature, the main 
concern seemed to be which fundamentals were better determinants of sovereign 
spreads, rather than the interactions between sovereign stress and financial 
markets. 
Arora and Cerisola (2000) estimate the determinants of secondary market 
sovereign bond spreads for a sample of 11 large emerging countries in 1994-
1999. They find a positive impact of the short-term US interest rate and of market 
volatility on spreads across all countries, in what can be considered a proxy for 
the effect of global risk aversion. Also, spreads are in large part explained by 
country-specific fundamentals, pertaining in particular to the external and fiscal 
position. They find a significant impact of the net foreign asset position, lower 
fiscal deficits and lower ratios of debt service to exports and debt service to GDP 
help decrease sovereign spreads.  
Aronovich (1999) uses daily data on sovereign spreads to assess the 
determinants in the 1997-1998 period for three large Latin American countries. 
These are the implicit probability of default and the 30-year USTB rate, where the 
latter is used as a proxy of an exogenous change in global financial conditions. 
1.1.9.2. Contagion and spreads 
Baig and Goldfjan (2000) test whether there was contagion from the Russian 
crisis to Brazil in the late 1990s, using daily data. They find evidence supporting 
the contagion hypothesis and report a negative impact of the long-term American 
interest rate on spreads. Nogues and Grandes (2001) also find a negative effect 
on sovereign spreads for Argentina in the late 1990s. In their paper, there is 
evidence of contagion but also of the relevance of country-specific factors, like 
fiscal deficits, GDP growth, the debt service to exports ratio, and institutional 
priorities.  
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Ferrucci (2003) investigates the empirical relationship between emerging market 
sovereign spreads and a set of common macroeconomic fundamentals, using 
Emerging Markets Bonds Index (EMBI spreads over the period December 1991-
March 2003. The estimation technique posits a dynamic error correction model 
that allows short-run parameters to vary across groups, while restricting long-run 
elasticities. Their results point to markets pricing in macro conditions in sovereign 
risk. In particular, indicators like external debt, openness and current account 
balance affect the pricing of sovereign spreads. 
However, non-fundamental factors like global liquidity conditions and US equity 
prices also play a role. This result is obtained by controlling for global risk 
aversion by using the spread between low and high-rating US corporate bonds 
and finds a negative impact on emerging market sovereign spreads: higher junk 
bond spreads lead to lower emerging market spreads. 
Gonzalez Rozada and Levy-Yeyati (2006) analyze the impact of interest rates of 
bonds issued by developed countries on emerging market spreads in 1993-2005. 
They find that a large part of the emerging market bond spreads is explained by 
global factors like risk appetite (the spread of high yield corporate bonds in 
developed markets), global liquidity and contagion from other financial crises. 
The link between emerging country spreads and global factors is shown to remain 
relatively stable since 1993. This finding is robust to the inclusion of country-
specific factors, asymmetries, alternative risk appetite indicators or adjusted 
ratings, and helps provide accurate long-run predictions. Overall, the results 
highlight the critical role played by exogenous factors in the evolution of the 
borrowing cost faced by emerging economies. This is in line with Garcia-Herrero 
and Ortiz (2005) conclusions on the influence of global risk aversion on Latin 
American sovereign spreads.  
Remolona et al. (2007) analyze the components of sovereign CDS spreads, 
decomposing the expected loss from default and the risk premium. They find that 
risk premia account for much of the spread (ranging from two thirds to four fifths 
of the change in the spread).  
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They also estimate the determinants of sovereign default risk using the rating-
implied probability of default for a sample of emerging countries, on which they 
run a panel regression with fixed effects, using annual data from 1990 to 2005. 
They find a significant relationship with country size, inflation, development, the 
current account deficit, and external debt. These results hold when considering 
debt intolerance, original sin and currency mismatch. In their framework, country 
fundamentals do improve access to foreign financing. 
There are other areas of study that can be mentioned. The first is on the 
determinants and dynamics of other measures of sovereign creditworthiness 
such as "distance to default", sovereign credit ratings, probabilities of default, 
analyzed by Rowland and Torres (2004) or Weigel and Gemmill (2006). Second, 
the strand of the literature that studies the relationship between sovereign 
spreads and currency risk (Domowitz et al., 2001; Ahumada and Garegnani, 
2005; Powell and Sturzenneger, 2000; Phillippon et al., 2001). Third, the pass-
through from US interest rates to emerging market spreads (Frankel, 1999; 
Frankel and Rose, 2000; Kamin and von Kleist, 1999). 
1.1.9.3. Spreads in the euro area 
While the main issue studied before the existence of the euro were the spreads 
in emerging countries, the creation of the single currency, and in particular, the 
sovereign debt crisis, led to an increase in the academic interest on sovereign 
spreads in the EMU. The setup is similar to that used previously for emerging 
economies, where the determinants used are country-specific risk factors, global 
risk aversion conditions and financial market-specific issues, like liquidity.  
 
Some authors find a relevant role for monetary policy on risk aversion and 
spreads. D’Agostino and Ehrmann (2012) focus on credit risk and surprises on 
macroeconomic indicators, such as the deviations of the forecasts of the key 
macro variables. Maltritz (2012) considers openness and the terms of trade.  
For example, Attinasi et al. (2010) find a role for bank rescue packages and the 
ensuing shifting of risk from the private sector to the public sector has played a 
key role. However, the elasticity of credit premia to fiscal fundamentals (a 
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measure of the price of credit risk) also increased during the crisis, partly owing 
to an increase in the degree of global risk aversion. Gerlach et al. (2010) finds 
that global risk interacts with country specific fundamentals. This interaction and 
its impact on spread changes over time. 
The impact of liquidity 
The last broad category of determinants of sovereign bond spreads relates to 
liquidity conditions in bond markets, usually proxied by overall outstanding 
amount of public debt, bid-ask spreads and trading volumes. Favero et al. (2010) 
propose a model with endogenous liquidity demand where liquidity and 
aggregate risk interact, leading to a negative dependence of spreads on the 
interaction of the latter source of risk and liquidity. Higher aggregate risk, by 
reducing the attractiveness of alternative investment opportunities, implies that 
less compensation for liquidity risk is required for sovereign bonds. 
Beber et al. (2009) find that credit premia are generally more relevant than 
liquidity premia for euro area sovereign bonds but, in moments of heightened 
market uncertainty, liquidity considerations may prevail. 
The euro area 
Euro area sovereign bond markets initially attracted attention from academia as 
a way to assess whether the adoption of the single currency was leading to 
increased financial integration, as studied by Codogno et al. (2003), Baele et al. 
(2004), or Gomez-Puig (2006 and 2008). In these first studies, the standard 
definition of sovereign risk included its two main domestic components, market 
liquidity and credit risk, and an international risk factor which reflected investors’ 
risk aversion. Some of the research then focused on systemic versus 
idiosyncratic risk. Geyer (2004) and Pagano and Von Thadden (2004) stressed 
the importance of systemic risk in the behavior of yield differentials in EMU 
countries, while others showed that the idiosyncratic risk component in the 
movements of spreads was generally more important than the systemic risk, as 
shown in Gomez-Puig (2009), Dotz and Fischer (2010) and Favero and Missale 
(2012). Some studies suggested that comovements across the Eurozone were a 
key determinant (Abad et al., 2010). 
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However, the sovereign debt crisis in Europe which began in late 2009 has 
revived the literature on euro area sovereign spread drivers and attributed 
increasing importance to uncertainty and variables reflecting country-specific 
confidence and indicators of real activity (see, e.g. Georgoutsos and Migiakis, 
2013). Favero and Missale (2012) find that credit risk has increased in importance 
as a determinant of sovereign bond spreads, while Buchel (2013) provides 
evidence that the market reacted to official statements during the crisis. Similar 
arguments can be found in other recent studies using data that extend beyond 
the crisis period such as Palladini and Portes (2011) or Beirne and Fratzscher 
(2013).  
Many authors have stressed the importance of other fundamentals beyond the 
country’s fiscal position to explain yield spread behavior after the outbreak of the 
crisis, as expressed in Mody (2009), Barrios et al. (2009), Bolton and Jeanne 
(2011) and Allen et al. (2011). Some studies have looked at the dynamic 
properties of sovereign spreads over time, testing whether there was a change in 
behavior during the crisis, as Pozzi and Wolswijk (2008), Gerlach et al. (2010), 
Aβmann and Boysen-Hogrefe (2012) and Bernoth and Erdogan (2012). 
Sguerri and Zoli (2009) find that euro area sovereign risk premium differentials 
are mainly driven by a common factor, in line with the finding on the importance 
of global risk aversion. They do however highlight a change starting in October 
2008, with markets becoming progressively more concerned about the fiscal 
stability of countries and in particular, reacting to the impact of the contingent 
liabilities arising from problems in the national banking sectors. 
Gomez Puig et al. (2014) similarly show that the rise in sovereign risk in central 
countries can only be partially explained by the evolution of local macroeconomic 
variables in those countries. They find that the importance of global variables 
increased in this period. 
So the fiscal balance may be important, but is not the only factor that can lead to 
financial stress, as shown in particular by recent research. In this context, the 
behavior of banks during periods of sovereign stress plays a central role in the 
propagation of the latter and as such has been studied amply by the literature. 
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1.2 The dynamics of financial crises 
A key area of study is how such crises unfold. While the first generation of the 
literature emphasized the role played by sovereign debt sustainability, later on, 
triggered particularly by the Asian crisis in the late 90s, a large body of the 
literature has been devoted to analyze market panic and the behavior of financial 
institutions in this context. 
Some authors (Radelet et al. 1998) emphasize the role of financial panic as an 
essential element of the Asian crisis. At the core of the crisis were bubble-like 
large foreign capital inflows into financial systems without the necessary 
regulatory and supervisory tools to manage them and so became vulnerable to 
panic. 
In a similar vein, some authors have explained financial crises through the Minsky 
(Arestis and Glickman, 2002) explanation of instability inherent to the financial 
sector. This view is supported by the finding that threats to growth and 
employment from the financial sector are much intensified in open, liberalized 
and, especially, developing economies. 
When financial crises unfold, financial sector vulnerability and sovereign debt 
vulnerability may reinforce each other. Some authors have emphasized how not 
having your own monetary policy can lead to more fragile bond markets. In 
particular, De Grauwe et al. (2013) show that part of the rise in sovereign bond 
spreads was not related to fundamentals. Secondly, some fundamentals, like 
sovereign debt, ignored before the crises, became significant during the crisis. 
However, this is a usual finding even for countries with their own central bank, as 
shown above.  
De Grauwe and Ji (2013) compare that analysis with that of countries that had 
their own currency but similar fundamentals in terms of debt and fiscal space as 
Eurozone countries. In these countries, however, they do not find evidence of 
heightened significance of fiscal fundamentals. Therefore, this may be a sign that, 
indeed, markets priced in the absence of a lender of last resort: in the presence 
of such a lender, one would expect the capital outflow to have materialized in 
other aspects, like a further currency depreciation, which in turn could have more 
expansionary effects that the rise in yields. 
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1.3. Interactions between banks and sovereigns 
The interactions of banks and sovereigns was first studied in the context of 
defaults by developing countries. Some authors have modeled debt rescheduling 
as a game where the two players are the banks and the sovereign. In Bullow and 
Rogoff (1987), debt rescheduling arises as the result of bank impatience because 
of the lost present value of their investments undermines their solvency and 
compromises their future, thus makes them willing to accept haircuts on debt 
payments. In this setting, strategic default arises naturally out of financial sector 
weakness and the corresponding lack of bargaining power by banks. 
1.4. Banking and fiscal crisis 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, 2011) find that financial crises are followed by fiscal 
crises. They conclude that sovereign debt ratios typically rise after a banking 
crisis. However, their use of annual data may hide more subtle interactions 
amongst the variables, as the interaction between banking risk and sovereign risk 
may take place within a year, and may change shape in that year. 
In their setting, the rise in sovereign debt is not primarily due to the cost of 
rescuing the financial system, but the slower growth after a financial crisis leads 
to a rapid rise in the public debt ratios. The fact that slower growth follows financial 
crises has been documented by Abiad et al. (2011): low growth stems for the 
scarcity of credit which typically follows banking crises. 
The approach of Acharya (2009) is slightly different: he considers slow growth as 
the result of a credit boom pre crisis, which masked the underlying low potential 
growth. Also, their use of annual data could explain the fact that they do not find 
a feedback loop from public debt to banking crises. This may downplay the effect 
that bank bailouts and the subsequent rise of public debt can have on the 
reinforcement of bank and sovereign weaknesses. 
At the core of this literature lie the links between the financial sector and fiscal 
sustainability. The relationship between both has been extensively documented 
by Reihart and Rogoff. However, somewhat contrary to Reinhart and Rogoff 
(2009, 2011) the results of Mody and Scatigna (2005) show that it is not just public 
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debt that causes a financial crisis. Rather, large private debt and a deterioration 
of the credit quality of the sovereign can also cause the financial panic. 
1.5. Sovereign-bank feedback loops 
The characterization of sovereign-bank feedback loops has been studied by a 
large literature. The evidence on the links is quite varied. 
Thukral (2013) uses a panel to study the role of financial sector variables on the 
determination of sovereign CDS spreads, and the results trigger his conclusion 
that there is bank dominance of sovereign financing conditions. Mody and Sandri 
(2012), using sub-periods similar to those in Acharya and Steffen (2015), find that 
the feedback between sovereign and bank risk changed.  Instead of comparing 
CDS spreads, Mody and Sandri (2012) use sovereign spreads as the 
manifestation of sovereign fiscal risk, and the level of stock market capitalization 
of banks as a measure of banking system risk. They show that the euro crisis 
traces back to the Bear Stearns crisis. As bailouts of banks began to be priced in 
the market, sovereign spreads started to reflect higher fiscal solvency risk, 
especially in countries where growth was expected to slow down and had, as a 
starting point, high debt levels. 
Candelon and Palm (2010) present further evidence that bailouts potentially 
undermine the sustainability of public finances. These financial rescues can 
enhance the transmission of risk from the banking sector to the sovereign through 
several channels, which include bailout disbursements, public deposits held with 
banks, the need for liquidity provisioning by the central bank acting as a lender of 
last result, the use of resources for bank recapitalization by the sovereign or, 
alternatively, the execution of public guarantees. 
According to Honohan (2008), the link between banking crisis and sovereign risk 
may arise from the slowdown and the credit shortage that usually follows a 
banking crisis. Such events tend to be long crises (lasting 2.5 years on average), 
and lead to sharp rises in public debt. The authors estimate that the median fiscal 
cost of a banking crisis stands at 15.5% of GDP. 
Kollmann and Roeger (2012) also study the macroeconomic effect of financial 
sector rescues. They find that bank rescue operations can help cut short a 
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financial crisis and improve macroeconomic performance. A key avenue of the 
recovery is that bank bailouts can help investment recover, consistent with Broner 
et al. (2014) or Popov and Van Horen (2014). However, they find evidence of a 
negative impact, as sovereign debt purchases by banks lead to a crowding out of 
private investment. In contrast, Gray and Jobst (2011) show the potentially high 
impact on fiscal risk associated to the existence of contingent liabilities. 
A key transmission mechanism is that domestic banks tend to be particularly 
vulnerable to restructuring. Noyer (2010) argues that by holding non performing 
government bonds capital could be compromised and so threaten the solvency 
of weaker and more exposed institutions.  
Erce (2013) suggests that the degree of bank intermediation and the banking 
system exposure to the sovereign strongly influence a debt crisis ripple effect on 
the real economy. In addition, the moral suasion of authorities may lead to 
excessive holdings of sovereign debt by domestic creditors at below market 
yields (Diaz-Cassou et al., 2008). While this helps the government keep financing 
conditions more favorable, a government default in this context would trigger a 
banking crisis. 
There are other channels by which sovereign stress leads to banking stress, 
although many papers emphasize the role played by the holdings of sovereign 
debt by banks. In Darraq-Pires et al. (2013) the positive connection between 
sovereign and bank risk is due to banks investing in government securities. Along 
these lines, Angeloni and Wolff (2012) assess the impact of sovereign bond 
holdings on the performance of banks during the euro area crisis using individual 
bank data and sovereign bond holdings. They find that peripheral sovereign 
bonds affect banks’ stock market valuations heterogeneously. While Italian, Irish 
and Greek debt appear to have negatively affected the market valuation of the 
banks holding them, such an effect is not significant for other peripheral sovereign 
debt of countries like Spain, suggesting that the specific characteristics of the 
banking sector (like its international presence) may also play a role.  
Acharya et al. (2012), document the high exposure of their sample banks to their 
own sovereign, which according to their theory should be a main channel through 
which stress feeds back from the sovereign to banks. 
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Popov and Van Horen (2013) focus on the feedback from sovereign risk into 
banking risk by assessing the extent to which holdings of sovereign bonds detract 
the resources available for lending to the private sector. This channel enhances 
the feedback loop by limiting growth and so further weakening the health of the 
sovereign. They find evidence that this was particularly relevant in the periphery. 
Finally, sovereign rating downgrades further limit banks’ access to foreign 
financing, leading to sudden stops or higher borrowing costs (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2011) 
Bank of International Settlements (2011) shows four main channels through 
which a deterioration in the creditworthiness of a sovereign can pass through to 
the banking system. One channel of transmission is banks’ holdings of sovereign 
government debt. Second, higher sovereign risk reduces the value of collateral 
that domestic banks can be used for funding. Third, sovereign downgrades 
normally translate into lower ratings for banks located in the downgraded country. 
Lastly, increased sovereign risk reduces the value of the implicit/explicit 
government guarantees to banks. 
Mody and Sandri (2012) show that sovereign spreads are affected by the 
domestic vulnerabilities of national banking sectors. Fiscal fundamentals can 
worsen the loop: the relationship seems stronger for countries showing large 
public debt. 
Similarly, Pisani-Ferry (2012) shows that one reason that sovereigns may be 
sensitive to the domestic banking sector is that the sector´s size has become 
large relative to tax revenues. As a result, small problems in the banking system 
can become an issue for government solvency. 
In periods of financial crisis, the implicit public guarantee on bank solvency is 
likely to become effective, so markets may price in this higher probability of 
payout by the sovereign (Gray and Jobst, 2011; Gerlachet al. , 2010; Pisani-
Ferry, 2012), thus enhancing the link between the sovereign and banks. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) show that historically public debt-to-GDP ratios are 
higher following a country’s banking crisis. The deterioration of sovereign 
creditworthiness is, however, only partly due to the cost of rescuing troubled 
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banks. The main explanation is the economic slowdown caused by the banking 
crisis 
Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012), for example, establish that the rise in domestic 
government debt raise the potential for negative feed-back loops between 
sovereign and banking stress. Mody and Sandri (2012) shows the supposed link 
between holdings of sovereign debt and banks’ market valuations was not 
significant in the period July-October 2011 in Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland. 
Only a clear relationship between Greek holdings and bank market valuation was 
established.  
Arghyrou and Tsoukalas (2010) posit that the mechanics of the EMU debt crisis 
are similar to those of a currency crisis: in this case, the systemic risk that would 
be seen in currency markets is diverted into the markets for sovereign bonds. As 
a result, sovereign bond spreads can be taken as an indication of stress that 
would eventually lead to abandonment of the currency regime. 
Illing and Konig (2014) show that the absence of lender of last resort (LLR) can 
lead to self-fulfilling crises even when fundamentals are good. The perceived 
weakness of the sovereign can lead to a deterioration of the quality of the 
guarantee that it has given banks and so would justify the transfer of risk from the 
sovereign to banks. 
The dynamics presented by the literature suggest that the absence of a central 
bank that is willing to act as a lender of last resort increases the likelihood, in 
stress, of sovereign defaults. In turn, the perceived lack of fiscal muscle leads 
investors to price in a bank default. While sovereign bond holdings may reinforce 
this loop, the transmission of stress can exist even if there are no sovereign bond 
holdings by the domestic banking sector. 
1.6. Regulation and the sovereign bank nexus 
Banking regulation has been blamed partially for reinforcing the bank-sovereign 
feedback loop. As is explained in chapter 3, bank holdings of sovereign debt are 
generally not subject to a risk weight in banks´ capital requirement ratio. 
To the extent that sovereign debt´s riskiness arises from the expansionary bias 
in fiscal policy over the cycle, it can be avoided through more responsible fiscal 
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policy in the upturn, as described in Breton et al. (2012). A source of instability in 
the financial sector can be the fact that public debt is perceived as not being 
sustainable which can lead to a sell off and a resulting vicious cycle (Acharya and 
Steffen, 2015; Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012). This has been a particular concern 
recently, when the recent developments in the Eurozone crisis questioned the 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009b) concept of graduation from serial default.  
The sovereign stress has led to a number of proposals to change the regulatory 
treatment of sovereign debt: Hannoun (2012) argues that highly rated sovereign 
assets should receive a treatment consistent with their low risk. This would entail 
a differentiation amongst the different sovereign assets according to their 
creditworthiness. 
However, instead of doing away with the Basel standards that use the 0 risk 
weight on domestic debt holdings, Hannoun (2012) calls for the introduction of 
enhanced supervision of sovereign risk through instruments like further and 
stricter stress tests. 
Praet (2013) highlighted that a regulation that treats banks’ holdings of sovereign 
debt according to the risk they pose to banks’ capital will prevent said banks from 
excessive use of central bank liquidity, which, in a currency union, according to 
Uhlig (2014) can lead to perverse incentives. Weidmann (2013) suggests that by 
biasing the demand towards sovereign bonds the regulation distorts the relative 
prices of assets signaled by interest rates. However, others have considered that 
some shortcomings of the introduction of a risk weight on sovereign exposures, 
such as the procyclicality associated with capital requirement ratios call for a 
different treatment of sovereign exposures. In particular, Nouy (2012), considers 
using a Pillar II approach to extend sovereign risk, along the lines of Hannoun 
(2012), not least because the procyclicality of capital regulation can be especially 
problematic for sovereign bonds. 
A key concern on this treatment is that the 0 risk weight has provided additional 
incentive to the exploitation of the carry trade (Acharya and Steffen, 2015). The 
absence of a capital requirement lowered incentives to lend to the real economy, 
particularly amongst the low-capitalized banks. As a result, the zero risk weight 
lets zombie banks continue operating, detracts resources from the economy and 
leads to perverse incentives in a currency union. 
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In this vein, Blundell-Wignall (2012) considers that the key may lie in the series 
of fiscal and structural policy measures being followed in the EU and aimed at 
tackling the underlying weaknesses of sovereign bond credit quality, which would 
eliminate the riskiness of those holdings and so the need for increasing its risk 
weight. The measures include credible fiscal consolidation plans, the 
enhancement of the European Central Bank (ECB)’s role as liquidity provider of 
last resort, and the creation of effective backstops. 
Of course, the findings of the literature on fiscal fatigue and fiscal sustainability 
are particularly important to this end. As such, countries that present the fiscal, 
institutional and growth strategies that allow them to avert fiscal fatigue can have 
a virtuous cycle by which their debt can safely be considered a risk-free asset, 
relieving the balance sheet of domestic banks and allowing public debt to play its 
role as a safe asset in times of distress. 
The need for a safe asset is inherent to the workings of a financial system. As 
Nakaso (2013) showed, this impact can be seen through several avenues: for 
instance, sovereign bonds act as a benchmark for other assets, as mentioned by 
Dunne et al. (2007), thus used as a reference rate from which the additional risk 
factors are compounded to determine the price of other assets. By serving as a 
safe and stable source of collateral in financial transactions, attracting lower 
haircuts and margin requirements, they allow markets to function smoothly 
(Giovannini et al., 2015). 
Their role as an accepted source of collateral allows sovereign debt to play a 
similar role to that of fiat money in economies (Singh, 2013). In this way, 
sovereign debt posted as collateral can be used in other transactions, creating 
an effect which is similar to the monetary multiplier effect (Singh, 2013); and 
Claessens et al. (2012). Without an accepted, liquid, risk free asset, some 
financial transactions that require the use of collateral may never happen. 
1.7. Connectedness: amongst financial firms and with sovereigns 
Finally, and as expected given its key role in the work of financial markets, safe 
assets are also integral to prudential regulation. Prudential requirements use safe 
assets in order to limit or prevent excessive risk taking in normal times. One can 
think that to the extent that both sovereign debt and money are backed by a 
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country´s central bank, they should be exchangeable assets. Debt only becomes 
risky when a country stops being backed by its central bank. 
Given the importance of financial stress, many resources have been devoted to 
understanding the workings of this event. A key area of analysis is how stress 
can propagate from one financial institution to the system, or to other institutions, 
or from the sovereign to financial system and vice versa. This played a key role 
in the start of the global financial crisis in 2008-2009: understanding which 
institutions are systemic and which aren´t is essential to understand the costs 
and benefits of the resolution of a given institution. 
As a result, much literature and policy effort has gone into determining what a 
systemically important institution is and how it should be dealt with. The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) has been a key player. In order to 
enhance the regulation of SIFIs, the first step was to identify them. To this end, 
the BCBS selected a number of indicators that reflect many dimensions of a bank: 
size, interconnectedness, the lack of readily available substitutes for the services 
they provide, their global (cross-jurisdictional) activity and their complexity. The 
size, interconnectedness and substitutability categories are in line with the 
guidelines of the IMF/BIS/FSB report submitted to the G20 Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank (BIS, 2010).  
A part of the literature has analyzed the need for such a regulation from a 
particular perspective: the implicit subsidy in being too big to fail. Some authors 
find that the subsidy is large enough to distort firms´ decisions, even beyond the 
banking sector (Baker and MacArthur, 2009).  
Others (Thomson, 2009) take a more policy-oriented approach and not only 
propose a framework for identifying and supervising such institutions; they 
attempt to remove the advantages from being SIFIs and the perverse incentives 
that may arise.  Size and interconnectedness would be the basic determinants 
for being considered a SIFI, and firms that are such by these two counts would 
be subject to the strictest regulations. In contrast, if a firm is highly correlated, it 
may not be subject to additional capital controls, but only to more strict disclosure 
arrangements.  Finally, institutions that are neither large, nor interconnected or 
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correlated but have a particular impact on the workings of a particular region 
would be subject to enhanced supervision. 
1.8. Macroprudential policy 
 The recent financial crisis has shown the need for new instruments to deal with 
the global build-up of financial imbalances, which can eventually have severe 
macroeconomic consequences. In particular, a major shortcoming in the run up 
to the crisis was the lack of understanding on how systemic risk builds up even 
when, from a microprudential perspective, the risks to the financial system may 
seem, ex ante, limited.  
This lack of understanding was in part due to the confidence that the financial 
system would be able to adjust itself automatically. As a result, growing debt and 
leverage before the crisis, often related to house price booms, were not tackled. 
As a result, low volatility and risk premia and the excessive risk taking they could 
entail were not considered as large a risk to the system as they turned out to be. 
In this context, the role of financial innovation, deregulation and disintermediation 
in the creation of bubbles was not sufficiently recognized. In particular, the 
avenues through which the fallout from the bubble would spread were not 
identified. 
The need to understand how interactions across firms develop means there is a 
need to complement the traditional, micro approach, with a macro approach in 
regulation and surveillance. This need for a macroprudential approach has led to 
several policy initiatives to implement macroprudential policies (see Gorton and 
Winton, 2003).  
The policy debate is, as a result, evolving around the range of macroprudential 
tools available, how they can be implemented and their effectiveness. The 
effectiveness has been analyzed both in terms of the economic impact of the new 
tools and the interactions with other policies, in particular monetary policy.  
A key issue is the interaction between monetary policy and other prudential 
policies. In particular, part of the reasoning focuses on the impact of monetary 
policy on financial stability, and so, the role that may be played by 
macroprudential policy as a complement to monetary policy. These interactions 
are not well understood, on account of the still nascent knowledge regarding 
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interactions between the real economy and the financial system. Macroprudential 
policy and the related literature can be seen as an attempt to bridge that gap. 
Clement (2010) shows that the term macroprudential was first used in the 
meetings of the Cooke Commission (today the BCBS) in the 1970s. Borio (2009) 
shows that the term was used to emphasize the links between financial regulation 
and supervision and the economic status quo. Tucker (2009) and Mccauley et al. 
(1999) also show the purpose of macroprudential policy when it started, and, in 
particular, its focus on managing the risks that arise from an increase in leverage.  
In BIS (1986), one can find references to the effect of regulation on the aggregate 
payments system and the financial system. This was followed by the insight that 
what appear as prudent from an individual perspective may be dangerous from a 
systemic perspective (Blunden, 2007). The need to understand the build-up of 
systemic risk was therefore present in the early literature 2000s (Crockett, 2000).  
However, the focus on macroprudential issues has rocketed after the current 
crisis, as can be seen in the references to the issue coming from policymakers 
(e.g. Shirakawa, 2009, Nijathaworn, 2009, Tumpel-Gugerell, 2009, Bini-Smaghi, 
2009, Kohn, 2009, and Brouwer, 2010). Some of the issues, in particular 
regarding the interaction of prudential policy and monetary policy, can be traced 
back to Borio et al. (2003), as acknowledged by Orphanides and Williams (2010).  
1.8.1. Objectives of macroprudential policy  
The emergence of the macroprudential debate came at a time when the 
academic literature seemed to have reached an agreement on what the target of 
monetary policy should be. The key target for central banks should be price 
stability over the medium term. In some cases, central banks had a dual mandate, 
such as for example the Federal Reserve, maximum sustainable employment. 
Given these targets, operative objectives were typically defined in terms of CPI 
inflation or some other measure of underlying price dynamics.  
As of now, there is still little agreement on what the target of macroprudential 
policy should be. Financial stability is seen as a key target, but an operational 
definition of it remains elusive. There are two main camps on this matter: First, 
those that define financial stability as the resilience of the financial system when 
faced with exogenous shocks (e.g. Allen and Wood, 2006; and Padoa-Schioppa, 
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2003). Second, those who think that financial distress can be endogenous and 
so consider that the essence of financial stability lies in the ability to manage the 
imbalances within the system (e.g. Schinasi, 2004) or how those imbalances can 
make the system vulnerable even in the face of relatively usual shocks (Borio and 
Drehman, 2009a). At the heart of the debate lies on whether policymakers should 
prioritize ex-ante supervision and regulation or ex-post resolution and crisis 
management policies. 
Regarding the specific targets of macroprudential policy, Brunnermeier and 
Pedersen (2009) suggest that it act to limit the financial system´s tendency to 
infraestimate risk in the downturn and overestimate it in the upturn. By leveling 
the measurement of risk through the cycle, regulation and policy may limit the 
magnitude of booms and busts. Bank of England (2009) shares this view and 
highlights that in avoiding such boom bust cycles, it will help the financial system 
provide services to the economy. As a result, if the boom bust cycle is not related 
to the provision of financial services and the supply of credit, it would be beyond 
the scope of macroprudential policy. Landau (2009), however, asserts that in 
practical terms it would probably be appropriate for macroprudential policies to 
take into account the creation of bubbles.  
Borio and Drehmann (2009a) contend that the main role of macroprudential policy 
is to limit the materialization of system-wide risk that can have a significant 
macroeconomic cost. One must understand the differences of macro- and the 
micro prudential regulation in order to understand the possible effects of the 
policies implemented (Crockett, 2000). Table 2.1 lists the differences between 
macroprudential and microprudential perspectives suggested by Borio (2003). 
Caruana (2010b) suggests that there are two elements to consider regarding 
macroprudential policy: the links across firms in a given point in time, and the 
exposures to similar risks and a more intertemporal dimension that should 
address the procyclicality of the financial system. From a more theoretical 
perspective, Perotti and Suarez (2009a) consider that macroprudential policy 
should tackle negative externalities of individual banks on the financial system: 
strategies that may be optimal from a bank´s individual perspective may end up 
being detrimental to the system as a whole.  
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Hanson et al. (2011) think macro prudential policy can complement 
microprudential policies, whose aim is to protect depositors by having banks 
internalize the losses they may incur in their assets. This behavior must be 
regulated because deposit guarantee schemes are subject to moral hazard. 
Alternatively, macroprudential policy should be designed to minimize the social 
costs of a general decline in the provision of banking services. The manifestation 
of this shrinkage of balance sheets can be found in credit crunches and fire-sales 
of assets. 
1.8.2 Macroprudential tools  
The broadening of the scope of financial policy in general introduces the question 
of how it may be instrumented. This is in contrast to monetary policy, which, at 
least in advanced economies, the debate on the instruments to be used had been 
broadly settled (at least until the advent of the global financial crisis). Short-term, 
interest rate was the primary instrument in monetary policy, and communication 
was an increasingly important complement (Blinder et al., 2008). Non-
conventional tools (e.g. Bernanke and Reinhart, 2004; Gertler and Karadi, 2011; 
Motto et al., 2010; Curdia and Woodford, 2009; Lenza et al., 2010), are 
considered instruments outside the usual policy toolkit, to be used in specific 
periods of time, in which the zero lower bound becomes binding.  
The research into the role of macroprudential policy being at an earlier stage, the 
conclusions remain far from obtaining the depth and the level of consensus on 
basic questions that has been achieved in monetary policy. To foster the debate 
in this area, the ECB has launched an initiative to facilitate academic research on 
aspects that could improve macroprudential supervision within the EU 
(Constâncio, 2010). A range of possible macroprudential measures have been 
investigated without identifying a primary instrument nor a standard taxonomy of 
instruments.  
One important distinction in the debate is between macroprudential tools – 
defined as prudential tools set up with a macro (in the sense of system-
wide/systemic) lens – and other macroeconomic tools that can support financial 
stability such as fiscal policy (see e.g. Blanchard et al., 2010; Borio, 2009). 
Hannoun (2010), gives an overview of alternative sets of tools geared towards 
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financial stability. Caruana (2010b) argues that financial regulatory policies are 
an essential part of the solution but they alone will not suffice to address systemic 
risk in all its complexity. 
 Part of the macroprudential literature is based on the attempt by emerging 
economies to deal with large incoming capital flows and reduce the domestic 
consequences of such flows. Some of these policies include limiting foreign 
exchange positions and constraining the type of foreign assets and magnitude of 
those purchases. Borio and Shin (2007) show that the build-up of financial 
imbalances was often accompanied by a growing share of net foreign-currency 
financing.  
Market-based regulations that try to discourage capital inflows (Mohanty and 
Scatigna, 2005; Ghosh et al., 2008; Committee on the Global Financial System, 
2009) and other tools aimed at controlling large capital inflows, some of which 
became increasingly popular in 2009-2010, are not considered within the scope 
of macroprudential regulation, but rather as tools that may have a prudential side 
effect (Ostry et al., 2010). While examples of such policies abound, many take 
the form of the tax on international debt described in Jeanne and Korinek (2010), 
which forces borrowers to internalize the costs of currency mismatches.  
Bank for International Settlements (2010) provides a useful summary of 
macroprudential tools and instruments, their targets and their implementation. 
One can classify macroprudential tools according to their aim. For instance, some 
tools are geared towards addressing risks that may arise over time, particularly 
linked to the procyclicality in the financial system. Others consider the distribution 
of risk within the financial system, that is, the cross-sectional dimension of 
macroprudential risk, focusing on the systemic contribution of an individual firm 
or its exposure to a system wide risk event. The procyclicality of risk is the key 
concern of the time series dimension (Bank for International Settlements, 2001; 
Borio et al., 2001; Danielsson et al., 2009; Borio and Zhu, 2012; Brunnermeier et 
al., 2011, Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Shin, 2009). 
Saurina and Trucharte (2007) and Repullo et al. (2009) show that capital 
requirement ratios are procyclical. Shin (2010) discusses ways of mitigating this 
procyclicality, and considers that countercyclical capital requirements, together 
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with forward-looking statistical provisioning schemes, can mitigate the harmful 
effects of excessive risk taking via securitization. Kashyap and Stein (2004) 
present a model where, if a social planner was to maintain credit during 
downturns and minimize the use of deposit insurance, then a time-varying capital 
requirement can be optimal. Hanson et al. (2011) argue that such a regulation 
may not be strong enough in downturns, when markets may find that the capital 
accumulated in good times may not be enough to convince to lend to the bank. 
These demands in bad times should be taken as a benchmark for the capital 
required in good times.  
The valuation of collateral and loan-to-value ratios may also be a source of 
procyclicality, which can be addressed through maximum loan-to-value (LTV) 
ratios. Borio et al. (2001) analyzes how this can be dealt with.  
The second macroprudential instrument that deals with the procyclicality of banks 
is loan loss provisions, which has been identified as a way of limiting the impact 
of the downturn in weakening banks’ balance sheets and so reduce the ensuing 
amplification of the financial cycle. Borio et al. (2001) argue that the procyclicality 
of bank provision is amplified by accounting practices, tax constraints and 
methodological shortcomings. Fernandez de Lis et al. (2000) discuss how 
forward-looking provisioning would limit the observed strong procyclicality of loan 
provisions. Jimenez and Saurina (2005) suggest that forward-looking loan loss 
provision should take into account the credit risk profile of banks’ loan portfolios 
along the business cycle.  
The third is haircut-setting and margining practices in securities financing and 
over-the-counter derivatives transactions. Committee on the Global Financial 
System (2010a) highlights the system-wide impact of these practices during the 
financial crisis, and discusses policy options for reducing the procyclical effects 
of mark to market and haircut determination practices on financial markets. These 
include countercyclical variations in margins and haircuts, and higher and 
relatively stable through-the-cycle haircuts for securities financing transactions.  
The cross-sectional dimension focuses on the distribution of risk in the financial 
system at a point in time. The idea is that linkages, common exposures, and herd 
behavior can introduce system-wide risk that needs to be reckoned with. There 
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is a rich literature on which analysis of the cross-sectional dimension can draw, 
such as studies of systemic aspects of risk management (see e.g. Hellwig, 1995) 
or theories of systemic risk (e.g. Acharya, 2009). Important elements within this 
perspective include market failures (e.g. Rabin, 1998; Calomiris, 2009) and 
propagation channels (e.g. Jensen, 1986; Calomiris and Khan, 1991; Caruana 
2010b). 
Short-term debt in banks’ liabilities has been identified as a major source of 
vulnerability (Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton, 2010; Shin, 2009; Hanson et al., 
2011). These are often modeled as idiosyncratic shocks that are amplified across 
the system, as banking networks reinforce the systemic nature of the 
amplifications. The key to the amplifications lies in the presence of 
interdependencies across banks, be it regarding assets and liabilities or though 
the payments and settlement systems. The accelerator of the spillovers is usually 
the difficulties in discerning in real time, which institutions are solvent and which 
aren´t (e.g., Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Allen and Gale, 2000; Rochet and Tirole, 
1996; Freixas and Parigi, 1998; McAndrews and Roberds, 1995; Aghion et al., 
2000). In fact, as Martin et al. (2010) showed using an extended Diamond-Dybvig 
(1983) framework, financial institutions that are funded by short-term debt and 
hold financial assets can run with similar effects on solvency as traditional deposit 
runs. According to a model developed by Stein (2012), in the absence of 
regulation, money creation by banks can lead to financial system vulnerabilities, 
as banks will issue more debt than is socially desirable and so could lead to 
externalities that would make the banking system vulnerable to crises.  
Given the prominence of balance sheet mismatch in the literature, it is natural 
that the key instruments that have been designed minimize the risks associated 
to this mismatch. Some examples of such tools are the net stable funding ratio or 
a liquidity coverage ratio (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009), which 
have an element of procyclicality. One way to overcome procyclicality, proposed 
by Perotti and Suarez (2009a, b, 2010), is discouraging short term funding 
through liquidity risk charges. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) propose that a 
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capital surcharge be created that is proportional to the maturity mismatch of the 
financial institution.  
The parallelism with monetary policy can also be found in the debate on whether 
there should be automatic, pre-specified rules or whether the supervisors must 
be afforded discretion and flexibility to enforce macroprudencial regulation (Borio 
and Shim, 2007). 
In the academic literature, and in particular since the observation that discretion 
can have a time inconsistency and as the historical experience built up, the 
evidence seemed to favor the existence on rules that would enhance 
transparency and accountability, and would be superior in welfare terms than 
discretion-based decisions (Kydland and Prescott, 1977).  
Rule-based macroprudential tools – e.g. automatic stabilizers – have, similarly, 
some interesting characteristics (Goodhart, 2004). Loan loss provisions, capital 
requirements/capital surcharges, or loan-to-value ratios can for example be 
designed in a rules-based way. One important built-in stabilizer are risk 
management practices that internalize the risk of the buildup of financial 
imbalances and their unwinding (Borio and Shim, 2007 or Sundaresan and Wang, 
2010).  
Midway between discretion and full flexibility, one finds contingent instruments, 
which try to have the best of both worlds, and can be considered rule-based tools 
that are state-dependent. Hanson et al. (2010) break up these instruments as 
those that are contingent reversible i.e. debt that is automatically converted into 
equity in times when a bank’s capital buffer declines under a pre announced limit 
(Flannery, 2005; French et al., 2010; Pennacchi, 2010), and, on the other hand, 
capital insurance, which would take the form of a policy purchased by the bank 
which pays off if certain conditions of stress or capital shortfall for the bank take 
place (Kashyap et al., 2008).  
While rule-based tools play an important role, in policy debates, other, more 
discretionary rules have also been highlighted. The reasoning behind this is that 
since the next crisis is likely to take a different form, the regulation may not be 
prepared to deal with it. As a result, discretion may play an important role. One 
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such instrument is the ability to issue warnings in speeches or in official 
publications. However, the use of warnings is far from uncontroversial: in fact, 
there may not be enough of them, as regulators could fear adverse effect, by 
triggering self-fulfilling dynamics (Libertucci and Quagliariello, 2010). An 
alternative could be levies or quantitative adjustments to prudential tools, so as 
to tackle the new forms of systemic risk that may arise (Hilbers et al., 2005).  
Another aspect of the debate has been on whether the regulation should be 
instrumented through prices or quantities. Perotti and Suarez (2011) provide a 
theoretical treatment of the difference between price and quantity-based tools 
based on the model by Weitzman (1974), who shows that in the presence of 
externalities the two types of policy instruments can have different welfare 
outcomes if there is uncertainty about compliance costs. Price-based tools fix the 
marginal cost of compliance and lead to uncertain levels of compliance, while 
quantity-based tools fix the level of compliance but result in uncertain marginal 
costs.  
Perotti and Suarez (2011) compare Pigovian taxes aimed at equating private and 
social liquidity costs to quantity regulations such as net funding ratios. They show 
that when regulators cannot target individual bank characteristics, the industry 
response to regulation depends on the composition of bank characteristics. 
Hence, depending on the dominant source of heterogeneity, the socially efficient 
solution may be attained with Pigovian taxes, quantity regulations or a 
combination of both.  
Among quantity restrictions, Hanson et al. (2011) argue in favor of small 
increases in capital in absolute terms for trouble banks, instead of using the 
capital ratio, so as to avoid the incentive to shrink their balance sheets and lead 
to more procyclicality of regulation. According to Hanson et al. (2011) this can be 
implemented through the introduction of a capital ratio requirements in terms of 
the maximum of current and lagged assets.  
Some studies also distinguish the context in advanced and emerging market 
countries. McCauley (2009) argued that emerging market central banks have 
been regular practitioners of macroprudential policy, without calling it by this 
name. As an example, he cited the Reserve Bank of India’s decision to raise the 
Basel I weights on mortgages and other household credit in 2005 (RBI, 2005). 
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Borio and Shim (2007) and Committee on the Global Financial System (2010b) 
provide an overview of emerging market economies’ experience with 
macroprudential instruments. Agénor and Pereira da Silva (2009) examined the 
cyclical effects of capital requirements for banking sectors in developing 
countries, with a view to understanding the cyclical effects of Basel regulations in 
the prevention and/or amplification of the financial crisis. Brunnermeier and 
Sannikov (2014), Tucker (2009) and Borio (2004), Peston (1959) Bullard et al. 
(2009) also contributed to this literature. 
1.8.3. Analytical underpinnings  
Macroprudential policy requires, from an analytical perspective, an upgrade in an 
area that has been considered a weakness of macroeconomic models up to 
today, in particular, the interactions between the macroeconomy and the financial 
system. 
Macroeconomic models and monetary policy analysis made use of a common 
framework of models, underpinned in the modelisation of micro fundamentals and 
rationality, and analyzed the dynamics at or near equilibrium. These models 
incorporated some sort of friction, from rigidities in the labor market or 
information. As a result, a monetary policy shock was found to have a tractable 
transmission mechanism, and a certain welfare consequence. The challenge was 
to incorporate and refine the interactions between the macroeconomy and the 
financial system. 
Macroprudential policy is far from having a clear network of models. This is part 
because it is still a recent line of work, and the enhanced focus on financial 
stability is rather new. As a result, the methodological literature, and the fact that 
financial stability, at heart, deals with the one question to which the literature has 
not provided a clear framework (the interaction between the macroeconomy and 
the financial system), makes it particularly challenging. Note that the lack of a 
concise, well- delimited definition of macroprudential policy makes it all the more 
harder to develop a class of models suited to address all the issues involved. 
 Financial stability and systemic risk  
Models that deal with financial stability typically take three different approaches, 
as shown by Borio and Drehmann (2009a).  Diamond and Dybvig (1983), design 
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models where exogenous shocks can lead to multiple equilibria, in line with the 
sunspot literature. A second class of models starts from a negative shock (Allen 
and Gale, 2004), which in itself is not necessarily systemic, but when coupled 
with a propagation mechanism (such as the balance sheet linkages of Rochet 
and Tirole, 1996) leads to financial instability. Finally, Minsky (1982) and 
Kindleberger (1996) posit that financial instability arises from cyclical fluctuations.  
De Bandt and Hartmann (2000) and De Bandt et al. (2009), consider the 
perspective of systemic weakness. While there is no clear definition of the 
concept (See Hutchinson and McDill, 1999; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Bell 
and Pain, 2000; Demirguç-Kunt and Detriagache, 2005; Davis and Karim, 2008; 
Dell’Arricia et al., 2008; Von Hagen and Ho, 2007). Definitions of systemic risk 
often evolve around the idea present in De Bandt and Hartmann (2000), by which 
systemic risk materializes when institutions that had a healthy starting point and 
were resilient to the first round of stress are vulnerable to a second (or ulterior) 
rounds of stress (See Borio and Drehmann, 2009a). 
Perotti and Suarez (2009b) interpret systemic risk as propagation risk, by which 
initial shocks end up affecting other institutions and can thus have an impact on 
the macroeconomy that is not the consequence of the initial shock. 
The literature analyzed above focuses on contagion as the mechanism that 
unearths financial instability. However, a line of literature focuses on how the 
interaction of financial decisions and the business cycle can lead to instability. 
The driver of this, according to Borio and White (2003), is that in boom times the 
financial sector overextends, and contracts in recessions, thus amplifying the 
cycle. In this context, risk and financial instability are endogenous to the 
macroeconomy, and have a dynamic, self-correcting element to it.  
Danielsson et al. (2009) consider as a starting point the divergence between 
perceived risk and actual risk. As a result, market participants may, in good times, 
underestimate the actual risk they are facing, and so, an equilibrium level of risk 
arises, which could be excessive from a social point of view.  
A key ingredient of the systemic risk literature has been the efforts at quantifying 
financial instability. A first such approach was the use of balance sheet structures. 
This was particularly popular over the past decade, where much effort has been 
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dedicated to the creation of indicators of financial distress (Carson and Ingves, 
2003; Bordo et al., 2002). In terms of policy, the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) upgraded its surveillance of the financial sector, creating a broad set of 
indicators that were meant to give an indication of the risks emanating from the 
financial sector (the Financial Soundness indicators; Moorhouse, 2004; 
International Monetary Fund, 2008) – and market indicators, such as those that 
use equity and credit-default-swap (CDS) or other derivative instruments (Illing 
and Liu, 2006; Tarashev and Zhu, 2006, 2008). While these indicators are 
increasingly used, they have important limitations (e.g. Fell, 2007). Most balance 
sheet indicators – such as loan loss provisions or non-performing loans – are 
typically backward looking (Bongini et al., 2002). Ratings of individual institutions 
are in principle forward-looking but in practice tend to incorporate new information 
only with a lag. Moreover, they are micro in nature and thereby fail to highlight 
vulnerabilities at the level of the whole financial system. 
One line of literature that has attempted to draw conclusions from underlying 
dynamics in the financial system is the literature on early warning indicators. 
These studies predict financial stress from a set of leading indicators, which 
(Aikeman et al., 2011) are typically associated with financial stress, the key 
shortcoming from a macroprudential perspective is that they provide limited 
information on the interaction between the real sector and the financial sector, 
and usually do not give a structural view on how risks arise and are transmitted 
so as to cause financial instability, thus limiting the information they provide to 
policymakers 
One are that is particularly interesting of this literature is that which looks at the 
interactions between credit growth and the consequences for asset price 
misalignments (Borgy et al., 2009; Borio and Lowe, 2002; Borio and Drehman, 
2009b; Gerdesmeier et al., 2009; Alessi and Detken, 2009; Fornari and Lemke, 
2009). Their theorical underpinning relies on endogenous cycles, which suggest 
that loose risk controls lead to excessive credit growth which, once asset prices 
turn round, lead to disorder which can have important macroeconomic 
consequences. Another advantage of these models is that they tend to spot 
financial instability over a longer horizon than other early warning models (Borio 
and Drehmann, 2009a, Borio and Lowe, 2002).  
  
60 
In terms of the econometric literature, VARs provide a method that can help 
understand the drivers, propagation mechanism and consequences of financial 
distress (Drehmann et al., 2006; Misina and Tessier, 2008). While flexible and 
tractable, they are purely empirical and are often highly stylized (Lucchetta and 
De Nicolo’, 2009). They are perhaps, most useful, in comparing the conclusions 
that arise from the literature with the empirical models that bring the data to the 
theory. 
Finally, macro stress testing provides a forward looking methodology for 
understanding the effect of macro shocks on the financial system. Of course, a 
limitation of these models is that they tend to rely on the existing knowledge of 
the macro and financial linkages, which is limited. Secondly, they tend to focus 
on large shocks, and usually do not consider the amplification of small initial 
shocks which can end up having systemic consequences. As result, they may not 
be particularly helpful to identify elusive connections between macroeconomic 
and financial variables. (Borio and Drehmann, 2009a). Alfaro and Drehmann 
(2009) emphasize that macroeconomic weakness was not at the heart of 
previous crises. As a result, traditional macro stress testing may be of limited use 
to predict future crisis. 
1.8.4 Assessing the systemic importance of individual financial institutions  
A main line of research involves understanding whether an individual firm can 
have systemic consequences, as described by Allen and Babus (2009). 
A key contribution, in the wake of the crisis, was the conditional value at risk 
(CoVaR) by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2008), which measures the value at risk 
(VaR) of the financial system conditional on the financial market being under 
distress. They define an individual financial institution’s marginal contribution to 
systemic risk as the difference between CoVaR and the financial system VaR.  
From this starting point, one can analyze what makes a firm become systemic, 
which is crucial from a supervisory point of view. They find that leverage, size, 
and maturity mismatch are the key drivers of a high CoVar. CoVar must be 
thought of for an individual firm, as it is not additive across firms (Tarashev et al., 
2010).  
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Buiter (2009a) notes that CoVar (which can be calculated through quantile 
regressions) do not necessarily measure causation, but rather correlation. Also, 
the CoVar does not consider that the Var may behave very differently in crisis 
times. Secondly, and crucially, the CoVar does not consider indirect effects, as it 
does not build the network of possible effects.  
Segoviano and Goodhart (2009) define systemic impact as the probability of 
having at least one extra bank failure given a particular bank fails, thus using 
conditional probabilities.  
Zhou (2010) proposed a “systemic importance index”, which could be related to 
the number of bank failures caused by the failure of one particular bank. Zhu 
(2008) constructs market-based systemic risk indicators, defined as the 
insurance premium for a hypothetical protection on liability losses when the 
financial system as a whole is in distress. He posits a rule to allocate systemic 
risk contributions, the losses from a particular bank conditional to the banking 
system being in distress. It has the same additive property (i.e. systemic risk 
contribution of individual bank adds up to the system's risk) and incorporates size 
weight information and information on the bank’s loss given default (LGD) in the 
simulation.  
Gauthier et al. (2012) use data on individual banks’ loan books, risk exposures, 
and on interbank linkages including over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives for the 
Canadian banking system to compare alternative mechanisms for allocating the 
overall risk of a banking system to its member banks. They explicitly take into 
account that overall risk as well as each bank’s risk contribution change once 
bank capital requirements change. Gauthier et al. (2012) consider five different 
ways to compute contributions to systemic risk, namely component VaR, 
incremental VaR, two kinds of Shapley values, and CoVaRs. They find that all 
five risk allocation mechanisms give similar results in terms of improving financial 
stability due to macroprudential capital buffers based on them that are quite 
different from the ones proposed at the BCBS.  
One literature strand on the interconnectedness of financial systems models 
them as complex systems (Hommes 2006, 2008, 2009; Hommes and Wagener, 
2009; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008).  
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Generally, the interconnections arise from exposures in the interbank market. 
These exposures can be modeled by estimating the actual network structure of 
the financial system (Lelyveld and Liedorp, 2006), which can then help 
understand the contagion risks. A typical result of this literature is that systemic 
risk only arises if the largest banks fail. Gai and Kapadia (2008) and Nier et al. 
(2007) construct artificial homogeneous networks of banks to test the results 
mentioned above. They find that connectivity has two opposing effects on 
contagion risk: on one hand, by favoring diversification, it helps reduce the 
probability of failure. However, the interconnections amongst firms facilitate the 
propagation of risk once failure affects one of the firms in the network. 
Relatedly, one can identify a measure of systemic risk and then calculate the 
contributions of individual institutions to it (Tarashev et al., 2008, 2010). Policy 
should be directed at the firms and the connections that lead to the systemic risk 
(Huang et al., 2009).  
Acharya et al. (2010) calculate the contribution of each individual financial 
institution to the social cost of a systemic failure, which is considered proportional 
to its size and to the percentage loss or negative return it suffers when the market 
is below this threshold. They propose a levy on banks depending on the average 
of this contribution (its Marginal Expected Shortfall, MES) multiplied by its weight 
in the economy.  
1.8.5 Understanding the interaction between the financial system and the 
macroeconomy  
The popularity of dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models in 
policymaking (Sbordone et al., 2010) made central banks vulnerable to three 
criticism. First, their unsatisfactory modeling of financial frictions (Bean, 2009). 
The Bank of England Quarterly Model, used as an input to its Monetary Policy 
Committee, is an example of this (Harrison et al., 2005). Second, DSGE models 
generally analyze the transition towards a steady state, so are not able to model 
the dynamics that generate financial booms and busts (see Buiter, 2009b; Bank 
of England, 2009 and Tovar, 2008).  
These limitations have been tried to overcome in different ways. First, 
augmenting DSGE with financial frictions (Curdia and Woodford, 2009; Christiano 
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et al., 2011, Gerali et al., 2010; Dellas et al., 2010.). The origin of this literature 
can be found in the financial accelerator of Bernanke et al. (1999). Some papers 
explicitly use these models to examine the interaction between monetary policy 
and the macroeconomy during the crisis. Del Negro et al. (2010) for example 
introduce a model with credit frictions of the form suggested by Kiyotaki and 
Moore (2008), as well as nominal wage and price frictions to show that the non-
standard monetary policies followed by the Federal Reserve during the crisis 
prevented a repeat of the Great Depression in 2008-09. The standard references 
are Bernanke and Gertler (2001), Goodfriend (2002), and, for an overview of the 
arguments, Giavazzi and Mishkin (2006).  
Kannan et al. (2012) show that the reaction by monetary authorities to the 
financial accelerator that drive credit growth and asset prices can deliver financial 
and macroeconomic stability. In addition, a macroprudential instrument designed 
specifically to dampen credit market cycles would be useful. In their model, policy 
responses must be flexible, if it is not, they run the risk of lowering stability. 
Vlieghe (2010) suggests that monetary policy take into account the fact that credit 
frictions may lead to an inefficient allocation of resources. 
This set of models usually examines the financial sector from the point of view of 
its ability to allocate resources to the right borrowers. The interactions amongst 
lenders (or intermediaries) as a source of financial instability is largely absent 
from these models. 
The second strand investigates frictions related to financial intermediaries, and 
studies the role of bank capital in the monetary transmission mechanism. 
Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) analyze the different financial markets, and so 
eliminate the one interest rate hypothesis. By thus modeling the financial sector, 
they find that actual resource allocation and so optimal policy responses can 
deviate from the standard conclusions of the regular DSGE. 
Other includes Cohen-Cole and Martinez Garcia (2008) and Gertler and Karadi 
(2011), who introduce balance sheet  constraints of financial firms in a DSGE, 
and make use of Kiyotaki and Moore (2008)’s modeling of liquidity risk. However, 
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) is a real business-cycle (RBC) model without frictions, 
and so not a useful framework to study the effect of monetary policy, although it 
is valid for the analysis of credit policies. Jeanne and Korinek (2010) show that 
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as borrowers do not internalize their contribution to aggregate volatility and as a 
result take on excessive leverage, thereby leading to boom-bust cycles. To reign 
in excessive leverage, Jeanne and Korinek (2010) propose a Pigouvian tax on 
borrowing that induces agents to internalize their externalities they generate.  
A set of papers has looked at the interaction between capital regulation and 
macroeconomic performance. Covas and Fujita (2009) calculate the effect of 
capital requirement ratios on the business cycle, in a banking model that mirrors 
Holmstrom and Tirole (1998). They find that Basel II capital requirements are 
procyclical and so increase output volatility. Zhu (2008) finds that a risk-sensitive 
capital standard leads to much higher capital requirements for small and riskier 
banks, and much lower requirements for large and less risky banks.  
Repullo and Suarez (2013) show that countercyclical capital buffers would reduce 
the incidence of credit rationing over the business cycle without compromising 
the long-run solvency targets implied in the original regulation. N'Diaye (2009) 
finds that binding countercyclical prudential regulations can help reduce output 
fluctuations and allow monetary authorities to achieve the same outcomes. 
Meh and Moran (2010) construct a DSGE model in which the balance sheet of 
banks affects the propagation of shocks. They find that economies whose 
banking sectors remain well-capitalized experience smaller reductions in bank 
lending and less pronounced downturns. Bank capital thus increases an 
economy’s ability to absorb shocks and therefore affects the conduct of monetary 
policy.  
Macroeconomic Assessment Group (2010) mainly consider macroeconomic 
models without a financial sector: the effect of stronger capital and liquidity 
requirements is mainly assessed by first modeling their effect on credit spreads, 
economy-wide lending volumes and lending standards, and then modeling the 
effect of these on macroeconomic outcomes using standard semi-structural 
macroeconometric models or DSGE models without a banking sector; but some 
DSGE models in which financial intermediaries and their balance sheets are 
modeled explicitly were also employed in the study. In Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (2010) the effect of a macroprudential overlay in the form of 
countercyclical capital buffers proposed under Basel III has not yet been 
analyzed.  
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Angeloni and Faia (2009) find that tighter monetary policy reduces bank leverage 
and risk, while a productivity or asset price boom increases it. They document 
that procyclical capital ratios are highly destabilizing. The best outcome is through 
mildly anticyclical capital ratios and a with monetary policy taking into 
consideration leverage and asset prices.  
Angelini et al. (2010) develop a DSGE model, calibrated to the euro area and 
investigate whether a countercyclical capital requirements policy can usefully 
interact with monetary policy in achieving an inward shift of the output-inflation 
volatility trade-off. Policymakers’ active management of capital requirements 
would improve the stabilization of economic activity.  
Goodhart et al. (2005, 2006) De Walque et al. (2009, 2010) and Uhlig (2010) can 
also be considered attempts to include the banking sector in a macroeconomic 
model. Similarly, de Walque and Pierrard (2009) embed that same model into a 
DSGE model and examine the implications for monetary policy. They find that 
Taylor rules directly targeting some banking variables may perform better than 
standard Taylor rules targeting output.  
Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2009) introduce the interactions between 
macroeconomic factors and the financial system in a model that does not 
necessarily evolve around a steady state. In this model, the financial sector does 
not internalize all the costs it generates, and so some aspects, particularly in the 
presence of securitization, can lead to excessive risk taking. In general, the main 
conclusion is that the financial sector can achieve inefficient outcomes.  
Related work examines the impact of monetary policy and funding liquidity on 
credit supply. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) point to the important role of 
liquidity, and how liquidity is correlated with market performance. As a result, it 
can suddenly disappear, leading to liquidity crises. Adrian and Shin (2009) point 
to the health of bank balance sheets as a key transmission mechanism of the 
macroeconomic outcome of monetary policy. In this vein, according to Adrian and 
Shin (2009), interest rates can affect bank valuations and creditworthiness, and 
so, risk taking. Geanakoplos (2010) introduces leverage in a DSGE framework. 
Freixas (2009), Freixas and Jorge (2008), and Ongena and Popov (2011) also 
analyze the interactions between funding conditions, bank health and the 
macroeconomy.  
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Borio and Zhu (2012) analyze the role of bank capital in the transmission of 
monetary policy, in particular through banks´ decisions of risk-taking. In particular, 
monetary policy affects banks´ perceptions of risk tolerance, and so the exposure 
to risk they are willing to hold in their portfolios. This in turns determines the 
funding and debt they use. They consider three avenues by which monetary 
policy affects risk: through its effect on valuations, search for yield and central 
banks perceived reaction function: more aggressive when stress emerges than 
when risk starts to build up (see Diamond and Rajan, 2009; Farhi and Tirole, 
2012).  
Dubecq et al. (2009), similarly, consider that risk taking is inversely proportional 
to the level of interest rate, which may in turn bias participants´ perception of risk. 
Disyatat (2011) considers that balance sheet strength and risk taking can affect 
the mechanics of the bank lending channel. 
There have also been important contributions to the debate from a more empirical 
perspective. Adrian and Shin (2009) find, empirically, that the size of balance 
sheets depends on short term interest rates. Maddaloni et al. (2008), Ioannidou 
et al. (2009) and Jimenez et al. (2008) find that lower interest rates leads banks 
to increase risk, via lower standards in credit origination. This effect can be 
deepened by innovation (Rajan, 2005) and by a long period of expansionary 
monetary policy (Altunbas et al., 2009; Gambacorta, 2009).  
The empirical literature has analyzed monetary policy´s role in the creation of 
bubbles. Some, like Taylor (2009), find that lower than optimal rates played a role 
in the formation of the housing bubble before the global financial crisis. However, 
others, including Dokko et al. (2009), do not find a central role for monetary policy 
in the formation of the housing bubble in those years.  
Cecchetti et al. (2000) argue that monetary authorities should deflate asset 
bubbles Bean (2003, 2004, 2007, 2009) and Detken and Smets (2004) argue that 
bubbles and financial stability should be part of a central bank´s reaction function, 
but not necessarily be a formal target of monetary policy.  
1.8.6 Effectiveness of macroprudential tools  
The literature on the impact of macroprudential policies is at a relatively early 
stage (see Turner, 2010).  
  
67 
Some have studied the case of pre-crisis in Spain, as in Borio and Shin (2007), 
with particular emphasis on the role of dynamic provisioning. Empirical studies 
find it had a small impact on credit, although it may have helped build up buffers 
in the upturn (Caruana, 2005, Saurina, 2009a). Saurina (2009b) finds that 
dynamic provisions provided a backstop and a larger first line of defense for 
financial firms. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) find that credit standards change 
throughout the cycle, which become more lenient in good times and stricter in the 
downturn. Such behavior may be curtailed by cyclical loan provision scheme that 
considers banks´ risk appetite as an input. Fillat and Montoriol-Garriga (2010) 
find that had a dynamic provisioning system been in place, the need to use 
Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) funds by firms would have been much 
smaller.  
Keys et al. (2009) conclude that lending standards were significantly determined 
by the law in mortgage brokering. Nadauld and Sherlund (2009) also find that 
capital requirements can reduce the size of bubble-formation. Their analysis 
focuses on the effect of a change in the law in 2004, which reduced some 
elements of capital requirements, which they find played a role in the granting of 
low quality loans which eventually defaulted.  
Part of the effort of the literature has focused on the data needed for an effective 
macroprudential supervision. In this context, some authors have argued for the 
creation of an agency that collects more data from banks so as to have a fuller 
picture of their exposures to other institutions and to market events, like a rise in 
correlations (Lo, 2009;. Sibert, 2010). From Sibert´s (2010) point of view, while 
this data would be useful, the difficulty in understanding the driver of systemic risk 
would make them of limited use. The data are a starting point from which network 
effects and connectedness could be derived. One way of possibly overcoming 
this aspect (at least partially) would be through a timely collection of a wide array 
of data which would help researchers understand the risk of building up in the 
system, as proposed by Brunnermeier at al. (2011), although it would still require 
a deeper understanding of the emergence of systemic risk.  
Using data on individual banks’ loan books, risk exposures, and on interbank 
linkages including OTC derivatives for the Canadian banking system, as 
mentioned above, Gauthier et al. (2012) take data on Canadian banks, and their 
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exposures with other banks, as well as risk and loan books, and empirically 
calculate that a macroprudential capital buffer could reduce the probability of 
systemic stress by about 25%.  
One controversial issue is the coordination of macroprudential policy across 
countries. This is particularly difficult in macroprudential policy (as in monetary 
policy) because leverage is usually not synchronized and regulatory arbitrage can 
undermine the effectiveness of the instruments used 
Foreign currency exposures, at the heart of the wave of macroprudential policies 
that started in emerging economies in 2009 has also been the subject of much 
debate. Allen and Moessner (2010) show the foreign currency swaps put in place 
by the major central banks in the wake of the crisis played an essential role in 
saving several banking systems from severe distress. However, it remains to be 
seen whether central banks will be willing to accept such degree of foreign 
currency liquidity risk in the future, in an event of a lower magnitude.  
Korinek (2011) uses the case of Indonesia to analyze the welfare implications of 
capital flows and risk taking. He finds that optimal taxes, which would target more 
volatile sources of funding could raise wellbeing significantly. 
Bianchi (2011) uses a DSGE with credit frictions, calibrated to some features of 
emerging markets finds that an ex ante reduction in foreign currency debt can 
reduce the pressure on emerging economies, by reducing leverage and so the 
magnitude of the downturn when financing conditions worse. In contrast, Benigno 
et al. (2010) do not find a clear preference for crisis prevention over intervention 
once the crisis starts.  
 
1.8.7. Coordination with monetary policy and governance  
 The consensus was traditionally that monetary policy should be geared towards 
price stability over the medium term. There were, however, some exceptions, that 
considered the need to use monetary policy to foster financial stability (e.g. Kent 
and Lowe, 1997; Borio and White, 2003; Filardo, 2004). 
However, the crisis introduced the idea that financial stability is part of a central 
bank´s reaction function, as noted by Trichet (2009), and Bernanke (2010).  
  
69 
Loisely et al. (2009) propose a model in which asset bubbles are possible 
because of their behavior in investment. Monetary policy, by introducing a cost to 
entrepreneurs who create new investment opportunities, can reduce those risks 
taken by banks. The model calibrates when this limitations may be beneficial from 
a social perspective. 
Agur and Demertzis (2009) consider a central bank that tries to preserve financial 
stability. In downturns, the central bank has more of an incentive to cut rates so 
as to reduce the probability of default of risky or illiquid projects. However, on 
average, though the cycle, interest rates will be higher, so as to avoid excessive 
risk taking during boom times. Borio and Drehmann (2009a) consider monetary 
policy can complement, and complete, macroprudential policy and prevent 
financial imbalances from arising or limiting their scope.  
The key is then the coordination of monetary and macroprudential policy. Some 
authors suggest it is analogous to the coordination between fiscal and monetary 
policy, which is modeled as a game in Lambertini and Rovelli (2003).  
Cecchetti (2009) shows that monetary policy and capital requirements are 
substitutes. Bean et al. (2010) study the issue in a New-Keynesian DSGE taken 
from Gertler and Karadi (2011). As a macroprudential tool they suppose 
regulators can directly affect the amount of capital that banks hold. As capital and 
leverage determine risk and lending, macroprudential policy can help monetary 
policy lean less against the wind and so have lower macroeconomic 
consequences. Macroprudential policy can be particularly useful if a country 
losses the ability to set rates (for instance because it enters a monetary union), 
as was the case of Spain upon entering EMU (Fernández and García Herrero, 
2009).  
Institutional set-up and governance issues  
Part of the literature has considered whether regulation and monetary policy 
should be undertaken by separate institutions (Lastra, 2003; Goodhart and 
Schoenmaker, 1995). Blanchard et al. (2010) discuss that regulation and 
monetary policy may have to be set at separate institutions. The issues to 
consider when arranging the institutions charged with macroprudential policy are 
the possible spillovers from the central bank´s ability to monitor macroeconomic 
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developments, second, the avoidance of coordination problems, which can be 
problematic once a crisis strikes, and third, the internalization of macroprudential 
considerations in the monetary policy decisions. 
The use of committees may provide better outcomes (see Blinder, 2009; Eslava, 
2006 and Sibert, 2010) not least because macroprudential policy requires a wide 
array of expertise, for which different backgrounds would be useful.  
Angelini, et al. (2012) shows that the macroprudential policies (such as LTV or 
capital requirement ratios that change over time) are helpful to counter financial 
shocks that lead the credit and asset price booms. In a similar way, Kannan et al. 
(2012) examines in a DSGE framework a monetary policy rule that reacts to 
deviations of prices, output and changes in collateral values with the possibility 
of using a macroprudential instrument (LTV). They find that the optimal policy 
response depends on the source of the imbalance. 
To sum up, while rapidly developing, some aspects of the literature on the 
interaction of fiscal and financial risk remains in its early stages. More research 
is needed to understand the channels of transmission of stress, the changing 
nature of this interaction, the best indicators of stress and the appropriate policy 
response. 
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Chapter 2: Fiscal fatigue and debt sustainability: Empirical evidence 
from the Eurozone 1980-2013 
 
2.1. Introduction 
The sharp rise in debt and long fiscal consolidation process in Eurozone countries 
has led some authors to believe that fiscal fatigue could occur, such that at some 
point the primary balance stops adjusting after a certain level of debt, as countries 
are no longer willing to continue improving their primary balances in response to 
rising debt.  
Generally, one can think the relationship between the level of debt and fiscal 
adjustment process goes through three phases. In the first phase, when debt is 
low, sovereigns may not adjust because increases in debt are considered 
irrelevant at those levels. Secondly, once rising debt reaches a certain size, so 
that for instance markets start reacting to it, sovereigns will start a fiscal 
consolidation process. The fiscal fatigue introduces the third phase of fiscal 
adjustment: when debt is so high for a long period of time, the required 
adjustment is large and the sovereign decides to stop adjusting.  
This concept is related to the fiscal limit in the sense of Leeper (2013), by which 
governments, when debt reaches a certain level, no longer adjust. This can be 
either because markets do not deem further adjustment credible or, because the 
economic situation is so deteriorated that further cuts are not revenue-generating. 
Ghosh et al. (2013) focus on the former phenomenon, and calculate the level of 
debt at which markets would stop financing the government, as debt would 
become unsustainable. 
This chapter tries to contribute by shedding light on what may halt fiscal 
consolidation efforts. According to the narrative above, once a country reached 
the debt limit, the other circumstances do not matter, and the government stops 
adjusting the primary balance, regardless of whether it is growing or not or the 
institutional circumstances at that point. These factors, which they control for, 
may change the debt limit in their setting, but they will not affect the policy reaction 
once the debt limit is reached. 
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Our contribution lies in testing whether the result holds if circumstances vary. In 
other words, reaching the debt limit may not entail the end of fiscal adjustment if 
at that point the economy is growing or if the institutional makeup that determines 
fiscal policy improves. 
We enhance the fiscal reaction function, taking into account a wide set of factors 
that may bias the original result. The first issue we tackle are non linearities in the 
effect of the output gap on the primary balance. These non linearities arise for 
different reasons: for instance, it may be due to the fact that cutting spending in 
a downturn can be particularly damaging to the economy. Also, the asymmetry 
may stem from a government´s myopia, which leads to the fiscal balance not 
being neutral over the cycle. 
Finally, the asymmetry could be due to the fact that agents change their behavior 
at different points in the cycle. For instance, they may increase the proportion of 
expenditure allocated to basic goods in the downturn. To the extent that these 
goods are less heavily taxed than regular goods, the result could be a more 
procyclical fiscal balance. Also, tax compliance has a cyclical component 
(Sancak et al., 2010): in a downturn, there may be more incentives to evade taxes 
than in an upturn, when the marginal cost in terms of welfare of paying taxes may 
be lower. 
We consider how institutional issues may alter the fiscal fatigue result. We 
analyze the evidence regarding political cycles. In particular, we focus on whether 
the delayed fiscal adjustment (Alesina et al., 1991) can affect the fiscal fatigue 
result: governments that are strong enough to carry out a fiscal adjustment may 
only be willing to do it when they do not have any other option, as in general they 
want to avoid restrictive fiscal policies that may be electorally costly. In other 
words, reaching the debt limit may lead to fiscal adjustment if the government has 
enough backing to implement it at that point. 
Our main result is that growth and institutional factors play a key role in 
determining whether a government reacts to debt. We do find some evidence that 
there is fiscal fatigue, in the sense that the higher the level of debt, at the margin, 
fiscal adjustment will be lower. However, this can be mitigated if the economy is 
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growing and if the government has broad parliamentary support and does not 
have to worry about elections when the debt limit is reached. 
Our sample of countries is the Eurozone as a whole. However, from a policy 
perspective, currently, it is clear that the fiscal fatigue results are important for 
countries with high debt and that have gone through large fiscal adjustments. In 
order to check the impact of our results on debt sustainability, we will run an 
exercise in which we create different debt forecasts for the Eurozone periphery. 
In these scenarios, we assume that the fiscal balance follows the enhanced fiscal 
reaction function we introduce in the study, and we compare those results with a 
baseline scenario, composed of forecast from the IMF World Economic Outlook 
as of end 2014. This exercise will illustrate the importance of strong growth for 
debt sustainability. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 introduces the data and the model we use, while the Section 
4 analyzes the results. Section 5 shows the impact of the enhanced fiscal reaction 
function on debt sustainability. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
2.2. Literature Review 
There are several strands of the literature that are relevant to this chapter. First 
of all, the fiscal reaction function literature which usually models the primary 
balance as a function of growth, particularly of the output gap, while also 
controlling for inflation 
The idea of Bohn’s (1998) approach rests on the analysis of how the primary 
fiscal balance (i.e. fiscal balance excluding the interest payments on public debt) 
reacts to sovereign debt. He considers fiscal policy is sustainable once the 
government reacts systematically to a change in public debt by adjusting the 
primary fiscal balance: if a fiscal policy is considered sustainable prior to a certain 
economic shock, the absence of any systematic policy reaction to this shock 
would cause the additionally issued debt to be uncovered by future surpluses, 
thus violating the no-Ponzi condition. Therefore, the government has to react 
systematically to the extended debt-to-Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ratio by 
increasing the primary surplus-to-GDP ratio, in order to maintain fiscal 
sustainability. 
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Bohn (1998) finds significant response coefficients for the period 1916 – 1995 as 
well as for the period 1793 – 2003 and thus concludes that U.S. fiscal policy has 
been in line with sustainability for these particular periods. Similarly, Semmler et 
al. (2007) investigate whether several Euro Area countries (Germany, France, 
Italy and Portugal) have restored their fiscal imbalance by appropriately adjusting 
their fiscal policy. Applying Bohn’s approach on annual fiscal data over the period 
1960-2003 they find positive and robust response coefficients, thus concluding 
that fiscal policy in these European countries follows a sustainable path. 
Sustainability in the hard sense would require perfect knowledge of the future 
distribution of sovereign debt across different states of nature (Bohn, 1995). 
Therefore when testing sustainability with fiscal reaction functions, we define it in 
a weak sense, i.e. as a policy which responds to surges in sovereign debt with 
increases in primary balance. This approach leaves out the unfortunate case 
when government’s response is too weak to avoid sovereign debt accumulating 
up to the level, where there is a serious risk of default. 
An essential contribution in the literature on fiscal fatigue has been Ghosh et al. 
(2013), who consider that fiscal fatigue appears when debt reaches a certain 
level, and so elaborate the concept of debt limit: a level of debt that marks when 
governments stop adjusting. They find evidence of fiscal fatigue in highly indebted 
countries in the past few years in the Eurozone. 
Fatas and Mihov (2010) find no evidence of fiscal fatigue in the Eurozone, as 
measured by the impact of debt on the fiscal balance. However, they do not 
consider the crisis period.  
In these papers, the output gap tends to affect the primary balance linearly. 
However, some of the literature has found that the reaction of the primary fiscal 
balance to the cycle does not behave this way. Sancak et al. (2010) shows that 
tax evasion is countercyclical and that consumer habits tend to change in 
downturns, so that their consumption of primary goods, which tend to be taxed at 
a lower rate, is greater. Also, the mere progressivity of the tax code can lead tax 
revenue to decline more than proportionally in downturns. 
Secondly, when prices decline, households have an incentive to save more, while 
business can postpone investment decisions. As a result, one would expect, 
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ceteris paribus, that a decline in inflation would have a negative impact on the 
fiscal balance, not just through the nominal growth channel described earlier, but 
also because deflation will lead to an increase in savings, which tend to be taxed 
at a lower rate than consumption Sancak et al. (2010). 
A large literature has analyzed the impact of institutions on the primary balance.  
Note that the impact of the institutional independence variables on the primary 
balance is not a given. Some studies find that it tends to worsen the primary 
balance, as shown by Eslava (2006). A strong judiciary may strike down certain 
spending cuts, or may pander more to pressure groups, that have the resources 
to appeal to them, unlike the median voter. However, the bureaucracy theory 
(Litan and Nordhaus, 1983) suggests that governments that have the possibility 
of increasing spending discretionarily will use it. Our model will shed light on 
which effect dominates in the Eurozone. 
Alesina and Drazen (1991) ´s war of attrition model shows why a government 
may implement delayed fiscal adjustment. In this literature there is little evidence 
that a strong government is more willing to undertake a fiscal adjustment upon 
entering office. 
However, they do find evidence that adjustments are more likely to occur in times 
of crisis, when new governments take office, or when they are strong, in the sense 
that they are unified or have a large majority. 
They think these facts are explained by their war-of-attrition model, which 
concludes that stabilizations are more likely to happen in crisis periods with a 
“strong” government. In their setting, delays in the stabilization emerge from 
political conflict between two different groups in this society. These could be 
social groups with different preferences that are represented by different political 
parties.  
The groups have different views on how to allocate the cost of the stabilization; 
each group would like the other to pay for the bulk of the fiscal adjustment.  
In their model, each group can veto the adjustment and is uncertain about the 
impact of the fiscal adjustment on the other group: they know the cost of waiting 
for stabilization but they do not know the other group´s cost function. 
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In this set up, the passage of time will reveal which of the two groups is weaker, 
in the sense that waiting is costlier for them. At this point, the key decision will be 
determined by the marginal cost of waiting vs the marginal benefit of waiting. The 
marginal cost is the cost of not having the stabilization for another period—that 
is, of living in an unstable economy for another instant. The marginal benefit is 
the probability that in the next period the opponent group concedes. 
The game ends when, for one of the groups, the marginal benefit becomes less 
than the marginal cost, and this will occur sooner for the group with the higher 
cost of waiting. So, in the end, the weaker group (that is, the one that suffers more 
from the delays) will concede. But resolution is in general not immediate because 
the passage of time is needed to reveal which of the groups is the weaker. 
Delaying a stabilization is costly for society as a whole, and it is Pareto inferior to 
immediate stabilization, but it is individually rational for each of the two groups. 
In terms of the effect of institutions, a key debate has been on rules vs institutions, 
some papers (Fatas and Milhov, 2010) have considered that rules are less 
important than institutions. The drawback of rules are that they tend to 
oversimplify, as a fiscal adjustment depends on a number of variables, and they 
are difficult to enforce. In contrast, appropriate institutions can have a positive 
impact, if they manage to affect the source of biases in fiscal policy: to the extent 
that institutions lead to a fiscal policy that is more aligned with the general 
interests and less prone for instance to be captured by interest groups, it will have 
a positive impact on the fiscal balance.  
Overall the literature tends to find that first, fiscal policy is procyclical, particularly 
in downturns. Secondly, that procyclical nature may depend on the debt level: for 
high debt levels, fiscal policy tends to be procyclical, while it is countercyclical for 
low debt levels. 
2.3. Data and Empirical Model 
2.3.1 Data 
Our model will use annual data, for the period 1980-2013 for the Eurozone 
member countries. The key macroeconomic variables: output gap, debt to GDP 
ratio and the primary balance are taken from the International Monetary Fund’s 
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World Economic Outlook (WEO) database. As Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show for the 
Eurozone as a whole, the recent period stands out as a time or large negative 
output gap and increasing government debt, in spite of the improvement in the 
primary balance. 
Figure 2.1: Output gap and primary balance in the Eurozone (1991-2013) 
 
Figure 2.2: Government debt in the Eurozone (1991-2013). 
 
Source: IMF WEO 
Secondly, we use the support that a government has. The variable is measured 
as the percentage of members of Parliament that have voted for a government in 
a given date. The literature tends to show a positive relationship between the 
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primary balance and the degree of support for a government, which is explained 
by two aspects: first, the fact that governments with broad support may be able 
to afford being more farsighted, and, secondly, governments that have broad 
support do not need to please a wide variety of pressure groups through a 
giveaways (Roubini and Sachs, 1989). 
According to the political cycle theories (Alesina et al., 1997 or Goeminne and 
Smolders, 2014), governments tend to increase spending ahead of elections. The 
variable we use will be the number of government changes in a given year. This 
indicator will enter the equation with a lead, to capture the forward looking effect 
described by the literature. This is taken from the comparative political data sets 
of Bern University. 
We also consider the impact on the type of government ruling the country. In 
particular, we distinguish whether the governing party has a large stable majority 
or not. The results refer to the existence of a multiparty minority government, 
which, in the classification we use, the weakest type of government. 
2.3.2 Model specification 
In the fiscal reaction function, the primary balance is a function of the previous 
level of debt, and then a series of controls such as the output gap and inflation 
and institutional variables as controls. Implicitly, the fiscal fatigue literature 
considers that the primary balance reacts linearly to changes in growth. 
The equation to be estimated is the following: 
, 0 1 , 1 2 , 3 , 4 , ,i t i t i t i t i t i ty d og ins                (1) 
where y denotes the primary balance, d is the debt-GDP ratio, og is the output 
gap (measured as the difference between actual and potential GDP1),  is 
inflation (measured as the rate of change in the consumer price index) and ins 
represents the institutional variables. 
                                                          
1 Potential GDP is estimated using the IMF WEO method, which draws upon several approaches and 
judgment by country desk officers. However, the institution checks that the methodology is robust and 
consistent across countries (De Masi, 1997). 
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As can be see, we start from the classic fiscal reaction function. This is estimated 
as a panel of current Eurozone countries, using annual data for the period 1980-
2013. 
Regarding the possible endogeneity of the primary balance, it is corrected by the 
introduction of an autoregressive (AR) term as a regressor, and using the lagged 
debt. One of the issues that must be considered is that debt depends on past 
values of the primary balance. As can be seen in Table 2.1, which shows the 
autocorrelation function of the residual, we do have reason to believe that there 
is autocorrelation. As a result, we model the error term as an AR(1) process, 
which corrects for the autocorrelation, and so endogeneity that arises from the 
persistence in the error term, which arises even though debt is in lagged. This is 
useful, as it corrects for the fact that some of the error of the regressions is 
reflecting what is not captured of the effect of the primary balance on debt,  so 
past errors could affect present primary balance (we introduce the debt variable 
with a lag of one period). We introduce the AR term to control for the persistence 
in past errors that could be reflecting endogeneity. 
Table 2.1. Residuals. Autocorrelation and Partial correlation 
 
 
 
An endogeneity issue arises from the fact that specific country characteristics 
may be captured by the impact of debt on the primary balance. These countries 
have heterogeneous institutional makeups, social welfare systems and tax 
systems, as a result, a given rise in debt may not have the same effect in a 
country as in another. While some of this may be captured by our institutional 
controls, we introduce fixed effects in the regression. This is supported by the 
Hausman test (see Table A2.1 in the Annex). 
Finally, in order to check for endogeneity, and as a robustness check, we employ 
the methodology developed by Arellano and Bover (1997), which uses orthogonal 
deviations and tends to give more robust results that the original estimation 
 
 
Lags Autocorrelation  
 Partial 
Autocorrelation 
   
   1 0.668 0.668 
2 0.407 -0.070 
3 0.184 -0.108 
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method proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991). Note that the coefficients are 
similar to those obtained in the other regressions. 
We explore the impact of growth and the impact of the cyclical position: just like 
downturns will impact revenues more than proportionally, recoveries should be 
more revenue intensive, as they capture the effect of consumer changing their 
habits back to normal.  
Our main contribution regards the correct specification of growth in the fiscal 
reaction function. This accounts for the exponential effect that growth can have 
on the primary balance according to the literature on fiscal revenues. Since we 
consider it in quadratic form and we want to explore non-linearities, the standard 
fiscal reaction function is no longer valid, as we cannot just control for inflation 
linearly, to the extent that the exponential impact of nominal growth could be 
related to either the price or the growth factor. In particular, we explore whether 
it is output growth or inflation that generate the particular primary balance 
dynamics. 
We run the regression using the output gap separating when it is positive and 
negative equation. This piecewise approach implemented in the literature by 
Egert (2014) is an alternative way of correcting for the non linearities in the 
response of the fiscal balance to changes in the cycle. 
From the first regressions we will replicate the fiscal fatigue literature and 
calculate the debt limit (i.e. the debt level at which the government stops 
adjusting). At that point, we will interact the debt limit with a series of variables to 
analyze whether the state once you reach the debt limit is significant: variables 
that may or may not play a role in the whole period may be significant when 
interacted with the debt limit. 
2.4. Empirical Results 
Table 2.2 reports the estimated coefficients and the associated p-values obtained 
from a fixed effects panel regression of the variables on the primary balance, for 
the current Eurozone countries in the period 1980-2013.
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Table 2.2 Empirical results 
 
 
The tables above show the results of the OLS regression. The dependent variable is the primary balance to GDP 
ratio. OGNEG and OGPOSITIVE are, respectively, the outputgap when negative and positive. GOV_SUP is the 
variable of government support, GOVCHAN indicates the number of government changes in a given year, 
OUTGAP the output gap as a % of GDP, DEBTLIM the debt limit and MULTIMIN indicates the existence of a multi 
party minority government. Prob shows the p value of each variable. 
As can be seen, our regression analysis shows that the relationship between the 
fiscal balance and debt is not as clear cut as the traditional fiscal fatigue result 
shows. In particular we present evidence that, first, there are non linearities on 
the impact of the cycle on the primary balance (Lee et al., 1993), and, secondly, 
Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob.
OUTGAP 0.31 0.00 0.35 0.00
OUTGAP^2 -0.05 0.00
OGNEG 0.78 0.00
OGPOSITIVE -0.07 0.61
GOVGROSSDEBT(-1) -0.14 0.04 -0.18 0.01 -0.12 0.04
GOVGROSSDEBT(-1)^2 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
GOVGROSSDEBT(-1)^3 -0.20 0.05 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.15
GOV_SUP 0.03 0.23 0.03 0.18 0.02 0.29
GOVCHAN -0.54 0.09 -0.47 0.13 -0.73 0.02
C 0.16 0.93 0.40 0.84 1.39 0.44
R^2 0.69 0.70 0.70
number of countries 15 15 15
observations 324 324 324
AR(1) coefficient 0.80 0.80 0.80
DW 2.08 1.99 1.98
Prob (F-statistic) 0.00 0.00 0.00
Variable Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Coefficient Prob. Arellano 
Bover
Prob.
OUTGAP 0,35 0,00 0,53 0,00 0,34 0,00 0,35 0,00 0,14 0,07 0,32 0,00
OUTGAP^2 -0,05 0,00 -0,06 0,00 -0,05 0,00 -0,04 0,00 -0,07 0,00 -0,10 0,00
GOVGROSSDEBT(-1) -0,06 0,02 -0,06 0,02 -0,08 0,00 -0,06 0,03 -0,23 0,00 -0,13 0,00
GOVGROSSDEBT(-
1)^2
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
DEBTLIM -0,04 0,00 -0,06 0,00 -0,05 0,00 -0,04 0,00 -0,03 0,01 -0,07 0,00
DEBTLIM*OGNEG -0,40 0,00
DEBTLIM*RGROWT
H
0,06 0,00
DEBTLIM*GOVCHA
N(1)
-0,08 0,06
MULTIMIN*DEBTLI
M
-0,06 0,02
GOVCHAN(1) 0,50 0,11 -0,52 0,08 -0,38 0,20 -0,78 0,01 -0,81 0,01 2,47 0,27
C 0,83 0,39 0,85 0,37 1,22 0,19 0,87 0,38 3,89 0,00
inflation 0,18 0,30 0,18 0,30 0,18 0,30 0,18 0,30
R^2 0,72 0,73 0,73 0,73 0,73
number of countries 15 15 15 15 15
observations 324 324 324 324 324
AR(1) coefficient 0,75 0,76 0,76 0,76 0,76
DW 2,03 2,02 2,00 2,05 2,05
Prob (F-statistic) 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
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institutional aspects can have a significant impact. Furthermore, the debt limit 
result can be altered if, when a sovereign reaches that point, it is growing or it 
has enough political strength to act. 
Regarding the reaction of the fiscal balance to the cycle, when using a piecewise 
explanatory variable, it turns out that the elasticity of the primary balance to the 
cycle is entirely driven by the observations with a negative output gap. When the 
output gap is positive, it does not have a significant impact on the primary 
balance.  
This result is consistent with the asymmetric adjustment in the primary balance 
in the literature and suggests that standard fiscal reaction functions will 
underestimate the impact that recessions have in the primary balance: by not 
separating the output gap into a positive and negative component, the resulting 
elasticity may be capturing some of the lack of impact from the positive output 
gap.  
Similarly, the significance of the squared output gap term is evidence then that 
the primary balance will deteriorate more than expected when in recession. In 
addition, a subject of interest, particularly at this point in the Eurozone, is the 
reaction of the primary balance in recoveries. As we show by the squared term 
of the output gap, the improvement in the fiscal balance is even greater, which 
would be consistent with the elasticity of the fiscal balance increases in 
recoveries. This could be because countries tighten policy in the downturn 
(procyclical fiscal policy, in line with the results in Alesina et al., 2008) and then 
do not loosen when they are growing again, but rather wait until the output gap is 
positive. So as we overestimate the primary balance in the downturn, we are likely 
to underestimate the primary balance in a recovery. 
Further, in this case the coefficient on the cubed debt becomes insignificant or 
very low, so that it only becomes relevant when growth is not taken into account 
(Figure 2.3). As can be seen, when we take account of these non linearities, the 
fiscal fatigue result disappears. This result suggests that the classic fiscal fatigue 
result is due to not accounting well for the impact of growth in the fiscal balance, 
so that the fatigue result may be more likely in the case of the sharp recessions. 
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Our results point to a larger sensitivity of the primary balance to growth in certain 
conditions, such as a recession, or when inflation is negative. What this means 
is that the primary balance can be expected to be more procyclical.  
Figure 2.3: Primary balance as a function of the level of debt to GDP (%) 
 
Source: Author´s calculations 
 
Note that we do not distinguish explicitly the orientation of fiscal policy and 
automatic stabilizers (although the latter may be proxied by the reaction of the 
fiscal balance to the output gap). As a result, the impact on growth may be due 
to the consumption habits discussed above, but also from the fact that in 
recessions, fiscal multipliers tend to be higher, so that a government that wants 
to stabilize output would do well to post higher deficits. This would be the way of 
stabilizing output. 
A key question remains whether once the supposed debt limit is reached, 
institutional and growth aspects can help a country avert the fiscal fatigue result. 
In order to test this, we use interaction terms, to test whether aside from their 
whole sample effects, when at the debt limit, the effect is negative.  
First, as can be expected, the debt limit itself has a negative effect on the primary 
balance. However, importantly, when the debt limit is interacted with institutional 
strength or growth, we find that this mitigates the debt limit effect. Finally, when 
 
With OG squared 
Without OG squared 
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the debt limit is coupled with a negative output gap, the impact on the primary 
balance is even more negative. Note that this is even true for some variables like 
government support, which are not significant determinants in the whole sample, 
but when coupled with the debt limit, they are significant. 
We now test whether fiscal adjustment speeds up after a certain point, and then, 
whether it slows down after debt reaches its tipping point. This is the path of fiscal 
adjustment as suggested by the cubed form of debt in the fiscal reaction function 
In order to do this, we first calculate, from our canonical equation, the low point 
and high point of debt to fiscal adjustment for each country, taking on board the 
country fixed effects. Secondly, we calculate the debt limit. We also show that 
when there is a weak government, as captured by the existence of a multiparty 
minority government, the interaction with the debt limit worsens the primary 
balance. 
A key takeaway from our results is that the debt limit can be avoided through 
other factors, growth being a prominent counterbalance to rising debt, or an 
improvement in the political situation.  As a result, estimates for debt sustainability 
in the long term could be wrong if they do no model adequately the impact of 
these variables on growth. 
2.5. Consequences for debt sustainability 
Our results suggest that in recoveries, growth will be more revenue-enhancing 
than in normal times. One important point is that this may offset the effect from 
fiscal fatigue in countries where debt has risen after a downturn but are now 
recovering. 
Since growth plays such a fundamental role in the determination of the primary 
balance, low growth may lead to unsustainable dynamics because the fiscal 
adjustment may not be enough to compensate the lack of nominal growth. 
Therefore, the debt limit is more related to growth than to the level of debt. 
We incorporate these effects into a debt sustainability analysis. This can be 
interesting because the results will be different depending on which are the 
drivers of the debt sustainability dynamics: those countries that are growing well, 
and escape deflation, can be expected to have more positive dynamics than 
  
85 
those that are not growing as much but have for instance a lower interest rate 
burden. 
We input the results from the fiscal reaction function into our debt sustainability 
equation. We use IMF forecast for growth, while interest rate forecasts are 
determined endogenously. In particular, the risk premium over the risk free rate 
is equal to the probability that debt will not stabilize in the time horizon (i.e., to 
2019). 
We run the stochastic process: we calculate shocks to our baseline scenario 
based on the probability distribution of the shocks that took place in the past. The 
distribution is based on a normal distribution, with mean the mean of the variable 
in the past, the variance the historical variance, and the covariance between all 
three determinants. As a result, we obtain different paths for debt and a 
probability associated to each of these paths. The risk premium is determined by 
these paths and in particular the probability that debt will follow a path in which it 
does not stabilize by 2019. 
We illustrate this exercise for Spain, Italy and Greece. We consider that the 
comparison will allow us to understand the effects we are showing with respect 
to a baseline, which we consider to be the IMF´s debt scenario. 
As shown in Figure 2.4, the debt dynamics for Spain and Italy are similar in the 
baseline scenario. This is due, however, to the different drivers of the debt path. 
While in Spain, growth will be favorable and provide a key source to reduce the 
debt ratio, its high primary deficit is the main driver of debt. In Italy, the key driver 
of better dynamics is the primary balance, while growth is expected to remain 
slow going forward, according to the IMF forecasts. Finally, the debt forecasts for 
Greece are extremely favorable, owing to the expected high growth and primary 
balances, combined with a low interest burden (relative to the size of its debt). 
The result is that in the baseline IMF scenario, debt declines substantially. 
 
Figure 2.4: Debt dynamics in the baseline IMF scenario 
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As can be seen, the endogeneisation of the interest rate is particularly 
problematic for Greece. Given that a large share of its debt is in official hands 
and has been restructured, its interest rate burden is lower than would be 
suggested by the probability of not stabilizing debt. Note that to the extent that 
most of Greece´s debt is in official hands, this can be thought of as a 
counterfactual: what Greece´s cost of funding would be in this benevolent 
macroeconomic scenario, if it financed its debt at market conditions. 
When these considerations are added to our debt equation, this points to a better 
behavior of Spain relative to the other countries, and , of course, a worse behavior 
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of Greece, which is in part due to a worse primary balance than expected in the 
baseline WEO scenario. 
While in Spain versus Italy the relative difference reflects the importance of 
growth, this does not apply to Greece, which according to the WEO October 2014 
forecasts was expected to growth the most. However, still, our fiscal reaction 
function leads to a lower primary balance that expected and the probability of 
default to a higher interest rate burden. These effects worsen the debt dynamics 
in Greece, although the favorable growth forecasts mean that it is still the country 
where debt declines the most (although the large variance of the distribution of 
shocks means that the probability of debt stabilization in lower than for instance 
in Span, even if the point forecast is better). 
Figure 2.5: GDP Growth forecasts in the IMF scenario (%) and primary balance 
Model and IMF forecast, as a % of GDP) 
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Figure 2.5 (continued) 
 
 
 
Source: IMF, author´s calculations 
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Figure 2.6: Probability debt has not stabilized in 2019 (endogenous scenario, 
and current effective interest rate, both in %)
 
Source: IMF, author´s calculations 
2.6. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has analyzed the determinants of the primary balance, and the 
impact of taking these determinants into account when analyzing debt 
sustainability. A key result from the previous section is the role that growth plays 
in determining the fiscal balance, both in a downturn and in a recovery. Taking 
this into accounts can be essential when forecasting debt dynamics: a low growth 
economy is more likely to stop adjusting than an economy which, in spite of rising 
debt, is growing. 
Secondly, and relatedly, downturns will be more damaging to debt sustainability 
that would be suggested by a linear relationship. As has been shown above, 
growth has an exponential impact on the primary balance. Therefore, recessions 
could have a severe impact on debt dynamics. 
Also, our results show that institutions, and inflation, play an important role. In 
general, our results hold policy lessons for both downturns and good times. 
First, when output is growing above potential, governments would do well to have 
larger surpluses, as the primary balance is likely to overshoot in the downturn. 
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Secondly, having appropriate political institutions that foster government stability 
can be of use. 
This second result is true not only at all times, but can be particularly useful in 
times of distress. A government that has the power to implement a stabilization 
program at times of stress will help with the needed adjustment. 
One avenue of research that stems from these results is the feedback loop 
between political results, fiscal fatigue, and the deterioration of fundamentals. In 
particular, if a government with a worse economic performance is more likely to 
be voted out, and replaced by a fragmented government, then the overall result 
can be reinforcing a vicious cycle: the worsening economic environment 
deteriorates a government´s ability to implement an adjustment, and the 
worsening in economic times further limits the government´s room for maneuver 
in stressful times (Coppedge, 1997). 
In terms of policies to be implemented in a downturn, the key lesson is that the 
non linearities call for a pre-emptive approach from debt sustainability: these non 
linearities in the relationship between the output gap and the fiscal balance can 
lead to a rapid deterioration in the balance. When the market then incorporates 
this worsened balance into its analysis of debt sustainability, it is more likely to 
increase the cost of funding, which in itself can contribute to the unsustainability 
of debt. 
These mechanisms call for swift action in downturns. Particularly, the promotion 
of growth can be effective in averting the negative spiral. Our study does not 
analyze which growth-enhancing measures are best, however, it does suggest 
that a strong, pre-emptive approach to a downturn is appropriate. Given that fiscal 
space will often be limited, demand is likely to have to be promoted through other 
instruments, like monetary policy. 
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APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2: 
Table A2.1. Hausman test results 
Correlated Random Effects - Hausman Test  
Equation: PRIMBAL   
Test cross-section random effects  
     
     
Test Summary 
Chi-Sq. 
Statistic Chi-Sq. d.f. Prob.  
     
     Cross-section random 7.915194 7 0.03 
     
     
     
 
Residual unit root test and correlogram 
Panel unit root test: Summary   
Series:  RESID01   
Date: 08/23/15   Time: 13:14  
Sample: 1 720   
Exogenous variables: Individual effects 
User-specified lags: 1   
Newey-West automatic bandwidth selection and Bartlett kernel 
     
        Cross-  
Method Statistic Prob.** Sections Obs 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)  
Levin, Lin & Chu t* -3.92328  0.0000  18  422 
     
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)  
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat  -4.74896  0.0000  18  422 
ADF - Fisher Chi-square  82.9549  0.0000  18  422 
PP - Fisher Chi-square  83.0413  0.0000  18  441 
     
     ** Probabilities for Fisher tests are computed using an asymptotic Chi 
        -square distribution. All other tests assume asymptotic normality. 
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Chapter 3: Demand for sovereign bonds in the periphery: a regime-
switching approach 
 
3.1. Introduction  
One of the characteristics of the recent financial crisis was the large rise in banks´ 
exposure to domestic sovereigns. As Battistini et al. (2014) mention, part of this 
retrenchment is common to many crisis, when financial institutions, worried 
possibly about redenomination risks of their assets, hold only domestic bonds to 
be protected from such risks ( to the extent that most of their liabilities are in the 
domestic currency). In addition, in times of stress, since ultimately the sovereign 
is the backstop for bank capital, it could be optimal for the banks to tie the knot 
with the sovereign: at the end of the day, it is the sovereign´s well-being that 
guarantees the banks existence, so the latter has an incentive to pre-emptively 
bail out the former. 
This behavior can be particularly problematic in a currency union. As Abascal et 
al. (2013) show, the rise in financial fragmentation within the Eurozone can have 
a negative impact on financing conditions. Secondly, Broner et al. (2014) point 
out that the increase in the holdings of sovereign debt can take resources away 
from the economy, as banks prefer to buy bonds instead of lending to the private 
sector, thus deepening the downturn. In addition, within country fragmentation 
can shut out parts of the banking system from normally functioning markets. 
According to Abascal et al. (2013), during the recent crisis, fragmentation in the 
interbank market has been, on average, higher in the peripheral countries than in 
the core ones and it has increased particularly during periods of financial stress. 
Among the most significant factors that contributed to the high fragmentation 
levels observed are counterparty risk and financing costs (overall factors), and 
country-specific factors such as banking sector openness, the debt–to-GDP and 
the relative size of the financial sector. One of the manifestations of this 
fragmentation was the rise in banks´ home bias. 
The pattern of buying up domestic sovereign bonds was particularly intense in 
the 2012-2013 period in Eurozone countries that were undergoing financial 
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stress, and was a lot less intense in Eurozone countries that were not going 
through stress (Figure 3.1). This then begs the question: when the rise in yields 
and the associated increase in the riskiness of the bonds was leading foreign 
investors away from those assets, what led domestic banks to increase their 
holdings of sovereign bonds.  
Figure 3.1: Sovereign debt holdings of domestic banks (as a % of total debt) 
 
Source: National central banks, author´s calculations, Bruegel 
At the same time as those countries were undergoing major financial stress, with 
rising yields on bonds. As can be seen in figure 3.1, holdings of domestic 
sovereign bonds rose at the start of the downturn in the three countries following 
the first round of stress in 2008-2009. These holdings accelerated in 2011-2012, 
as renewed tensions emerged in the Eurozone periphery (Figure 3.2). 
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Figure 3.2 10-year yield on sovereign debt, key periphery countries (%) 
 
Note: Spa_10Y is the 10 year yield on Spanish debt, ITA_10Y the yield on Italian bond and IRE_10Y the yield on Italian 
debt. Source: Bloomberg. 
This behavior has spurred a large literature on the matter. In general, the 
explanations of the behavior can be separated into two groups. 
First, the group that considers that the driver of the increase in sovereign bond 
holdings was the lack of investment alternatives in the home country. In a context 
of rising non-performing loans (NPLs) and economic uncertainty, banks preferred 
to hold the safest domestic asset available, government bonds, instead of lending 
to the private sector for which the solvency prospects had deteriorated. According 
to this view, the key to determining the determinants of sovereign bond holdings 
lies in disentangling the impact of the downturn from the impact of the rise in 
yields. Both happened broadly in tandem, but Castro and Mencia (2014) find, for 
the case of Spain, that the main driver was the economic downturn, and do not 
find evidence of search for yield by Spanish banks. 
A second set of explanations suggests that the rise in yields was the driver of the 
rise in sovereign bond holdings. The key debate evolves around what made 
sovereign bonds so attractive in bad times. In bad times certain distortions can 
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alter bank behavior and lead them to hold more bonds than they would in normal 
times, given the underlying conditions.  
The first such distortion can be moral suasion. By this count, governments in 
stress that have difficulty financing their deficits in the market ask domestic banks 
to hold government assets, and they do so even if a certain government bond is 
not particularly attractive to them. Acharya and Steffen (2015) test the moral 
suasion hypothesis by looking at whether intervened or non-intervened banks 
were more likely to increase their holdings, assuming that the sovereign only 
exerts real influence over the intervened banks. However, this is unconvincing: 
the sovereign has broad powers to affect non intervened banks, so the fact that 
home bias affected the non-intervened banks should not exclude the use of moral 
suasion. 
A second possibility is that this was due to regulatory incentives: since sovereign 
debt holdings carry a 0 risk weight in the calculation of banks´ capital requirement 
ratio, banks may have preferred to hold that asset over others. Of course, banks 
consider the capital impact of their investments at all times, not just during stress 
times, so this bias would be present at all times. However, if rising NPLs lead to 
capital shortages and equity market valuations decline, raising capital could be 
particularly difficult. As a result, the deterioration in banks’ balance sheet may 
lead it to want to hold more sovereign bonds than before, when the capital 
adequacy ratios of the banks were broadly stable. Acharya and Scheffen (2015) 
find that low capitalized banks were the more likely to be involved in carry trade, 
which lends some support to this hypothesis.  
The distinction between holding government bonds just because there are no 
investment alternatives or whether it is due to biases in banks´ investment 
decisions has important welfare consequences.  
As Broner et al. (2014) show, by detracting resources from the wider economy, 
holdings of sovereign bonds are problematic. Of course, banks continually value 
the risk-return tradeoff in their investment decisions, so the particularly negative 
consequence arises because during a downturn because there is a distortion, 
arising from the fact that, according to Broner et al. (2014), sovereign debt 
holdings provide an extra yield to domestic banks. This extra yield can take many 
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forms: one can be the fact that banks have an interest in bailing out the 
government, as a banks´ access to markets tends to be related to its sovereign´s 
financial health. 
Also, in a monetary union, as Uhlig (2014) shows, the perverse incentives can 
lead to a greater exposure of banks to their own sovereign. According to Uhlig 
(2014), banks use domestic debt to obtain liquidity at the central bank in 
repurchase operations, with the implicit backing of the state. In Uhlig (2014) ´s 
model, a safe sovereign has an incentive to limit these operations to solvent 
banks, as it does not want to bail out insolvent banks. However, a risky sovereign 
has an interest in these operations, as it knows that if the bank fails, the sovereign 
will ultimately fail and so will not have to honor the guarantee. In other words, 
financial fragmentation in a monetary union can lead to increased holdings of 
government debt in risky countries. 
The literature also provides a number of reasons for which banks may be biased 
towards holding more sovereign bonds than other institutions in normal times, 
such as the liquidity of bonds, or their role as market makers in sovereign bond 
markets. If these arguments hold, this should be visible not only by looking at 
whether bond holdings increased in a given period, but rather whether banks 
changed their sovereign bond demand function at a time of stress (which could 
be the extra yield that domestic banks obtain a certain point mentioned by Broner 
et al., 2014). 
Our contribution is two-fold. First, we analyze the difference between the 
sovereign bond demand function in crisis and in normal times, and we look at 
what changed in the demand function in crisis times. The distortion should show 
not in changes in sovereign bond holdings but rather in the sovereign bond 
demand function. 
Secondly, we test whether the behavior of banks was the same as investment 
funds: while the latter have some restrictions on own funds, they are not subject 
to the regulatory capital restrictions of banks, so that they have no incentive to 
increase sovereign holding in their optimal asset allocation. However, they are 
subject to moral suasion: to the extent that they also change their behavior during 
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the crisis, it would undermine the role played by regulatory arbitrage, and would 
signal that other factors may have been at play. 
Our strategy to test changes in sovereign bond demand and the reasons for it is 
the following: we use a time series since 2000, on which we calculate the 
cointegrating relationship between sovereign bond holdings, bond yields and the 
state of the economy (that we proxy through the European Commission´s 
consumer confidence indicator). By using a relatively long time series, we 
overcome the problems that arise from the short time period used in other papers, 
in which cointegrating relationships may be spurious (see Castro and Mencia, 
2014).  
The yield can be thought of as the market valuation of the asset. Banks could 
have a structural advantage/disadvantage in buying bonds which would be 
different from other market participants, so there could be a long term relationship 
between yield and bank holdings. Some of these benefits that banks obtain from 
their holdings of sovereign bonds can be found in Castro and Mencia (2014) or 
in Nakaso (2013), and they include, for example, liquidity provision. This should 
be present in the long run determinants of bond holdings. 
In a second step, we calculate the adjustment equation for sovereign debt 
holdings of the Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) as a regime switching 
equation, where the regime switching parameter is the constant. This way, we 
first obtain a long run relationship, and then we test whether the adjustment 
towards that long run relationship between bank holdings, sovereign yields and 
underlying economic conditions changed during the crisis period. The higher the 
constant, the larger the response from sovereign holdings to a shock in any of 
the determinants. 
We find evidence that while there was a change in the demand function of banks, 
favoring domestic sovereign bonds more than in the pre-crisis period, and other 
financial institutions displayed a similar behaviour, which signals that the driving 
force of this home bias was probably not due to regulatory incentives in those 
countries. While in the 2008-2009 turmoil the behavior of both was similar, we 
find some evidence for Spain the increase in home bias was a bank-specific 
phenomenon. However, evidence from a probit model suggests that the 
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sovereign bond bias was sparked by stress in the sovereign, rather than a search 
for yield. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows: first we will review the capital 
requirement regulation for banks and other financial institutions. Next, we will 
introduce the model to determine the holdings of sovereign bond by both types 
of institutions. We will then discuss the results and offer some concluding 
remarks. 
3.2. The regulation of banks and other financial institutions 
Microprudential regulation is used to prevent and mitigate risks in individual 
banks’ balance sheets. In this section we summarize the treatment of sovereign 
exposures in Basel and European Union (EU) regulation.  
3.2.1. Capital requirements 
Capital requirements are calculated based on either a simple Standardized 
approach, which draws upon Credit Rating Agencies ratings, or based on banks’ 
internal credit ratings, the Internal Ratings Based (IRB) approach. Pillar 1 capital 
requirements are calculated either way and complemented with supervisory 
review (Pillar 2) and banks’ disclosures requirements (Pillar 3). 
The standardized approach (SA) calculates sovereign debt exposures according 
to their external rating. However a domestic sovereign carve-out means that 
national supervisors may apply a lower risk weight to banks’ exposures to their 
own sovereign (when denominated in domestic currency and funded in that 
currency). In practice, in the EU a 0% risk weight is assigned under the SA to 
exposures to member states´ central governments. 
In addition, banks that use an IRB approach may apply a partial use of the 
standardized approach for central government exposures in the EU. As a result, 
a bank using the IRB approach can end up applying the standard 0% risk weight 
for exposures within the EU, regardless of the risks associated with a given 
sovereign. As Nouy (2012) points out, the partial use of the SA is justified by the 
fact that the calculation of the key risk parameters is difficult for sovereign 
portfolios from advanced economies, as sovereign defaults by advanced 
countries are rare events.  
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As a result, the application of IRB models would lead to very low capital 
requirements for sovereign exposures. In fact, the lack of sovereign defaults 
leads banks to use external ratings even under the IRB. As a result, strict IRB 
estimates would be similar to the 0% risk weight allowed under the carve out.  
  
In order to avoid excessive exposures that may escape the risk-weighted 
minimum capital requirements, the Basel Committee has introduced a leverage 
ratio that limits overall bank leverage, regardless of the risk weighting of specific 
exposures. This ratio, indirectly, limits the exposure of banks to their sovereign. 
The Capital Requirements Directive and Regulation (CRD4/CRR), a reporting 
requirement to supervisory authorities for the leverage ratio, was introduced 
starting in 2014 with the idea of migrating to a binding harmonized requirement 
in 2018. 
Asset managers, as of yet, are not bound by the requirement to hold capital 
against their exposures. However, there are calls to revise the regulation on 
account of their growing prominence in financial markets, and, consequently, 
their ability to have an impact on the functioning of markets. In particular, large 
holders of a given asset may be prone to fire sales in times of rising tensions, 
which can lead to an increase in market turmoil (Financial Times, 2015). 
A. Market risk 
Similarly to the credit risk treatment, market risk (to which asset managers may 
be subject, see below), may also be calculated through two methods, a 
standardized one and one based on internal models. The standardized method 
allows national supervisors to apply a lower specific risk charge to sovereign debt 
denominated in the domestic currency and funded by the bank in the same 
currency (Basel Committee, 2006).  
A deeper redefinition of the entire framework is being envisaged in the 
“Fundamental review” of the trading book framework (Basel Committee, 2014). 
Basel II.5 includes sovereigns in the Value at Risk (VaR) and Stressed-VaR 
calculations under the Internal Models Approach. The shortcomings of VaR 
approach in calculating the market risk of illiquid products are dealt with by the 
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introduction of a risk capital charge on migration risk, which includes sovereign 
exposures. 
B. Liquidity risk 
Another change in the regulation has been the introduction of the Liquidity 
Coverage Ratio (LCR), which requires banks to hold a minimum buffer of 
unencumbered high-quality liquidity assets against their stress net cash outflows 
over a 30 days’ time window.  
The composition of the liquidity buffer is divided into two tiers. The first tier 
comprises those assets of highest quality in the pool of eligible assets, like cash 
and highly rated Sovereign debt (AAA-AA). The LCR also includes a “carve-out” 
for domestic sovereigns, considering them Tier I assets even if rated below AA-.  
Basel III also requires banks to meet the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), 
designed to ensure that there is a minimum amount of stable funding available in 
relation to the liquidity characteristics of banks’ assets . The NSFR is not a binding 
requirement in the EU yet. But the CRD4/CRR provides for a reporting obligation 
to national supervisory authorities. And national authorities are also allowed to 
apply provisions in the subject even before the specific regulation is passed. 
C. Concentration risk 
Diversification requirements (i.e. concentration risks) could lead to a regime of 
limits to large exposures, by which exposures exceeding 10% of capital will be 
subject to a mandatory reporting requirement, with a limit of exposures of 25% of 
capital. Sovereign exposures have been excluded both in the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and in the Capital Requirements Directive IV 
(CRD IV) from the large exposures limit. 
D. Recent proposals 
Given the relevance of the debate on sovereign exposures, European Systemic 
Risk Board (2015) proposed avenues to reduce the incentive of banks to holding 
domestic sovereign bonds. These proposals cover the broad set of instruments 
available to regulators. 
First, stricter Pillar 1 capital requirements for sovereign exposures could be 
achieved by removing the domestic carve-out in the standardized approach, 
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introducing a non-zero risk-weight floor for sovereign exposures in the 
standardized approach. Also, they propose reducing the reliance on external 
credit ratings in the standardized approach (although the methodological 
difficulties of the alternatives exposed above deem this problematic). Finally, they 
propose the use of overcoming the lack of observations by setting a minimum 
(regulatory) floor in the internal ratings-based (IRB) approach. 
Diversification requirements could be implemented by fully or partially removing 
the exemption of sovereign exposures from the large exposures regime and 
introducing a capital requirement for concentration risk. Or, alternatively, 
coverage of sovereign exposures in macro-prudential regulation, a flexible tool 
that would introduce changes to the capital requirement on sovereign debt to vary 
over the cycle. 
As a result, in the current discussions, sovereign bonds may be left out of the 
solvency ratio but included in other ratios, such as the large exposures ratio. This 
is intended to reduce the procyclicaclity of the regulation (as Repullo and Suarez, 
2013, capita requirement ratios tend to have undesired procyclical 
consequences) has , while at the same  time discouraging banks to being too 
exposed to a certain sovereign.  
Recently, the financial regulation community has started to debate the role played 
by asset manager in financial markets (see financial times, 2015). Asset 
managers are playing an ever larger role in financial markets, in part covering 
some functions that used to be carried out by banks, which have been 
deleveraging and faced adverse market conditions and higher capital 
requirements. One aspect currently on the table is the possible special treatment 
of the largest asset managers. This special treatment could lead to heightened 
supervision or to capital surcharges.  
As of now, however, the own funds requirements regulation deals with some 
aspects related to asset managers: first, they must hold enough capital to be able 
to continue business in bad times (this justifies holding capital against fixed 
overheads) and secondly, they must have rules for a smooth winding down of 
business. Finally, they must hold capital for the market risk they may face in their 
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operations. Typically, however, capital, is a small fraction of the assets they 
manage.  
In this context, the risk weighting of the underlying assets is usually not an issue 
for asset managers, and holding sovereign debt will only have a marginal benefit 
from a market risk perspective. This is all the more are true given that around half 
of asset managers in Europe do not execute the transactions themselves, but 
rather use a third party, typically an investment bank, to carry out the execution 
of the transaction, so they do not incur in market risk.   
A final aspect to consider is the prudential regulation regarding banks´ 
participation in asset managers, typically the so called look-through approach. 
This means that banks must treat their equity participation in asset managers as 
if it was their own, so it does not provide a significant advantage. However, to the 
extent that the asset manager does not bear the risk on the underlying asset, the 
bank does not have to treat the asset as if it was on its balance sheet. 
In any case, own funds requirements are barely a constraint for asset managers, 
so that they are relatively free to hold the assets they want to within their mandate, 
without affecting the own funds they need to hold to back them. Given the signs 
that this regulation could change, this chapter tries to contribute to the debate by 
shedding some light on how these institutions behave. 
In particular, own funds requirements of investment firms are fixed as a percent 
of fixed overheads. The approach for calculating fixed overheads is the 
subtractive approach, by which variable cost items are deducted from the total 
expenses as calculated in the firms´ accounting. The subtractive approach 
ensures that changes to the accounting framework are automatically taken into 
account, limiting the leeway for firms to change the accounting of fixed 
overheads. It is also easier to be calculated by firms that do not follow the IFRS. 
The difference in the regulation of holdings by banks and investment funds 
provides an opportunity to shed light on whether the regulatory motive was the 
driving force of bank´s increase in bond holdings, or whether it was some other 
aspect (Angeloni and Wolff, 2012): if funds behave like banks in increasing home 
bias in the downturn, it can be a sign that home bias was driven by other factors 
and not regulatory arbitrage by banks. 
  
104 
3.2.2. Data 
We analyze the determinants of sovereign holdings for Spain, Italy, Greece and 
Ireland. These are four countries that suffered stress during the crisis, for which 
we have found comparable data. The period used is 2000-2015 with quarterly 
data. 
Sovereign bond holdings by banks and other financial institutions refer to the 
logarithm of sovereign bond holdings by monetary financial institutions and other 
financial institutions in each of their countries, as reported by the national central 
banks. 
Secondly, we use consumer confidence as a proxy for domestic economic 
conditions. This is the indicator published on a monthly basis by the European 
Commission. 
Finally, the 10 year yield on sovereign bonds is used as a proxy for the yield on 
all banks´ sovereign bond holdings. This is consistent with the fact that the bulk 
of bank holdings tend to be around that remaining maturity, and that it is typically 
one of the more liquid benchmarks. 
3.3. Specification 
Our baseline model is a VECM, in line with the standard literature on the holdings 
of bonds of the domestic sovereign, which allows us to disentangle causality 
amongst the various drivers and short term effects from long term relationships. 
However, as mentioned before, our modeling strategy is designed to overcome 
two difficulties common in the literature: the fact that the crisis period had too 
short a time span to test long term relationships and, secondly, testing specifically 
the role played by regulatory incentives during the crisis period. 
In order to test whether the behavior changed at certain points in the crisis, we 
employ a regime switching error correction model, in line with Alizadeh et al. 
(2008). We proceed in the following way: first, we determine the stationarity 
properties of the variables. This is done through the unit root tests that determine 
that the null of the existence of a unit root cannot be rejected. However, none of 
the variables have a unit root test in first differences, signaling that they are all 
integrated of order 1. 
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Secondly we analyze whether the variables are cointegrated. Some papers in the 
literature have used this approach for a sample of just the crisis period, which has 
been subject to the criticism of Mencia and Castro (2014) of having too short a 
time span. Furthermore, by taking just the crisis period, understanding the 
counterfactual can be elusive, as the cointegrating relationship may or may not 
be driven by anomalies specific to that period. 
We solve this problem by using a longer sample. In the long run, one can think of 
banks as having a different bond demand function than other market participants: 
as discounting to obtain liquidity in the central bank, or in order to keep safe 
assets in the balance sheet, sovereign bonds can be more attractive to banks 
than to other businesses. Secondly, since banks are large holders of sovereign 
bonds, they may act as automatic stabilizers in financial markets, trying to reduce 
the volatility of market prices so as to reduce the impact on their portfolio (El 
Erian, 2010). 
The lag structure of the VECM is based on the Wald test criteria (Dolado and 
Lutkepol, 1996), which suggests we use two lags in the cointegrating relationship 
and the corresponding adjustment equations (Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1: lag structure of the VECM 
 
 
Therefore, we estimate the following equation, by which we will obtain the long 
term relationship between the variables and the short run dynamics 
∆ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡 =∝ [ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡−1 +  𝛽
′𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑡−1 + 𝛽
′′𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1] + 𝛽2𝑑(ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡−1)
+ 𝛽3𝑑(ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑡−2) + 𝛽4𝑑(𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑡−1) + 𝛽5𝑑(𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑡−2)
+ 𝛽6𝑑(𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−1) + 𝛽7𝑑(𝑦𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑𝑡−2) + 𝑢𝑡 +  𝑐 
Spain Italy Ireland
DLag 1 36.89 15.35 27.66
[ 0.00] [ 0.08] [ 0.00]
DLag 2 16.45 11.07 36.80
[ 0.06] [ 0.07] [ 0.00]
Statistic and in brackets, the p value of the Wald 
lag test
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where holding is the log of sovereign bond holdings, cconf the consumer 
confidence index, yield the 10 year yield on sovereign bonds d is the first 
difference operator, and u is an error term, while c is a constant. 
Note that the equation describes the adjustment process of the variable holding. 
the first term of the right hand side of the equation shows the speed of correction 
from the cointegrating relationship, the second term the dependence on own lags, 
the third term the dependence on the lags of other variables and finally, the 
residual. The cointegrating relationship is obtained through the Johansen (1988) 
method. 
The ∝ coefficient on the previous equation is the error correction term, and 
describes how the holdings of sovereign bonds react when there is a shock to 
the long run relationship. The higher the absolute value of the coefficient, the 
quicker holdings revert back to their long run relationship.  
We estimate the VECM equation that describes the adjustment process of all the 
determinants in the cointegrating relationship, and focus on the adjustment path 
of bond holdings. Note that this equation can be estimated using Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS): all variables on the right hand side are exogenous and stationary, 
as it is composed of the lags of the determinants in differences and the lag of the 
error in the cointegrating equation. 
The equation above can be modeled as a first order Markov chain. The stochastic 
process for generating the unobservable regimes is an ergodic Markov chain, 
defined by the transition probabilities: The probability of being in a certain regime 
will be state-dependent. Specifically, we will estimate c using the following 
conditions. 
 
𝑐 = {
𝑐1 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡 = 1 
𝑐2 𝑖𝑓 𝑠𝑡 = 2 
 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑗 = Pr(𝑠𝑡+1 = 𝑗 𝑠𝑡 = 𝑖) , ∑ 𝑝𝑖𝑗 = 1
2
𝑗=1
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Evidence that there could be a regime change in the cointegrating relationship 
during the crisis can be found in the shape of the residuals. As can be seen 
above, in practically all the countries, for some periods in the 2008-2014 period, 
there is evidence that the cointegrating relationship does not capture all the 
effects. Our regime- switching approach will attempt to capture the specific issues 
that arose in this period. 
In order to further examine whether a regime switching process is appropriate, 
we can run parameter stability tests on the error correction equation. Table 3.2 
shows the results for the Chow breakpoint test used for different periods of time. 
As can be seen, for different dates we find a breakpoint which may warrant the 
use of a regime switching equation. 
Table 3 2. Chow breakpoint test results 
 
3.4. Results 
First, using the Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test, we find that the variables 
tend to be I(1), as seen in Table 3.3. This result is robust to the use of the 
alternative Phillips and Perron’s (1988) method for determining whether there is 
a unit root (not shown)2. As a result, we search for the existence of a cointegrating 
vector. We model the cointegrating vector as freely as possible, using the option 
for which we do find that such a vector exists, according to the Johansen (1988) 
                                                          
2 Results available upon request 
Spain Ireland Italy
F-statistic 5,02 2,65 2,19
Log likelihood ratio 19,61 15,08 9,28
Wald Statistic 20,07 13,25 8,75
2012Q2 2008Q1 2012Q1
Prob. F(4,57) 0,00 0,05 0,08
Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0,00 0,01 0,05
Prob. Chi-Square(4) 0,00 0,02 0,07
The bottom three lines show the p values associated to the 
breakpoint in the date shown. The null hypothesis of not 
break at the specified breakpoint can be rejected for all of 
them
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method (Table 3.4) and obtain an estimation of the cointegrating equation (Table 
3.5).  
Table 3.3. Unit root test results 
 
Table 3.4: Cointegration test results 
 
 
ADF statistic
levels first differences
Spain bond holdings 2,5 -7,888 ***
10 year bond yield -1,8 -5,66 ***
consumer confidence -2,4 -5,08 ***
Italy bond holdings 0,77 -7,11 ***
10 year bond yield -2,7 -6,08 ***
consumer confidence -1,7 -7,61 ***
Ireland bond holdings 0,77 -6,799 ***
10 year bond yield 2,54 -3,86 ***
consumer confidence -1,67 -7,56 ***
*** indicates significanca at the 1% level, ** at the 5% and * at the 10%. 
An asterisk would indicate rejection of the null that the variable has a unit root.
Country Variable used Number of CE Trace statistic p-value
Spain Banks None * 44,52 0,00
At most 1 4,27 0,88
At most 2 0,02 0,90
OFI None * 44,33 0,04
At most 1 1,94 0,26
At most 2 0,02 0,90
Italy Banks None * 32,37 0,02
At most 1 7,03 0,57
At most 2 0,13 0,71
OFI None* 22,25 0,04
At most 1 4,26 0,67
At most 2 0,35 0,62
Ireland Banks None * 30,14 0,05
At most 1 10,17 0,27
At most 2 2,78 0,10
OFI None * 36,37 0,01
At most 1 9,13 0,35
At most 2 3,17 0,07
*Marks rejection of null hypothesis at the 5% level
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Table 3.5. Cointegrating equation 
 
 
  
GREECEBANKH GREECEOFIH LSPBANK LSPOFI LIRBANK LIROFI LITBANK LITOFI
10 year yield 0,10 * -0,61 ** 3,30 ** -0,19 ** 0,12 ** -0,18 2,50 *** -0,71 *
Consumer confidence 0,03 ** -0,40 -0,34 ** -0,36 * -0,09 * -0,90 ** -0,30 * 0,04 *
Constant -10,80 15,48 -0,31 18,35 5,30 3,67 -8,36
*** indicates significanca at the 1% level, ** at the 5% and * at the 10%.
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Figure 3.3: Residuals of the cointegrating relationship 
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Figure 3.3 (continued) 
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Note: LIRBANKH, LITBANK and LSPBANK indicate the log of the holdings of domestic sovereign debt by Irish, Italian 
and Spanish banks. Source: author´s calculations 
As can be seen, we find a negative long term relationship between bond holdings 
and consumer confidence in all countries excep Greece: when growth prospects 
are good, we can expect holdings to decline, as more investment opportunities 
may exist. This is consistent with the view that banks turn to domestic bonds in 
bad times, forced possibly by the absence of other investment alternatives.  
With these facts in mind, we must examine the behavior during the crisis period: 
The key question we are trying to shed light on, is whether the demand for 
sovereign bonds function changed during the crisis period, reflecting some of the 
afore-mentioned distortions. Note that even if banks´ demand function had 
remained the same as in good times, the increase in yield and the recession 
would have led to an increase in holdings. The fact we explore is whether that 
demand function changed during the crisis. 
The evidence that the behavior changed during the crisis can be first noticed in 
the residuals from the cointegrating equation (Figure 3.3). These residuals 
suggest that bank demand and reacted different in the crisis period than in normal 
times. 
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The regime switching approach can help us identify whether the peak in the 
residuals was due to a change in the sovereign demand function, which would be 
captured by the constant term. 
Figures 3.4 show how the demand function changed for both banks and other 
institutions at the height of financial stress. The higher constant means that the 
holdings of domestic bonds increased more as banks reacted to shocks in either 
of the determinants than in the pre-crisis period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
113 
Figure 3.4 Regime switching results: Smoothed probability of being in each of 
the regimes 
Figure 3.4a: Spanish Banks 
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Figure 3.4b: Spanish other financial institutions 
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Figure 3.4c: Italian banks 
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Figure 3.4d: Italian other financial institutions 
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Figure 3.4e:  Irish other financial institutions 
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Figure 3.4f: Irish banks 
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The charts show the probability of each of the different regimes. The equation of each regime is shown in table 3.7. 
 
Our interpretation of that result is that, indeed, in the height of the crisis, the 
banks´ holdings of sovereign bonds were larger than would be predicted by the 
long run sovereign bond demand function. This was driven by a larger reaction 
to shocks to yields and economic conditions. 
The comparison with other financial institutions suggests that there were two 
differentiated episodes. In the 2008-2009 period, and around 2012-2013, both 
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banks and other financial institutions preferred sovereign bonds. In this period, 
regulatory incentives do not seem to play a role, as both types of institutions show 
a change in their demand function for sovereign bonds (towards increased 
holdings of bonds as a reaction to any of the exogenous variables). The reason 
could be related to banks protecting themselves from redenomination risk, as 
explained by Acharya (2013) and Battistini (2013) 
A key aspect of the results is that the regime with high demand for sovereign 
bonds is short lived. This can be seen in the regime probabilities, and also in the 
expected duration of each regime and the probability of switching a regime once 
we are in that regime: when the starting regime is the low demand one, the 
probability of continuing in that regime is high, while when banks and other 
financial institutions are in a high demand for sovereign bonds regime, the 
probability of switching is high, which suggests that this is indeed a ‘crisis mode’ 
regime rather than a persistent result. 
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Table 3.6: Regime switching equations 
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3.5. Drivers of the change in bond demand 
We take a closer look at what may have driven the switch in regime for Spanish 
banks. The behavior is similar for both banks and other financial institutions in 
the different countries, which may exclude the role played by regulatory 
incentives exclusive to banks, however, we see a change in the demand function, 
so we must explore the drivers of that change in behavior. 
We set up a probit model, where the dependent variable is a dummy defined by 
sovereign bond demand function being in a crisis mode. The determinants are 
two different factors: first, the level of the 10 year yield, and, second, the 2 year 
and 10 year spread.   
Our interpretation is the following: if banks moved to a higher holdings regime in 
the height of the turmoil, the motivation would show in the determinant of the 
higher holdings: in particular, if the motivation is to obtain a larger carry trade, 
banks should react to a rise in the yield of those assets of which they increased 
holdings. If the motivation was bailing out the sovereign, the determinant was 
probably the spread between the sovereign and the risk free asset (the German 
yield in this case. We add international risk aversion, as captured by Chicago 
Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), as a control variable. 
In contrast, if banks hold more sovereign bonds because they want to save the 
sovereign (the motivation being, either, moral suasion, or the fact that their own 
rating and survival is linked to their sovereign), they would increase their holdings 
in response to heightened worries of the solvency of the sovereign. This would 
show not so much in the yield of the bonds, but in the spread. This effect would 
be present both in shorter and longer maturities.  
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Table 3.7: Results of Probit on sovereign debt holding regime 
 
This is related to the debate on regulatory incentives: banks wanting to use the 
carry trade to save their balance sheet from capital shortages would be more 
likely to react to a rise in the 10y yield, which would offer the better carry trade 
opportunities. Note that our analysis does not look at individual banks: it could be 
that the lower capitalized institutions would do the carry trade, but this does not 
show in the aggregate because the driver of the holdings of the larger institutions 
was different. 
As can be seen in the results of the probit model, the explanatory factor was the 
spread, either at the short end of the curve or on the 10 year, which is evidence 
that the motivation for holding more sovereign bonds was, on aggregate, more 
related to relieving the stress of the sovereign that the carry trade. 
3.6. Concluding remarks 
Our analysis suggests that the retrenchment during the crisis periods did stem 
from a change in the sovereign demand function of banks and other financial 
institutions. However, the crisis mode demand, by which banks and other 
financial institutions responded to shocks in the yield or consumer confidence by 
holding more bonds suggests, was short lived in most cases. Therefore, the 
impact on the recovery of the detraction of resources from the private sector was 
probably rather small, by this count. 
Second, in the countries studied, the behavior of banks and other financial 
institutions were similar, suggesting that regulatory incentives (in particular, the 
SPA_10YSPREAD 0,65 **
SPA_10Y 0,69
SP2YSPRE 0,61 **
VIX 0,11 *** 0,11 ** 0,13 ***
C -5,18 *** -7,69 *** -6,13 ***
McFadden R-squared 0,52 0,38 0,56
AIC 0,32 0,39 0,30
Schwarz 0,42 0,49 0,41
* indicates a p-value of 0,1, ** of 0,05 and *** of 0,01
Dependent variable: high sovereign debt demand regime
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0% risk weight on the holdings of sovereign debt) did not play a significant role. 
This suggests other factors, like moral suasion, or banks´ incentives to safeguard 
the sovereign´s stability at certain specific points in time may have played a more 
important role. This is emphasized by our finding that the key driver of the crisis-
mode sovereign demand function was more the spread (and so the risk attached 
to it by the markets) than the yield on the assets. 
The policy conclusions are significant. First, the results suggest that the 
introduction of a risk weight on sovereign bond holdings would not make much of 
a difference. This is because the other drivers of sovereign spread are the likely 
reasons for the rise in the holdings of sovereign bonds. 
The key response would probably lie in avoiding sovereign stress in the first 
place. Given the particularly damaging consequences of sovereign stress in a 
monetary union, enhancing (or completing) the monetary union with instruments 
that may avoid sovereign stress, and so, financial fragmentation, should be a 
priority. 
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Chapter 4. Connectedness in EMU banks and sovereign bond CDS 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The transmission of stress between banks and sovereigns has been the subject 
of a large literature. Papers often use a panel approach between the credit default 
swap (CDS) of banks and sovereigns, or a cross section approach with different 
states, so as to assess the role that, for example, bank bailouts had in the 
transmission of risk between banks and sovereigns.  
Other papers analyse the connections amongst financial institutions, in order to 
understand their systemic importance. However, a network approach is usually 
only used to understand connections in the exposures amongst firms. This, 
however, has usually not been applied to price indicators. 
In this study we will focus on the interconnection between sovereign debt markets 
and banks in the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by applying 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014)’s measures of connectedness (both system-wide and 
pair-wise). The results will shed light on the drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus, 
the effect of key policy decisions during the sovereign debt crisis and how a 
bank´s impact on the banking system as a whole changes in crisis times. 
A substantial amount of literature uses different extensions of Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2012)’s methodology to examine spillovers and transmission effects in stock, 
foreign exchange, or oil markets in non-EMU countries. Awartania et al. (2013), 
Lee and Chang (2013), Chau and Deesomsak (2014) and Cronin (2014) apply 
this methodology to examine spillovers in the United States’ markets; Yilmaz 
(2010), Zhou et al. (2012) or Narayan et al. (2014) focus on Asian countries; 
Apostolakisa and Papadopoulos (2014) and Tsai (2014) examine G-7 
economies, and Duncan and Kabundi (2013) centre their analysis on South 
African markets. However, few papers to date have looked at the connectedness 
and spillover effects within euro area sovereign debt markets, let al.one between 
banks and sovereigns, even though quantifying the spillover risk is a very 
important tool in order to assess whether the benefits of a sovereign or bank 
bailout may outweigh its costs. 
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Some exceptions that have looked at sovereign bond spillovers are Antonakakis 
and Vergos (2013), who examined spillovers between 10 euro area government 
yield spreads during the period 2007-2012; Claeys and Vašicek (2014), who 
examined linkages between 16 European sovereign bond spreads during the 
period 2000-2012; Glover and Richards-Shubik (2014), who applied a model 
based on the literature on contagion in financial networks to data on sovereign 
CDS among 13 European sovereigns from 2005 to 2011; and Alter and Beyer 
(2014), who quantify spillovers between sovereign credit markets and banks in 
the euro area. While the above authors apply Diebold and Yilmaz’s methodology, 
Favero (2013) proposes an extension to Global Vector Autoregressive (GVAR) 
models to capture time-varying interdependence between EMU sovereign yield 
spreads.  
This paper presents an analysis of the connectedness in sovereigns’ market with 
other sovereigns and including in the same framework banks. By including such 
a network, our study controls for indirect linkages amongst banks and sovereigns. 
Therefore, our analysis provides a methodological contribution and relevant 
empirical insights to the assessment of financial stress transmission in EMU 
sovereign bond and bank CDS. 
Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) showed that the connectedness framework was 
closely linked with both modern network theory (see Glover and Richards-Shubik, 
2014) and modern measures of systemic risk (see Ang and Longstaff, 2013 or 
Acemoglu et al., 2015). The degree of connectedness, on the other hand, 
measures the contribution of individual units to systemic network events, in a 
fashion very similar to the conditional value at risk (CoVaR, see, e. g., Adrian and 
Brunnermeier, 2008). 
After explaining the methodology that will be used in the empirical analysis, we 
will proceed in four stages. First, in order to estimate system-wide 
connectedness, we will undertake a full-sample (static analysis) that is not only 
of intrinsic interest, but will also prepare the way for the second stage, where we 
analyse connectedness in several subperiods that are of interest because they 
are marked by different stages in the EMU crisis. Finally, in the last stage we will 
analyse the implications of the results for several aspects of the literature: the 
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ability to determine ex ante which institutions are systemic, and understanding 
how the connectedness between banks and sovereigns has evolved over time. 
Overall, our results confirm the finding that the positive influence exerted by 
economically sound core countries over peripheral ones in the stability period 
suddenly vanished with the outbreak of the crisis, when investors disavowed the 
shelter that peripheral countries could find in central countries and turned their 
attention to the major imbalances that they presented. Part of this increase in 
sovereign risk, we find, was due to an increase in the connectedness from banks 
to sovereigns in the height of the crisis. Secondly, we find that a bank´s 
connectivity with its own sovereign changed, as sovereign stress rose and as 
bank bailouts were announce. Third, starting from the calculation of a bank´s 
systemic impact, we show how difficult it can be to determine ex ante which banks 
are systemic, as connectedness changes during crises. Finally, we find that the 
connectedness between banks and own sovereign is not particularly related to 
the bank holdings of sovereign bonds. 
Consequently, during the period of stability, beside the slight differences in yield 
behavior (all followed the evolution of the German bund, and spreads moved in 
a very narrow range) it was the central countries that triggered net connectedness 
relationships; in the crisis period, however, there was a major shift and this role 
was now played by peripheral countries. In addition, bank connectedness to 
sovereigns changes in crisis periods, and seems to be unrelated to the actual 
exposures of the banks. Therefore, according to our results, in a context of 
increased cross-border financial activity in the euro-area, the concern that in 
turbulent times a shock in one country might have spillover effects into others 
may be well founded, and global financial stability may be threatened. 
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents Diebold and 
Yılmaz (2014)’s methodology for assessing connectedness in financial market 
volatility, and the empirical results (both static and dynamic) obtained for our 
sample of EMU sovereign and bank CDS. In Section 3 we report the empirical 
results regarding the evolution of connectedness in different subperiods from the 
outset of the global financial crisis. Section 4 examines the policy implication and 
our interpretation of the key results. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the findings 
and offers some concluding remarks. 
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4.2. Connectedness analysis  
4.2.1. Econometric methodology 
The main tool for assessing connectedness is based on a decomposition of the 
forecast error variance, which results from the following steps: 
1. Fit a standard vector autoregressive (VAR) model to the series. 
2. Using series data up to and including time t, establish an H period-ahead 
forecast (up to time t + H). 
3. Decompose the error variance of the forecast for each component with respect 
to shocks from the same or other components at time t. 
Let us denote by dHij the ij-th H-step variance decomposition component (i.e., the 
fraction of variable i’s H-step forecast error variance due to shocks in variable j). 
The connectedness measures are based on the “non-own”, or “cross”, variance 
decompositions, dHij, i, j = 1, . . . , N, i ≠ j.  
Consider an N-dimensional covariance-stationary data-generating process 
(DGP) with orthogonal shocks: ,)( tt uLx   ...,)(
2
210  LLL
.),( IuuE tt   Note that 0 need not be diagonal. All aspects of connectedness 
are contained in this very general representation. Contemporaneous aspects of 
connectedness are summarized in 0 and dynamic aspects in ,...}.,{ 21   
Transformation of ,...},{ 21   via variance decompositions is needed to reveal 
and compactly summarize connectedness. Diebold and Yilmaz (2014) propose a 
connectedness table such as Table 4.1 to understand the various connectedness 
measures and their relationships. Its main upper-left NxN block, which contains 
the variance decompositions, is called the “variance decomposition matrix," and 
is denoted by ].[ ij
H dD   The connectedness table increases HD  with a 
rightmost column containing row sums, a bottom row containing column sums, 
and a bottom-right element containing the grand average, in all cases for i ≠ j. 
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Table 4.1: Schematic connectedness table 
 x1 x2   ... xN Connec-
tedness from 
others 
x1 Hd11  
Hd12    … 
H
Nd1  1,
1 1
  jd
N
j
H
j  
x2 Hd 21  
Hd 22    … 
H
Nd 2  2,
1 2
  jd
N
j
H
j
 
. . .   .   
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
. 
  . 
. 
  
xN H
Nd 1  
H
Nd 2    … 
H
NNd  Njd
N
j
H
Nj   ,1
 
Connec-
tedness to 
others 
 
N
i
H
id1 1
1i  
 
N
i
H
id1 2
2i  
  …  
N
i
H
iNd1
Ni   
 
N
ji
H
iNd
N 1,
1
 
Ni   
 
The off-diagonal entries of HD are the parts of the N forecast-error variance 
decompositions of relevance from a connectedness perspective. In particular, the 
gross pair-wise directional connectedness from j to i is defined as follows: 
.Hij
H
ji dC   
Since in general ,
H
ij
H
ji CC    the net pair-wise directional connectedness from j 
to i, can be defined as: 
.H ji
H
ij
H
ij CCC    
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As for the off-diagonal row sums in Table 4.1, they give the share of the H-step 
forecast-error variance of variable xi coming from shocks arising in other variables 
(all others, as opposed to a single other), while the off-diagonal column sums 
provide the share of the H-step forecast-error variance of variable xi going to 
shocks arising in other variables. Hence, the off-diagonal row and column sums, 
labelled “from" and “to" in the connectedness table, offer the total directional 
connectedness measures. In particular, total directional connectedness from 
others to i is defined as 
,
1



 
N
ij
j
H
ij
H
i dC  
and total directional connectedness to others from i is defined as 
.
1



 
N
ij
j
H
ji
H
i dC  
We can also define net total directional connectedness as 
.

 Hi
H
i
H
i CCC  
Finally, the grand total of the off-diagonal entries in DH (equivalently, the sum of 
the 
“from" column or “to" row) measures total connectedness: 
.
1
1,




N
ij
ji
H
ij
H d
N
C  
For the case of non-orthogonal shocks, the variance decompositions are not as 
easily calculated as before, because the variance of a weighted sum is not an 
appropriate sum of variances; in this case, methodologies for providing 
orthogonal innovations like traditional Cholesky-factor identification may be 
sensitive to ordering. So, following Diebold and Yilmaz (2014), a generalized VAR 
decomposition (GVD), invariant to ordering, proposed by Koop et al. (1996) and 
Pesaran and Shin (1998) is used. The H-step generalized variance 
decomposition matrix is defined as gH gH
ijD d    , where 
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 
 
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
  
In this case, 
je  is a vector with jth element unity and zeros elsewhere, h  is the 
coefficient matrix in the infinite moving-average representation from VAR,   is 
the covariance matrix of the shock vector in the non-orthogonalized-VAR, 
jj  
being its jth diagonal element. In this GVD framework, the lack of orthogonality 
means that the rows of gHijd  do not have sum unity and, in order to obtain a 
generalized connectedness index g g
ijD d    , the following normalization is 
necessary: 
1
g
ijg
ij N
g
ij
j
d
d
d



, where by construction 
1
1
N
g
ij
j
d

  and 
, 1
N
g
ij
i j
d N

   
The matrix g g
ijD d     permits us to define similar concepts as defined before for 
the orthogonal case, that is, total directional connectedness, net total directional 
connectedness, and total connectedness. 
4.2.2. Data 
We use daily data of CDS spreads built on data collected from the Bloomberg 
database for six EMU countries: Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and 
Ireland. We also use data for the two large banks in each jurisdiction that quote 
CDS: Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Societe Generale, BNP Paribas, BBVA, 
Santander, ISP, Unicredito, Banco Espirito Santo, BCP, Bank of Ireland and 
Allied IrishBank. Our sample begins on December 30 2008 and ends on 12 
August 2014 (i.e., a total of 1,652 observations), spanning the key events since 
the start of the global financial crisis. 
 
4.2.3. Static (full-sample, unconditional) analysis 
The full-sample connectedness tables appear as Table 4.2 and Table 4.3 for 
senior and subrogated CDS, respectively. As mentioned above, the ijth entry of 
the upper-left 18x18 assets submatrix gives the estimated ijth pair-wise 
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directional connectedness contribution to the forecast error variance of asset i’s 
yields coming from innovations to asset j. Hence, the off-diagonal column sums 
(labelled TO) and row sums (labelled FROM) gives the total directional 
connectedness to all others from i and from all others to i respectively. The 
bottom-most row (labelled NET) gives the difference in total directional 
connectedness (to-from). Finally, the bottom-right element (in boldface) is total 
connectedness.  
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Table 4.2: Full-sample connectedness for senior CDS 
 
Notes:  GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland 
respectively.  BBVA SNR, SANSNR, UNISNR, ISPSNR, SGEN SNR, BNP SNR, DBSNR, CMB SNR, AIB 
SNR, BOI SNR, BCP SNR and BES SNR stand for senior CDS for Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 
Santander, Unicredito, Intesa San Paolo, Societe Generale, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, 
Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, BCP and Banco Espirito Santo  
 
Table 4.3: Full-sample connectedness for subrogated CDS 
 
Notes:  GER, FRA, ITA, SPA, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland 
respectively CMB SUB, DB SUB, BNP SUB, SGEN SUB, ISP SUB, UNI SUB, SAN SUB, BBVA SUB, BES 
SUB, BCP SUB, BOI SUB, AIB SUB stand for subrogated CDS for Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, BNP 
Paribas, Societe Generale, Intesa San Paolo, Unicredito, Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, 
Banco Espirito Santo, BCP, Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank. 
 
As can be seen, the diagonal elements (own connectedness) are the largest 
individual elements in the tables, but total directional connectedness (from others 
or to others) tends to be much larger for both banks and sovereigns.  
GER CMB SNR DB SNR FRA BNP SNR SGEN SNR ITA ISP SNR UNI SNR SPA SAN SNR BBVA SNR POR BES SNR BCPSNR IRE BOI SNR AIBSNR
Contribution
From Others
GER 20.4603 4.7301 4.5182 12.2666 6.6317 6.6314 8.2766 5.3162 5.6580 3.1234 6.2735 6.1966 2.9160 0.7722 1.0346 4.5265 0.5318 0.1362 79.5397
CMB SNR 4.6800 13.5396 5.7271 6.6549 9.2014 8.2286 6.6858 7.4859 8.7482 1.7605 9.1905 8.7908 2.5327 1.5924 1.8251 2.7168 0.6187 0.0211 86.4604
DB SNR 7.5405 7.7660 20.9839 6.2413 6.1046 5.9420 5.0538 4.5534 5.2607 3.0692 7.4675 6.5947 2.7041 2.8664 2.7129 3.9477 1.1665 0.0247 79.0161
FRA 9.5280 5.4233 2.9758 17.0165 8.1613 7.4531 10.1516 6.1698 6.2929 2.4798 7.2821 7.3786 3.4215 0.9334 0.9933 3.7232 0.4700 0.1458 82.9835
BNP SNR 5.3129 7.9046 3.4902 8.2522 12.4400 10.1791 8.5387 7.9522 8.2225 1.8335 8.9115 9.1909 2.7388 0.8385 1.1437 2.3957 0.6320 0.0231 87.5600
SGEN SNR 5.1039 7.8541 3.3357 8.2215 11.2022 12.8059 8.0539 7.8198 7.9030 2.2217 8.7033 8.7393 2.7086 0.9410 1.2139 2.5363 0.6308 0.0051 87.1941
ITA 5.8543 5.5231 2.4905 8.3142 7.1362 6.9356 16.0414 7.2365 6.9304 4.3044 8.2331 8.2512 4.4154 1.2279 1.7881 4.8277 0.4815 0.0084 83.9586
ISP SNR 3.9734 7.1193 2.6533 6.7437 8.7562 7.9030 8.7749 12.4902 11.1327 2.0725 10.2053 10.0718 2.5442 1.1485 1.4273 2.5275 0.4414 0.0148 87.5098
UNI SNR 4.0973 7.1624 2.7762 6.5120 8.6807 7.7739 8.5662 10.7837 14.1188 1.7192 9.9519 9.7082 2.2046 1.3628 1.4545 2.6229 0.4844 0.0204 85.8812
SPA 3.4823 3.8928 2.2785 4.1390 4.3730 4.5415 9.0174 5.1689 4.1541 25.8566 8.7410 9.3592 4.6907 1.6305 2.0111 5.5859 0.9623 0.1153 74.1434
SAN SNR 3.5856 6.9621 3.5652 6.2096 7.8449 7.1486 7.1862 8.4502 7.6625 3.3551 14.7021 13.4474 2.8503 1.6093 1.7762 3.0504 0.5722 0.0219 85.2979
BBVA SNR 3.4775 6.7722 3.4461 6.1961 8.0023 7.0589 7.4299 8.2827 7.4969 3.4891 13.4255 14.7099 3.0303 1.7310 1.7837 3.1233 0.5236 0.0211 85.2901
POR 3.8746 4.6174 2.0288 6.8361 5.5850 5.7133 8.0393 7.0407 4.3339 3.8201 5.7619 7.0415 21.1986 1.6633 1.9387 8.9360 1.3061 0.2646 78.8014
BES SNR 1.8333 4.1420 4.2586 3.2595 4.7497 4.7238 5.0417 5.7836 5.0103 2.8383 7.5279 7.6683 4.6257 22.4666 10.1161 4.0926 1.3927 0.4691 77.5334
BCPSNR 2.4820 4.2069 3.5851 3.6575 5.8990 5.3910 6.4464 5.6719 4.6459 2.4321 7.6338 7.5582 4.4651 9.5228 19.7408 5.0432 1.5550 0.0632 80.2592
IRE 4.6511 4.1258 2.8575 6.7139 4.0717 4.6030 8.3323 5.3591 4.6384 4.3414 5.9387 6.7588 8.6356 1.4782 2.7600 21.5681 2.1096 1.0568 78.4319
BOI SNR 1.3896 1.8726 1.8443 1.8526 2.2860 2.2927 1.5456 1.7985 2.2605 1.0519 3.7763 2.6962 2.9545 1.9308 1.9964 6.6524 61.7556 0.0434 38.2444
AIBSNR 0.4100 1.1071 0.5371 0.4618 0.1449 0.3005 2.2878 1.4807 0.8945 0.9142 1.2361 1.0466 5.5833 0.9124 2.7982 7.5400 0.2970 72.0477 27.9523
Contribution
To Others
77.6967 87.0708 71.3929 85.7661 89.7420 88.9247 88.1587 89.4902 87.7616 63.4189 89.8580 89.8698 74.8295 58.8736 66.2636 77.3957 18.6688 3.2950 77.0032
Net Contribution
(To-From)  Others
-1.8430 0.6104 -7.6231 82.9835 2.1820 1.7306 4.2001 1.9805 1.8803 -10.7244 4.5600 4.5797 -3.9719 -18.6598 -13.9956 -1.0361 -19.5756 -24.6573
GER CMB SUB DB SUB FRA BNP SUB SGEN SUB ITA ISP SUB UNI SUB SPA SAN SUB BBVA SUB POR BES SUB BCP SUB IRE BOI SUB AIB SUB
Contribution
From Others
GER 22,8148 4,9836 5,4796 12,7287 5,8190 6,4945 8,2236 5,1067 5,0405 3,1703 5,7658 5,3766 2,9721 0,3564 0,8661 4,6520 0,1239 0,0258 77,1852
CMB SUB 5,4661 13,6752 8,3104 7,1581 8,3926 8,7977 5,7990 7,6375 8,7495 1,4828 8,4180 8,4281 2,0946 1,3097 1,8295 2,1701 0,1908 0,0902 86,3248
DB SUB 6,7750 8,4739 13,0819 6,8296 7,7474 8,6296 6,2122 7,4815 8,3135 1,9006 8,4613 8,5406 2,3334 0,6554 1,7213 2,6114 0,1670 0,0644 86,9181
FRA 10,9069 4,8748 4,9930 17,6803 7,0206 7,2456 10,0402 5,7750 6,0303 2,3307 6,6664 7,2381 3,6882 0,4319 1,2714 3,7473 0,0317 0,0276 82,3197
BNP SUB 5,5779 6,8785 7,1084 7,8456 11,9440 10,8052 7,5863 7,7812 8,4978 2,1457 8,3758 8,4985 2,5396 0,5174 1,3882 2,3281 0,0900 0,0918 88,0560
SGEN SUB 5,2434 6,8828 7,2104 7,7833 9,9351 13,4237 7,3816 7,4408 8,2999 2,4410 8,4506 8,1520 2,9011 0,5029 1,1917 2,4654 0,1086 0,1856 86,5763
ITA 6,6411 4,5032 5,0285 8,6464 6,8740 7,1915 16,7943 6,7298 6,4942 4,4013 7,4571 7,7699 4,6947 0,5110 1,6894 4,4997 0,0600 0,0140 83,2057
ISP SUB 4,9335 6,8813 6,7438 6,7826 7,9181 8,3965 8,3602 11,0018 10,5159 2,0631 9,3496 9,2958 2,9278 0,6347 1,5402 2,4577 0,1759 0,0214 88,9982
UNI SUB 5,3253 6,6565 6,6331 6,6733 7,6827 8,5480 7,7472 8,9140 13,4510 2,0595 9,2858 9,1798 2,7242 0,7386 1,6301 2,5714 0,1624 0,0170 86,5490
SPA 3,5291 3,0917 3,4458 3,9693 4,7232 5,1144 8,9970 5,5415 4,3496 28,1018 7,3168 8,1631 4,6332 1,3699 1,9882 5,4481 0,1007 0,1165 71,8982
SAN SUB 4,6589 6,6648 6,6298 6,2588 6,8882 7,5208 7,1453 7,2006 7,8317 3,2723 14,1260 12,6819 3,1255 0,9880 2,0181 2,7724 0,1005 0,1166 85,8740
BBVA SUB 4,3304 6,3322 6,2278 6,6862 6,9892 7,1337 7,2699 7,2208 7,6600 3,5163 12,4656 14,7905 3,2898 1,1816 1,8094 2,9204 0,0526 0,1237 85,2095
POR 4,2428 4,3034 4,0229 6,9069 5,5085 6,2601 7,2419 7,0122 5,0738 3,5714 6,1238 6,8479 20,3210 1,3835 1,7280 9,0569 0,2548 0,1401 79,6790
BES SUB 2,2938 5,8290 3,9516 3,0160 3,6596 4,0079 3,5001 4,8284 4,5097 3,3377 6,7024 7,2492 4,0226 31,3668 7,4895 3,8248 0,3594 0,0517 68,6332
BCP SUB 3,0532 5,3040 4,5440 3,3644 3,8852 5,6002 4,9058 5,1271 4,6873 3,0327 6,5202 6,9682 4,2823 9,1105 22,5750 5,6206 1,2884 0,1309 77,4250
IRE 5,5142 3,3643 3,5819 6,9413 4,0255 5,1551 6,9572 4,9896 4,6594 4,2805 5,2447 6,1949 9,1836 1,3735 2,9773 24,0712 0,2489 1,2369 75,9288
BOI SUB 1,4621 1,0148 2,3669 0,3930 0,0908 0,8762 0,1564 1,1861 1,7918 0,0275 1,6338 1,4569 2,0044 1,3051 2,7045 3,5833 76,9325 1,0140 23,0675
AIB SUB 0,3761 1,0692 0,8030 0,4775 1,4877 1,9347 0,7853 0,6976 0,7731 0,5110 0,7130 0,8846 0,8907 0,0995 0,2072 0,9949 5,6826 81,6122 18,3878
Contribution
To Others
77,8807 86,4311 86,9394 85,2837 89,1999 89,0985 86,5757 90,1481 88,4768 60,7769 89,3851 89,2602 74,1558 41,7368 60,1324 71,9436 10,6795 4,0764 75,1242
Net Contribution
(To-From)  Others
0,6956 0,1063 0,0213 82,3197 1,1439 2,5221 3,3700 1,1499 1,9277 -11,1212 3,5111 4,0507 -5,5232 -26,8965 -17,2925 -3,9852 -12,3880 -14,3114
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Regarding pair-wise directional connectedness (the off-diagonal elements of the 
upper-left 11 × 11 submatrix), the highest observed pair-wise connectedness is 
from BBVA to Santander, and vice versa. In general, the highest value of pair-
wise directional connectedness is amongst banks of the same country (ISP and 
UNI, Santander and BBVA, BNP and SocGen), a sign that, for the whole sample, 
financial fragmentation in the Eurozone was an issue. 
The total directional connectedness from others is highest in Italian, French and 
Spanish banks. As for the direction connectedness to others, it is also highest in 
these banks, led by Santander, ISP and BNP, although closely followed by the 
Italian sovereign. 
Finally, for the countries involved, we obtain that connectedness is usually higher 
amongst countries (this is true of Germany, France, Italy and Spain, whose 
highest connectors, both in to and from connectedness are other countries), than 
between countries and banks. However, in the case of the two bailed out 
countries that received a full sovereign bailout (Portugal and Ireland), the highest 
connectedness is with their own banks. 
4.2.4 Sub sample approach  
The full-sample connectedness analysis provides a good characterization of 
“unconditional” aspects of the connectedness measures. However, it does not 
help us to understand the connectedness dynamics. This section presents an 
analysis of connectedness in each of the subperiods identified.  
The dynamic connectedness analysis starts with total connectedness, and then 
moves on to net directional connectedness across countries in Section 3. 
4.2.4.1. Total connectedness 
As can be seen in Figure 4.1, total connectedness changed abruptly in the 
subsamples studied. In particular, total connectedness declined as market 
turbulences deepened, and only slowed down in superiod 5, after Draghi´ 
whatever it takes speech and the implementation of the OMTs. In subperiod 6, 
possibly related to the Greek bailout, total connectedness declined slightly again. 
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Figure 4.1: Net pair-wise directional connectedness during the five sub-periods 
after breakpoint 
Sub-period 1: 12/30/2008 to 03/18/2009 
 
Sub-period 2: 03/19/2009 
to 04/22/2010  
 
Sub-period 3: 04/23/2010 to 10/07/2011 
 
Sub-period 4: 10/08/2011 
to 07/26/2012 
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Sub-period 5: 07/27/2012 to 03/23/2013 
 
Sub-period 6: 03/24/2013 to 12/08/2014 
 
Notes: We show the most important directional connections among the 55 pairs of the 10-year bond yields 
under study. Black, red and orange links (black, grey and light grey when viewed in grayscale) correspond 
to the tenth, twentieth and thirtieth percentiles of all net pair-wise directional connections. GER, FRA, ITA, 
SPA, POR and IRE stand for Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and Ireland respectively.  BBVA SNR, 
SANSNR, UNISNR, ISPSNR, SGEN SNR, BNP SNR, DBSNR, CMB SNR, AIB SNR, BOI SNR, BCP SNR 
and BES SNR stand for senior CDS for Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, Santander, Unicredito, Intesa San 
Paolo, Societe Generale, BNP Paribas, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, Allied Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, 
BCP and Banco Espirito Santo 
 
The first sub-period (1), which spans from December 2008 to march 2009, can 
still be defined as a pre-crisis period, since the downtrend in the total level of 
connectedness in euro area sovereign debt markets is suddenly reversed. 
However, during in the following sub-periods the downtrend in connectivity 
deepens. Indeed, sub-period 3– from April 2010 to October 2011 – was a time of 
turbulence in EMU sovereign debt markets: rescue packages were lent to Greece 
(May 2010), Ireland (November 2010) and Portugal (April 2011), and at the end 
of it (August 2011) the European Central Bank (ECB) announced its second 
covered bond purchase program. As noted, the uncertainty continued in 
European debt markets during sub-period 4 (August 2011 - July 2012). During 
this phase, Italy was in the middle of a political crisis and the main rating agencies 
lowered the ratings not only of peripheral countries but of Austria and France as 
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well. In this context of financial distress and huge liquidity problems, the ECB 
responded by implementing nonstandard monetary policies – that is, policies that 
went further than setting the refinancing rate. In particular, the ECB’s principal 
means of intervention were the so-called long term refinancing operations 
(LTRO) 3. In November 2011 and March 2012, the ECB provided banks with a 
sum close to 500 billion Euros for a three-year period. However, in March 2012 
the second rescue package to Greece was approved, and in June 2012 Spain 
requested financial assistance to recapitalize its banking sector. This was the 
backdrop to the ECB’s President Mario Draghi’s statement that he would do 
“whatever it takes to preserve the euro”. Sub-period 5, which starts after that 
statement in July 2012, clearly reflects the healing effects of Draghi’s words since 
a substantial increase in the level of total connectedness can be observed in EMU 
sovereign debt markets. Nonetheless, our indicator definitely registered a new 
slowdown in March 2013, when Cyprus requested financial support. Therefore, 
the last sub-period (6) spans from that date to the end of the sample (December 
2014). 
 
4.3. Net pair-wise directional connectedness  
Connectedness rose and then fell. It peaked when ‘whatever it takes’ was 
announced, thanks exclusively to a rise in the bank sovereign connectedness. 
However, this was not driven by a rise in the connectedness between periphery 
banks and sovereign. The sovereign connectedness rose in the period prior to 
‘whatever it takes’, partly driven by a rise in the bank-sovereign connectedness 
(Figure 4.2). 
                                                          
3 When the crisis struck, big central banks like the US Federal Reserve slashed their overnight interest-rates in order 
to boost the economy. However, even cutting the rate as far as it could go (to almost zero) failed to spark recovery. 
The Fed then began experimenting with other tools to encourage banks to pump money into the economy. One of 
them was Quantitative Easing (QE). To carry out QE, central banks create money by buying securities, such as 
government bonds, from banks, with electronic cash that did not exist before. The new money swells the size of bank 
reserves in the economy by the quantity of assets purchased—hence “quantitative” easing. In the euro area, the 
principal means of intervention adopted by the ECB was the LTRO, which differed notably from the QE policies of the 
Federal Reserve, in which the Fed purchased assets outright rather than helping to fund banks’ ability to purchase 
them. The LTRO is not the only non-standard monetary policy to have been implemented by the ECB since the crisis. 
Other measures were the narrowing of the corridor, the change in eligibility criteria for collateral, interventions in the 
covered bonds market and, most importantly, the ECB’s launch of the security market program in 2010 involving 
interventions in the secondary sovereign bond market. The latter program was discontinued in 2011. 
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Figure 4.2: Net direction connectedness from Germany to Italy, France and 
Spain 
 
Source: author´s calculations 
In particular, while the number of significant pairwise connectedness rose from 
33 (subperiod 1) to 87 (subperiod 5), this was mainly driven by an increase in the 
bank-sovereign connectedness in period 5.  Also, note that there is a rise in 
connectivity amongst peripheral countries that recedes in the last period, a sign 
that investors start to differentiate amongst specific countries in the periphery, 
given the differences in their stress levels. 
Finally, a measure of the disconnect between the periphery and Germany (which 
we consider a safe asset throughout the period) may give an indication of the 
level of transfer of risk between the stressed Eurozone countries and the 
periphery. This transfer of risk can be considered an indication of the resilience 
of the Eurozone. Note for instance that in the case of Italy, net  directional 
connectedness with Germany turned negative as soon as stress started (in 
particular, periods 4 and 5, meaning that instead of Germany anchoring Italian 
CDS, Italian CDS were driving German CDS higher), however, it recovered in 
subperiod 5, in the wake of ‘whatever it takes’, and then worsened, although 
slightly, in period 6, when some worries about specific periphery countries 
resurfaced. The results for the Spanish CDS are similar. 
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4.4. Policy implications 
The indicator developed in the above sections has a number of implications for 
policy. In this section, we use the results from the previous section to shed light 
on three aspects that have been debated in the academic and policy literature. 
First, the change in the direction of the spillovers from sovereigns to own country 
banks. Secondly, we show the difficulty in regulating SIFIs in normal times, as 
institutions that may not seem SIFIs in normal times can become systemic in 
times of stress. Finally, we analyse how connectedness between sovereigns and 
own country banks has strengthened over time, and test two usual determinants: 
global risk aversion or the increase in the demand for sovereign bonds. 
4.4.1. bank-sovereign connectedness 
Acharya (2009) and others show that bank bailout programmers implemented in 
2008 led to a change in the risk transfer between sovereigns and banks: before 
the bailouts, the sovereigns transferred risk to the banks, but once the market 
perceived there was a blanket guarantee from the sovereigns to the banks, the 
directions of causality was the opposite, with the banks being net issuers of stress 
to the sovereigns, and the latter going from being net issuers to net receivers. 
This result has been confirmed by others like Erce (2013).  
Figure 4.3 shows the net issue of stress for each bank in the sample to its 
sovereign: in most cases banks went from being net receivers of risk to being net 
senders of risk from their sovereigns, which is consistent with the hypothesis 
mentioned above. This was particularly true in period 5, although in some cases, 
in core countries like France the process started in period 3. What´s more, Figure 
4.3 suggests a relatively similar trend for the banks in a given country, which may 
be a sign that the connectivity with the sovereign is a function of policies 
implemented by the latter. This is in line with the finding that the bailouts of the 
banking sector effectively transferred their risk to their sovereign. 
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Figure 4.3: Net issuance of connectedness from banks to own sovereign  
 
Source: author´s calculations 
4.4.2. Systemically important financial institution (SIFI) status  
Another aspect that may be analysed in this framework is whether the Basel III 
SIFI regulation is appropriate in preparing the banking system for a future 
downturn. The regulation identifies firms that may have a negative externality on 
the system because of the systemicity. The interconnectedness of the firms with 
the system is a key ingredient of SIFI status. As a result, firms that qualify as 
SIFIs are required to hold extra capital, so as to make the failure of one of these 
banks, which is deemed particularly costly from a social perspective, less likely.  
We test the regulation in three ways, although the robustness of the relationships 
are limited by the short sample of banks that are both included in our exercise 
and the data made available under regulatory disclosures. First, we compare the 
total exposures, the key indicator of systemicity, with a firm`s connectedness with 
the system: this will test whether exposure based indicators of systemicity are 
good indicators of actual contributions to systemic risk. Secondly, we compare 
the contribution to systemic risk to the SIFI capital surcharge that firms are 
subjected to. Finally, we run a simulation, where we show that even for a firm that 
the systemic contribution in the crisis was rather low, the prevalence of shocks is 
such that there is a high probability that its contribution to global risk may be larger 
than that of a SIFI. 
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Figure 4.4 displays the relationship between the systemic impact and total 
exposures of the entities. In normal times or in the initial phase of the crisis, there 
is a positive relationship, such that the banks with a larger exposure are the ones 
considered more systemic, and so the ones holding more capital on this account. 
While there are some divergences, overall, the result points to the fact that the 
more systemic institutions are the ones that have to hold more capital, meaning 
that, overall, SIFI regulation is well targeted.  
After a few years of the crisis and after the broad declines in the connectivity of 
institutions (e.g. the period 6), the relationship between total exposures and the 
systemic capital surcharge changes completely: the total exposure is no longer a 
good predictor of connectivity. Note that the R2 is low even when an apparent 
outlier is taken out of the simple. Therefore, the current regulation of SIFIs might 
not be appropriate in times of crisis, when a relatively small bank can have 
systemic consequences once crisis mode sets in and the systemic impact 
becomes less related to bank exposures.   
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Figure 4.4: Total bank exposures (Mln Euros) and connectedness 
 
 
 
Source: author´s calculations 
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These results suggest that the changing nature of connectivity makes the ex-ante 
determination of which bank is systemic difficult. In other to further research this 
point we compare the impact on financial system stress of a given institution 
during the global financial crisis with the capital surcharge that is meant to 
internalize the costs of the contribution to systemic stress (Table 4.4). 
Table 4.4. CDS: baseline and stressed scenario 
 
Initial CDS is the CDS value in the first period, while stressed CDS is the maximum value attained. The % of stress 
caused by a banks results of the calculation and normalization of our connectedness results for each bank with the 
whole system. 
 
Secondly, we calculate the additional capital that Basel III regulation requires 
SIFIs to hold on accounts of their systemicity (Table 4.5). 
  
Initial CDS
Stressed 
CDS
% of stress 
caused by 
banks
CMB SNR 86,5 361,8 9,9
DB SNR 101,078189 186,79 6,7
BNP SNR 70,5 354,24 10,1
SGEN SNR 107,5 426,2 10,0
ISP SNR 112 607,89 10,2
UNI SNR 124 678,31 10,2
SAN SNR 103 490 10,1
BBVA SNR 99 513,5 10,1
BES SNR 94 1277,02 8,1
BCP SNR 104 1878,54 8,9
BOI SNR 245 2218,702 5,0
AIB SNR 206 19483,279 0,8
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Table 4.5. Capital requirements (Mln Euros) and systemic capital surcharge 
 
Source: European Banking Authority, 2015. 
As Figure 4.5 illustrates, firms that had a substantial systemic impact on stress 
will not be considered systemic, while other with a similar impact will be 
considered systemic.  
Figure 4.5: Systemic capital requirement and contribution to systemic stress (%) 
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The above analysis shows that first, the institutions that have a systemic impact 
in stress may be different to those in normal times, and, secondly, the current 
SIFI systemic capital requirement regulation would treat firms that in 2008 had a 
similar systemic impact differently. The question that emerges is whether there 
can be indicators that can be more reliable. 
In order to answer this question, we run a simulation to test the circumstances 
under which a non-systemic institution may become systemic. In order to do this, 
we test the probability of systemic stress of a not SIFI is superior to a SIFI 
systemic stress.   
We analyze two firms: BOI and Unicredito. The first generates 5.5% of the stress 
of the system, the second a 10.15%, as measured by our systemic indicator. The 
first is not SIFI according to the classification used by Basel III, the second is.  In 
this case, one could argue that this classification is correct, given the large 
difference in their contribution to systemic risk. However, even in such cases, the 
systemic contribution is similar enough that the possibility of a shocks that is large 
enough to Unicredito cannot be ruled out. 
We assume that an increase in the CDS of Unicredito of 1% increases on average 
the CDS from the system in 0,1015% (the CDS of the system being a synthetic 
measure of system-wide risk). In the second case this figure is 0,055%. This is 
the interpretation of the result that 5.5% of the stress of the system is because 
BOI-10.15% to UNI (Table 4.6). 
 
Table 4.6: System CDS 
 
Source: author´s calculations 
 
Where start and end are the system risk before each bank is shocked and finish 
system risk after a shock to each of the banks studied. In one case and another, 
to shock: a worsening of the BOI CDS increases the system CDS 5 and UNI CDS 
1% shock Start Finish
to BOI 100 105
to UNI 100 110
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increased increases the CDS from the system by 10%, in line with the results 
obtained previously.   
We assume that the BOI and UNI CDS that generated this increased systemic 
risk are subject to a large number of shocks, with the probability distribution of 
each shock corresponding to the historical probability distribution of the shock to 
the average CDS. From this distribution, we can obtain the probability that BOI 
suffers a shock such that their CDS contributes to the system more than the 
shock from UNI.  
Figure 4.6 presents the systemic contribution of each of the banks, when 
subjected to shocks. The probability distribution of a given shock (shown here as 
a certain contribution to system risk) is shown in the chart. As can be seen in the 
graph, there is a 45% chance of that contribution to systemic risk of BOI is greater 
than the Unicredito. Where start and end are the CDS of the system in one case 
and another, to shock. This results from the fact that while in the central scenario 
the shock to BOI is less systemic than the shock to Unicredito, the stardad 
deviation of BOI shocks is so large that one cannot rule out a shock that is so 
large that its systemic impact is larger than that of Unicredito. 
Figure 4.6: Systemic contribution of the CDS of Bank of Ireland and Unicredit 
(basis points) under scenarios weighted by the probability of ocurring 
 
 
Source: author´s calculations 
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This exercise shows that even banks that a priori have a very different systemic 
importance, can be subject to shocks such that, with a probability close to 50%, 
the non-systemic institution has more systemic impact than the a priori systemic 
institution. This is due to the large differences in the probability distribution of the 
shocks: in this case, BOI has a much large standard deviation, which results in a 
different frequency distribution of the shocks (Figure 4.7). 
 
Figure 4.7: Frequency distribution of 1000 draws of the BOI (right axis) and UNI 
CDS (draws taken using the historical average and standard deviation distribution 
of shocks) 
 
Source: author´s calculations 
 
The difficulty in determining ex-ante the systemic institution, as shown in the 
examples above, can be taken as evidence that a non-systematic approach to 
SIFI may be warranted. Alternatively, the focus can be set on swift bank 
resolution rather than the ex-ante determination of which institutions are 
systemic. The difficulties of this approach have already been highlighted by Chen 
(2010), and Brownlees (2011). 
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4.4.3. The role of sovereign debt holdings in sovereign-bank connectedness 
Finally, an aspect that our indicator can help us shed light on is the role of home 
bias. Much has been written about the retrenchment of capital in crisis times. 
Some have argued that this retrenchment, articulated through banks´ increased 
holdings of sovereign bonds, is at the root of the reinforcement of the bank-
sovereign nexus, which is costly in that it creates an inefficient allocation of 
resources and that it leads to perverse incentives (Uhlig, 2014; Broner, 2013). 
In order to test this, we compare our connectedness indicator, which can be 
considered an indicator of market perception of sovereign-bank connectedness, 
and actual holdings of government bonds. 
As Figure 4.8 shows, there does not seem to be a clear relationship between the 
holdings of sovereign debt and the connectivity with its own bank. As can be seen 
in the chart, the holdings of sovereign bonds seem to follow a rising path, while 
connectivity between Banks and sovereigns peaks around 2013. This suggests 
that there could be other driving forces of connectedness. For instance, the 
absence of a lender of last resort could reinforce the nexus. In this light, the ability 
of the ECB to quell stress in the 2013-2014 (and its lack of intervention in the 
early stages of the crisis), thus reducing the perceived probability of default, may 
be a more robust explanation. 
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Figure 4.8 Domestic bond holdings (orange line, million EUR) and sovereign-
bank connectivity (blue line, right axis) 
 
Source: author´s calculations, European Banking Authority 
 
Indeed, the driver of connectedness could be volatility or the deterioration in 
sovereign solvency conditions: to the extent that banks and sovereigns become 
healthier, the probability of a bank rescue that leads to the bankruptcy of both the 
bank and the sovereign becomes lower. As can be seen in Figure 4.9, 
connectedness is more correlated with country stress indicators (in this case, the 
CDS), than with domestic bond holdings. 
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Figure 4.9: Correlation coefficient, sovereign-bank connectivity with sovereign 
CDS level and domestic bond holdings 
 
Source: author´s calculations 
 
Figure 4.10: Sovereign CDS, selected Eurozone countries (basis points) 
 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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4.5. Concluding remarks. 
The analysis above sheds light on interconnectedness across banks and 
sovereigns in the Eurozone. The results show the importance of the links both 
between banks and sovereigns and across sovereign in determining the 
developments in sovereign risk. The main takeaways are, first, the role played by 
the transmission of risk between core and periphery countries, and secondly, the 
changing importance of banks in relation to their own sovereign. It is important to 
note that even when controlling for bank CDS, the pattern between core and 
periphery remains similar to those of other studies (like Singh et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, the elaboration of a connectedness indicator shows, first, the 
difficulty involved in determining ex-ante the systemic impact of banks. Second, 
it suggests that the link between banks and sovereigns is probably more related 
to stress in the sovereign than to other factors, like increased bank holdings of 
sovereign debt. 
From a policy perspective, the main takeaways, are, therefore, that the 
characterization of the EMU sovereign debt crisis as a crisis of confidence in the 
Eurozone is appropriate, but this was solved by upgrading the role of the ECB in 
this context. Secondly, in a more pessimistic note, while our results show that 
bank stress can be quite significant in determining sovereign stress, they suggest 
that it is difficult to determine which banks are systemic, and as a result, require 
higher capital for these institutions, which in turn should minimise their negative 
impact on sovereign risk.  
One way of dealing with this uncertainty is to deepen the current workings of the 
EMU. By creating a true banking union, the nexus between a bank and its own 
sovereign should decline. Secondly, the difficulty in assessing systemicity calls 
for a quick, structured framework for bank resolution after a crisis. Assuring that 
resolution authorities have the resources and the mandate to tackle issues from 
wherever they might arise can be essential, given the difficulties in understanding 
the origins of systemic risk. 
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Conclusions: Main findings and policy implications 
This section summarises the main conclussions from the analysis that have 
carried out throught the thesis and the main policy implications that derive from 
them. 
This thesis has studied the developments in the Eurozone from different 
perspectives. A key takeaway from the previous chapters regards the limits of 
fiscal policy in the context of a single currency struck by a financial crisis. In such 
a setting, a previously sound fiscal position can spiral out of control quickly. Some 
main questions also emerge from our analysis. 
Given the issues associated with a currency union, it is essential to build up sound 
institutions and political room for maneuver. The growth and inflation environment 
emerge from the first paper as a key driver of fiscal policy in distressed times. In 
particular, it seems pre-existing policies may help a government deliver during 
stress. Also, slower growth can have a higher impact on debt sustainability than 
one would expect. 
A key consequence of this is that fiscal policy can become quickly constraint. 
When one adds the possibility that interest rates rise non-linearly when debt 
sustainability is in question, the ability of fiscal policy to adjust so as to make debt 
sustainable will be limited. In addition, a new angle regarding contractionary fiscal 
policy can be found in this first chapter: aside from the worsening of growth due 
to the fiscal consolidation in a recession, the fact that the government balance 
reacts more than one-to-one to growth suggests debt dynamics will worsen 
further. 
In our view, these results suggest two avenues to avoid distress: first, a good 
starting position not just in terms of the fiscal stance, but also in terms of the 
institutional make up. The flexibility afforded by this position will be essential in 
the downturn. A possible avenue for further research would analyze how the 
interaction of sound policies and fiscal room help debt dynamics by helping 
countries avoid fiscal fatigue.  
Second, once financial stress sets in, the dynamics that emerge may have 
different implications and drivers than would seem apparent at first sight. In 
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particular, the rise in the holdings of sovereign bonds, considered generally as a 
destabilizing factor in the downturn that deepens the credit crunch may not have 
been as negative.  
In particular, the evidence we find suggests banks increase in holdings of 
sovereign domestic debt only in specific periods of times. In addition, the 
stabilization of a distressed sovereign was probably the driver of the rise in 
holdings. Our analysis suggests alternative hypotheses, such as search for yield 
or regulatory incentives did not quite play a role in the build up of sovereign bonds. 
Further research is therefore required to understand the overall welfare 
implications of the 0 risk weight: aside from the negative implications regarding 
the sovereign-bank nexus and the bias of banks away from other investment 
opportunities, banks may act as stabilizers in sovereign debt markets, while 
sovereign bonds, in turn, provide banks with a liquid, risk-free asset that avoids 
worsening the crisis. 
Indeed, the build up of sovereign holdings did not play a major role in the 
connectivity between banks and sovereigns. We find distress in the sovereign is 
much better correlated than holdings with connectivity amongst these two 
entities.  
Given the limits to active contractiony fiscal policy in the downturn, and the fact 
that sovereign stress leads to negative dynamics such as the reinforcement of 
the bank sovereign nexus and renders countercyclical fiscal policy more difficult, 
greater emphasis should be placed in other policy levers or on those levers that 
may accommodate the fiscal expansion. 
An important research question regards the use of alternative policy levers during 
a downturn. In particular, the expansionary effects of monetary policy may be 
enhanced to the extent that it is used to lower financial fragmentation. Other 
levers, such a countercyclical prudential policy may be appropriate. To the extent 
that bank profitability shocks may lead to more switches in bank demand towards 
sovereign bonds (like those found, for small periods, in the third chapter), lower 
capital requirements may boost lending to the private sector. However, such a 
policy has limits: if by reducing capital buffers investors perceive that banks are 
weak, such banks will come under pressure, which could, as a result, enhance 
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the sovereign-bank nexus and deliver a worse outcome. Understanding the 
appropriate policy mix in a downturn, given that fiscal policy could be constraint, 
requires a deep understanding of the determinants of bank-sovereign nexus and 
can be subject of fruitful further research. 
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